\ 



The Influence of Grenville 



ON 



PITT'S Foreign Policy 

1787-1798 



THE 



INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE 



¥3 S 



ON 



PITT'S FOREIGN POLICY 



1787-1798 



BY 



EPHRAIM DOUGLASS ADAMS 

OF I,EI,AND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY 




PUBLISHED BY THE CARNEGIE INSTITUTION OF WASHINGTON 

1904 




■p4 ft ^ 



Carnegie Institution of Washington 

PUBLICATION No. 13 



PAPERS OF THE BUREAU OF HISTORICAL RESEARCH 
ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, EDITOR 

Gift 
4 F'05 



JUDD & DETWRII^BR, PRINTERS 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 



/:i.. 



THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT'S 
FOREIGN POLICY, 1787-1798. 



INTRODUCTION. 



In discussing the course of tlie English government during the wars 
of the French Revolution it has been the custom of historians to credit 
Pitt with responsibility for the initiation and adoption of each specific 
point of Knglish policy. Pitt, it is said, was the head of the English 
government and the English government was Pitt. In minor matters 
he might defer to his colleagues, but in greater questions of policy his 
will was supreme and his decision final. In short histories of the 
period such extreme statements may be excused by the necessity for 
concise writing, but the tendency to overestimate the importance of 
4tt is found also in more extended accounts. It amounts very nearly 
CO an assertion of despotic control by the chief minister and of an 
entire subordination of the other members of the Cabinet. 

In fact, however, Pitt's Cabinet was so organized as to preclude the J 
absolutism of one man. It consisted not of the chief supporters of 
one fixed line of policy, as is the case today, but of a variety of ele- 
ments, all of which it was necessary to harmonize by concession and 
compromise. At least two of the members of the Cabinet, Dundas and 
Grenville, asserted their authority in their own departments, and were 
in consequence rather the fellow-ministers of Pitt than his executive 
agents. Contemporary opinion, indeed, credited Grenville with a 
greater influence upon the general policy of government and a more 
complete control of his own department than were exercised by any 
other of Pitt's colleagues. Lord Muncaster* is authority for Gren- 
ville' s independence in outlining foreign policy ; Lord Shefl&eld con- 
sidered Grenville's " head as a statesman • • • * to be at least as 
good as that of any of His Majesty's ministers," f and Count Woron- 
zow, the Russian ambassador, told Gouverneur Morris that Grenville 

* Stanhope, III, 4. f Auckland, III, 371. 

(3) 






4 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

was the strongest man in the English Cabinet.^- As less direct evidence 
may be cited Malmesbury's resume of the difficulties of temper experi- 
enced by Pitt and Grenville in their relations,! and Rose's testimony 
to the same effect. | Of a directly opposite character, but equally to 
the point, is the picture presented by Stanhope § of the friendship and 
intimacy existing between these ' ' two proud and sensitive natures 
when personal affection was not clouded b}^ differences of political 
opinion." 

In themselves, these and similar isolated assertions of Grenville's 
influence and of his intimacy with Pitt furnish insufficient proof of the 
important role sustained by Grenville in formulating English foreign 
policy during the French Revolution. That proof has been unex- 
pectedly supplied by the recent publication in England of the Dropmore 
manuscripts, embodying a very complete series of ' ' most private ' ' and 
' ' most secret ' ' letters between Grenville and English diplomats at 
foreign posts. It is the purpose of this article, by means of these manu- 
scripts, in connection with the principal memoirs of the time, and with 
the aid of some few primary authorities, to trace the development and 
extent of Grenville's influence in foreign policy up to the Napoleonic 
period. No attempt is here made to outline all of the important events 
of English diplomacy of the period. Only those episodes are described 
in which Grenville was an important factor, and these are treated in 
their chronological order ,y 



OCCASIONAL INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON FOREIGN POLICY. 

1787 TO April, 1791. 

William Wyndham Grenville entered upon his Parliamentar}'^ career 
in 1782, when but twenty-two 3-ears of age. His first official position 
was that of chief secretary to his elder brother, Earl Temple, then Lord 
Lieutenant of Ireland, and with Temple he resigned office in June, 1783, 
on the accession to power of the short-lived Coalition Ministry. In the 
July following, George III began those negotiations which in December 
resulted in Pitt's acceptance of the difficult task of forming a ministry- 
against the will of the majority of the House of Commons. In these 
negotiations Grenville had an intimate share, though less as an active 

"Morris, II, 95. 
tMalmesbury, III, 291^. 

i Rose, I, 4. Pitt is stated to have said, "I will teach tliat proud man [Gren- 
ville] that I can do without him." 
§ Stanhope, II, 122. 



OCCASIONAL INFLUENCE. 5 

agent than as an intermediary in the discussions between Pitt and 
Temple upon the policy of the prospective government and the make-up 
of the Cabinet.* Under Pitt's government as organized in December, 
1783, Grenville filled the position of Paymaster General, while other 
minor ofl&ces were held in succeeding years. The correspondence for 
this period as given in the Dropmore manuscripts shows very clearly 
that while Grenville was aiding his kinsman Pitt in every way, he was 
as yet essentially a subordinate. 

Grenville' s first service seems to have been the smoothing of difii- 
culties between Pitt and Temple, who had now become Marquis of 
Buckingham. His importance was, however, rapidly increasing, for 
the steadiness and caution of his judgment, the coolness of temper that 
marked his decisions, combined with a conciliatory manner, made him 
a valuable ally in the dailj^ Parliamentary battle. By 1786, though not 
a member of the Cabinet, he actually wielded an influence on the con- 
duct of public affairs greater than that of ostensibly more important 
members of the government."}" 

It was as an interlude in the routine of customary official duties that 
Grenville first undertook a diplomatic mission. In the spring of 1787 
affairs in Holland had reached a stage where it finally became necessary 
for Pitt to determine whether or not England should unite with Prussia 
in repelling the aggressive interference of France. Harris, the English 
diplomat at The Hague, had been insistent upon more forcible measures 
by England and more open assistance to the Stadtholder, but Pitt was 
as yet undecided. In his perplexity he determined to send Grenville as 
a trusted friend and adviser to report upon the situation in Holland. J 

That Pitt felt the utmost confidence in Grenville' s judgment is evinced 
by the letters passing between them at this juncture, § while the recog- 
nition in other quarters of the extent of Grenville' s influence is shown 
by the correspondence of Harris and others interested in upholding the 
Stadtholder.il 

Pitt gave Grenville a free hand in managing the details of the enter- 
prise. "If," he wrote in forwarding the draft of a memorial to Hol- 
land, "you find anything objectionable as it now stands, have no 

* A series of letters between Pitt, Grenville, and Temple. Dropmore, I, 214-220. 

tBurges, 68. 

t Malmesbury, II, 302-307, and Keith, II, 208-218. Grenville's mission was also 
undertaken for the effect it was likely to have in consolidating the party of the Stadt- 
holder in Holland. At the time it was considered that the strongest proof of the 
intention of the British government to act with vigor was *' the mission of Mr. 
Grenville, who was supposed to possess, and was known to deserve, the entire con- 
fidence of Mr. Pitt." History of the Late Revolution in the Dutch Republic, 193. 

§ Dropmore, III, 408^. 

II Letters between Grenville, Harris, and Bentinck. Ibid., 415, 416, 417, 422, 423' 



6 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

scruple to get Sir James Harris to change it in any manner you think 
safe, preserving the two general ideas I have just mentioned."* 
Grenville found conditions in Holland favorable to intervention and 
supported with energy the efforts of Harris. He was thus an active 
participant and agent in formulating those principles that resulted in 
the Triple Alliance of 1788, and heartily approved the spirited attitude 
assumed by the English government in its relations with France, f 
Grenville 's services at this crisis were not, however, concluded with 
the completion of his work in Holland. He returned to London in 
the middle of August, and the scene of diplomatic action was trans- 
ferred to Paris, where Eden and Goltz represented England and 
Prussia. Goltz reported to his government that Eden was not sup- 
porting him with energy in the demand made for a cessation of French 
interference in Holland, and this gave rise to a momentary impression 
at Berlin that England was not acting in good faith. Though Eden 
was anti-Prussian in his sympathies, the report was seemingly unjust 
to him, but it determined Pitt to send him a letter of reproof X and to 
hurry Grenville to Paris to take charge of the negotiations. Grenville 
went to Paris " to speak plain, because he [Eden] has not " § spoken 
plainly, and wrote to Buckingham, who disapproved of his acceptance 
of the undertaking, that "one of the difficulties on this subject was 
Eden's want of a competent knowledge of the points in dispute. • • • • 
Another, and perhaps not the least of the two, was the strong bent of 
his mind to admit the assertions of the French government, however 
unfounded, and to soften our communications in order to keep back a 
rupture • • • •." || Grenville set out for Paris on September 21, 
but before he arrived the rapid march of Prussian troops under 
the Duke of Brunswick had restored the Prince of Orange to his 
authority and nearly all of Pitt's demands were already satisfied. In 
these circumstances Pitt thought that England should ask a guaranty 
of non-interference from France, rather than enter upon stipulations 

*Pitt to Grenville, August 7, 1787. Dropmore, III, 414-415. 

f Couri and Cabinets, I, 319-339. 

j Smith MSS., p. 357 [Papers of Joseph Smith, private secretarj^ to Pitt after 
1787]. Eden was reported at Berlin to have stated in Paris that England was not 
interested in supporting Prussia's claims to satisfaction in Holland, but merely 
desired Prussian mediation. Pitt wrote to Eden, Sept. 8, 17S7 : " The report of it 
[this speech] may have produced the most serious and, in my opinion, irreparable 
consequences, if communications since made from hence have not fortunately 
arrived in time to counteract it." It is noteworthy, as illustrating the caution 
with which memoirs and letters compiled by interested partisans or relatives must 
be taken, that the portion of this letter containing Pitt's reproof is wholly omitted 
in the Auckland Correspondence without any indication of the elision. 

§ Buckingham to Grenville, Sept. 20, 1787. Dropmore, I, 283. 

II Grenville to Buckingham, Sept. 19, 1787. Court and Cabinets, I, 326-327. 



OCCASIONAL INFLUENCE. 7 

for a settlement in Holland.* Grenville opposed this, and wrote at 
length to Pitt, stating his reasons for preferring to any guaranty a 
silent acquiescence by France in the events in Holland. f Harris, the 
foremost manipulator for England in the intrigues at The Hague, 
strongly urged a guaranty, t while Eden, still friendly to France, 
thought the time was ripe for establishing an alliance between England, 
France, and Spain. § Before Grenville's letter could reach England, 
Pitt had come to a similar opinion in favor of silent acquiescence. || 

Grenville, having satisfied himself that France would accept such a 
settlement, asked and obtained leave to return to London, leaving the 
formal conclusion in the hands of Eden. Negotiations were closed 
October 27 by the signing at Paris of a declaration and counter- 
declaration, H in which the French government stated that it had not 
had and did not have any idea of interfering in Holland, and agreed 
with England to a disarmament. It was the exact result desired by 
Grenville. He had not brought Pitt to this conclusion, for both had 
separately reached the same opinion, but probably the incident still 
further increased the confidence felt by Pitt in Grenville's judgment. 
The letters between the two at this period are remarkable for their tone 
of sincere friendship and confidential intimacy. They are rather familiar 
letters of conference than diplomatic instructions, and are in marked 
contrast to the letters passing between Pitt and other diplomatic agents. 
Two days after Grenville left London on his journey to Paris, Pitt had 
written in regard to foreign complications : " Let me know what you 
think of all this. Even in these two days I feel no small difference in 
not being able to have your opinion on things as they arise. ' ' ** Harris, 
Eden, and others interested in these negotiations noted Grenville's 
aptitude for diplomacy, and were not slow to express their appreciation 
of his influence and their admiration for his intelligence. 

As yet, however, Grenville was not a member of the Cabinet, nor is 
it to be understood that he was always consulted on questions of for- 
eign policy. His activities were principally directed toward the details 
of Parliamentary management, and in January, 1789, his services in this 
field were rewarded by election to the speakership of the Commons. 
During the regency crisis of 1 788-1 789 Grenville vigorously supported 

* Pitt to Grenville, Sept. 23, 1787. Dropmore, III, 428. 
t Grenville to Pitt, Sept. 27, 1787. Ibid., 431. 
X Harris to Grenville, Oct. 5, 1787. Ibid., 437- 

§Bden to Grenville, Oct. 10 and Dec. 6, 1787. Ibid., 438, 440. Also Eden to 
Pitt, Oct. 10, 1787. Auckland, I, 219. 

II Pitt to Grenville, Sept. 28, 1787. Dropmore, III, 434. 
il For text see Parliamentary History, XXVI, 1264. 
**Pitt to Grenville, Sept. 23, 1787. Dropmore, III, 429. 



8 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PiTT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

Pitt in the determination to make no compromise with the opposition 
and was particularly efficient in influencing his brother, Buckingham, 
the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, to conduct affairs there in such a man- 
ner as not to embarrass the English ministry.* The occupancy of the 
speakership was brief, for on June 5, 1789, Addington became Speaker, 
while Grenville took up the position and duties of Secretary of State 
for the Home Department.! He was now a full-fledged member of the 
Cabinet, with an important department of public business within his 
own personal control, yet Pitt still found occasion to use him in con- 
nection with foreign complications. In the Nootka Sound controversy 
with Spain it was Grenville who corresponded directly with Bden, now 
become Baron Auckland, who was the English minister at The Hague, 
with the view to obtaining information from the Dutch as to the readi- 
ness of Spain and France for war and to securing Dutch assistance 
under the terms of the Triple Alliance. | 

Grenville' s intimate knowledge of details of foreign policy and the 
great degree of confidence reposed in him are brought out even more 
clearly in connection with another episode relating to this controversy 
with Spain. France was bound by the Family Compact to support 
Spain if war took place. In order to prevent such support Pitt, using 
Italian diplomacy not customary with him, sent Hugh Elliot and Miles 
to propose secretly to Mirabeau an alliance with England. This nego- 
tiation was kept entirely out of the Foreign Office. Miles' s share in it 
apparently was not known either by Lord Gower, the English ambas- 
sador at Paris, or by the members of the Cabinet in England. All 
documents relating to it, whether in the letters of Elliot, Miles, or Pitt, 
were suppressed, and the sole source of information in regard to it is in 
the later statements of the persons interested. It is certain that Pitt 
merely used Elliot and Miles to avert French interference, and that 
Miles at least was ignorant that Pitt was not in earnest in the proposals 

* Buckingham was opposed to summoning the Irish Parliament for January, 1789, 
but yielded to Grenville's advice, and later recalled a letter of resignation which 
Grenville, urging a reconsideration, had withheld. Dropmore, I, \'i\ff. Gren- 
ville also influenced Buckingham to refuse to transmit to England the address 
of the Irish Parliament requesting the Prince of Wales to assume the regency of 
Ireland. Bernard to Grenville, Feb. 21, 1789. Ibid., ^i^. 

t Grenville succeeded Sydney in the Home Department. The change had been 
decided on a year previous, but had been delayed by circumstances connected with 
Buckingham's control of the county represented by Grenville in Parliament. Gren- 
ville's letter of acceptance at this time exhibits him as still in a subordinate posi- 
tion : " In being allowed to look forward to this object at the beginning of the next 
session, I feel I am placed much beyond what I had any right or pretension to look 
to ; and that in the interim I shall only be desirous to give any assistance which 
may be in my power, on every occasion on which it can be of service. " Grenville 
to Pitt, June 11, 1788. Ibid., 335. 

X Auckland to Grenville, May 15 and June 8, 1790. Ibid., 585, 588. 



OCCASIONAL INFLUENCE. 9 

made. In spite of the great secrecy maintained in the entire conduct 
of the negotiation, Grenville was unquestionably informed of it and 
was known by Miles to be so informed, for the latter on two occasions 
wrote to Buckingham, evidently with the purpose of influencing Gren- 
ville, urging an actual alliance with France. Grenville' s knowledge 
of this incident of Pitt's diplomacy — an incident of which even the 
Secretary of State for the Foreign Department, the Duke of Leeds, 
was ignorant at the time— is most positive proof of Pitt's confidence 
in his advice. * 

Grenville' s influence on foreign policy was in fact steadily increasing, 
and in another direction also was being exerted without the knowledge 
of the nominal head of the Foreign Office, the Duke of Leeds. A new 
commercial treaty was being negotiated with Holland, and Pitt had 
chosen to take this out of the hands of Leeds in order apparently to 
conduct the details himself. In reahty he had transferred the whole 
matter to Grenville, with whom the idea had originated, f and whose 
familiarity with Dutch affairs, acquired by his mission in 1787, fitted 
him to deal with what proved to be a most difficult and intricate prob- 
lem. After July, 1790, Grenville was in constant and secret corre- 
spondence with Auckland in regard to the details of this treaty, t and 
when finally, in January, 1791, these had been formulated in a pre- 
liminary draft, Pitt took the precaution to send them through the 

* Miles to Buckingham, Dec 13, 1790. Miles, I, 178. Miles is the chief author- 
ity for this negotiation, but as a friend of the French Revolution and ignorant 
of Pitt's duplicity, his entire thesis is that Pitt in 1790 was on the point of 
making a friendly alUance with France, and thus of safely guiding France through 
the dangers of revolution. Neither the letters of Hugh Elliot nor of Miles for this 
period were to be found by their biographers, nor can any statement by Elliot be 
found save a very meager one in Morris (II, 256) to the effect that an alliance was 
actually proposed. Bourgoing gives no hint of Elliot's mission, while Sorel briefly 
describes it as merely to convince French leaders that England sincerely desired 
peace Pitt's real purpose and secret plan is, however, revealed in a letter from 
the King, included in the papers of Joseph Smith, Pitt's private secretary. ' ' From 
a thorough conviction how essential Peace is to the Prosperity of this Country it 
is impossible for me to object to any means that may have a chance of effecting it; 
though not sanguine that Mr. H. Elliot and his French Friend [Mirabeau] are 
likely to succeed where caution and much delicacy are necessary. While our 
Ambassador and Official Correspondence are kept clear of this business, it will cer- 
tainly be wise to keep up the proposed Communication for the sole purpose of re- 
storing peace, but no encouragement must be given to forwarding the internal 
Views of the democratical Party. We have honourably not meddled with the in- 
ternal dissensions of France, and no object ought to drive us from that honourable 
ground." George III to Pitt, Oct. 26, 1790. Smith MSS., p. 368. 

Oscar Browning's Despatches of Earl Gower proves that Gower knew of the 
friendly advances made by Elliot to Mirabeau, and hence that Leeds was also aware 
that Elliot was being employed by Pitt, but no hint is given of Miles's activities. 
Despatches of Oct. 22 and Oct. 26, 1790, PP- 38, 4o. 

t Dundas to Grenville, Sept. 2, 1787. Dropmore, III, 419. 

JPitt to Grenville, July, 1790, and Grenville to Auckland, July-August, 1790- 
Ibid., I, 597, 598- 



lO THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PiTT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

English Foreign Office in such a manner as to prevent lyceds's knowl- 
edge of Grenville's authorship. * Leeds was in fact rapidly becoming 
a mere figurehead in English diplomacy. Pitt more and more exercised 
a direct supervision, leaning the while on the advice of Grenville. 

It was while engaged in this negotiation with Holland that Gren- 
ville consented to an arrangement which, in the opinion of many of 
his friends, involved a distinct sacrifice of his political future. On 
November 25, 1790, he was created Baron Grenville, and was trans- 
ferred to the House of Lords. Personally he was not averse to the 
change, and politically he rendered a great service to Pitt, who did not 
possess in the upper house a single supporter of ability upon whose 
fidelity he could rely.f Grenville was admirably suited to the place 
and at once assumed the leadership of that majority of mediocrity 
always at Pitt's service in the House of Lords. As it proved, he was 
considerably advanced in political importance by the change. Each 
departure in governmental policy, each serious defense against the 
attacks of the opposition, was made in the Commons by Pitt, in the 
Lords by Grenville. Both spoke for the government with the voice of 
authority, while Grenville was listened to with an increased attention, 
Auckland in particular was quick to express his sense of the much 
greater influence now likely to be wnelded by Grenville, and sought to 
establish an intimacy that, might be used in thwarting what seemed to 
him an ill-considered and dangerous scheme of foreign policy. The 
time was now at hand in fact when Grenville was to enter formally 
upon his long tenure of office as Foreign Secretary, in w^hich his influ- 
ence was to be no longer occasional and concealed, but constant and 
direct. 

*Pitt wrote to Grenville, Jan. 11, 1791, referring to the draft sent him by Gren- 
ville: "• • • • I am satisfied that in substance 3'our proposal is the best that can 
be made. I have suggested some alteration as to the form which I wish you to 
consider and to dispose of as you think best. • ■ • • i see no possibility of 
conveying this to the office without its being known that you have been chiefly 
concerned in the manufacture. I have thought that the best way of avoiding any 
difficulty on that account was to send a letter to the Duke of Leeds, which Smith 
can seal and forward with the draft." Dropmore, II, 12. 

t Pitt to his mother, Nov. 24, 1790. Stanhope, II, 74. Thurlow had already 
begun to evince the sullen temper which ultimately caused Pitt to remove him 
from the chancellorship. 



RUPTURE OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE. II 

RUSSIAN ARMAMENT OF 1791 AND RUPTURE OF TRIPLE ALLIANCE. 

When in 1788 the Triple Alliance had been signed between Holland, 
England, and Prussia, it was understood that a check was to be put 
upon the ambitious designs of Russia and Austria in Turkey and of 
Austria in Germany. iPitt in fact regarded the alliance as an instru- 
ment suited to maintain the existing balance, and saw in this the best 
interests of both England and Prussia. Yet by 1790 it became evident 
that Frederick William II had schemes of aggrandizement for his coun- 
try. His diplomats busied themselves in intrigues, planning a revolution 
in Galicia and sustaining a similar movement in Belgium ; signing 
secret treaties with the Turks, then at war with Austria and Russia ; 
proposing a Polish cession of Danzig and Thorn to Prussia : and en- 
couraging Gustavus III of Sweden in his attack upon Catherine II. 
The Prussian diplomacy failed in every direction and the Prussian 
ministers found themselves confined to only two points of their wider 
intrigues — the limitation, if possible, of Austrian annexations, and the 
manipulation of the terms of the treaty of peace to be signed between 
Russia and Turkey. But in this latter plan, since England and Prussia- 
were agreed to prevent any acquisition of territorj^ by Russia, Frederick 
William II saw the opportunity of saving his prestige in the diplo- 
matic field and of drawing a distinct benefit from the Triple Alliance.* 
He therefore urged the English government to act with him in bringing 
pressure to bear upon Russia, and to this Pitt at first agreed. 

At the opening of the negotiations with Russia in September, 1790, 
the instructions of Leeds to Whitworth, the English representative at 
St. Petersburg, ordered him to insist on a restoration of the status quo 
ante belluni and went so far as to threaten an English-Turkish alliance 
if this was not conceded. f Catherine II, however, was determined 
not to make peace without some acquisition of territory, and fixed 
upon the fortress of Ochakov with the surrounding district as the 
least price at which she would discontinue war. Moreover, Pitt's i 
supporters were not united in favor of an anti-Russian policy. As ' 
early as December, 1790, Auckland, who was throughout his career 
an advocate of a peaceful diplomac}^ for England, began to interject 
in his letters to Grenville arguments against the project of a Russian 
war. In this he was earnestly supported by Van der Spiegel, the 
Grand Pensionary of Holland ; for Holland by the terms of the Triple 
Alliance seemed likely to be drawn into a contest in which she had no 
real interest. Auckland's first letter to Grenville on this topic was 

* Sorel, II, 154-155- 

tSee Pitt's speech in the Commons, March 29, 1791. Pari, Hist., XXIX, 52-55, 
70-75 ; also Lecky, V, 292. 



12 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

apparently in reply to a request b}^ Grenville for information,* and 
after this opening had been presented, Auckland, in nearly every letter, 
up to the actual change in English policy in April, 1791, continued to 
supply arguments for peace, f Moreover, he took advantage of the 
necessity of corresponding with Pitt on the commercial treaty then being 
negotiated between Holland and England to emphasize his objections 
to the policy about to be pursued, J writing to Grenville by the same 
mail : "I have addressed to Mr. Pitt the answer which I wished to 
write to your letter from Hoi wood, and as happily for both of you 
and for the public, whatever is written to one may be considered as 
written to the other, I will not detain the packet." § 

Yet Grenville was in no sense attempting to influence Pitt bj^^ indirect 
means. Auckland was entirely correct in supposing that it made no 
difference to whom his letters were addressed, for they were certain to 
be read by both men. Grenville was in fact convinced of the inad- 
visability of pushing Russia to extremes, and was trying to bring Pitt 
to the same conclusion ; yet he was so loyal to his chief as to give 
Auckland no hint of his own sentiments. On March 5 Auckland, who 
had just received a strong letter from Burges,|| an Under Secretary 
of Foreign Affairs, urging increased efforts to procure effective Dutch 
armaments, wrote to Grenville: "I have collected with concern from 
your silence • • • • that my sentiments and those of the Grand 
Pensionary have not the good fortune to be approved by you. ' ' Tf 

A few days later this judgment seemed premature, for on March 7 
Pitt addressed a private letter to Auckland asking for specific infor- 
mation on the importance of Ochakov, information which Auckland 
hastened to give, quoting Kingsbergen, the Dutch admiral, as author- 
ity for his statements of the small importance of the district in ques- 
tion.** In spite, therefore, of a savage letter from Burges threatening 
investigation and censure for his indifference, ff Auckland was suffi- 
ciently hopeful to write to Keith at Sistovo, hinting at a probable 
change in English policy. J J 

In reality, however, Pitt had not as yet decided to yield to the ad- 
vice of Grenville and Auckland, though he was becoming less firm in 
his determination to risk a war with Russia. The instructions to 

* Auckland to Grenville, Dec. 31, 1790. Dropmore, I, 612. 

t Auckland to Grenville, Feb. and March, 1791. /bid., II, 31, 32, 33 

j Auckland to Pitt, Feb. 2, 1791. Ibid., 23. 

§ Auckland to Grenville, Feb. 2, 1791. Ibid., 25. 

11 Burges to Auckland, March i, 1791. Burges, 160. 

TJ Dropmore, II, 38. 

**Pitt to Auckland, March 7, 1791. Auckland, II, 382. 

tt Burges to Auckland, March 21, 1791. Burges, 163. 

jj Auckland to Keith, March 24, 1791. Keith, II, 394. 



RUPTURE OP THK TRIPLE ALLIANCE. 



13 



English diplomats still breathed the language of firmness, and on 
March 27 an ultimatum to be addressed to Catherine II was sent to 
Whit worth at St. Petersburg.* The arguments hitherto advanced 
against armed intervention had turned upon the dubious delay of Leo- 
pold II in making peace with the Turks at Sistovo.f the danger of war 
to English commerce, and the uselessness of Ochakov to Russia, even 
if acquired. These were now greatly strengthened by the evident dis- 
like of England for the war and the rapid lessening of Pitt's majority 
in the Commons, t Grenville returned to the attack, and on April 16, 
three weeks after the sending of the ultimatum to Russia, an instruction 
was read to the Cabinet recalling it before delivery. Leeds, refusing 
to sign the paper, retired from the Cabinet,§ and Grenville at once took 
up the responsibilities of the office, though not formally assuming the 
title of Secretary of State for the Foreign Department until June 8. 

The new regime in England was immediately manifested in the in- 
creased activity of English diplomats on the continent. Keith, who was 
watching English interests in the wearisome negotiations for an Austro- 
Turkish peace at Sistovo, received definite instructions. || Auckland 
concerted with the Dutch government measures to secure Austria's 

* Koch, XIV, 500-503. 

t The quibbling of Leopold's diplomats in the negotiations at Sistovo has not 
usually been cited as a cause of Pitt's change of policy ; yet Auckland wrote to 
Keith on March 24, 1791 : "I have strong hopes that the incomprehensible conduct 
of Leopold, to which I allude, will tend to prevent the breaking out of new wars 
in Europe and in its effects to a general pacification sooner than was expected. I 
will take occasion to explain this by the first safe conveyance." Keith, II, 394. 

t Various reasons have been asserted for Pitt's sudden face-about. Stanhope 
(II, 115-118) ascribes it entirely to the lack of support in the country and in Par- 
liament, and quotes Pitt's letter to Ewart, May 24, 1791 : "To speak plainly, the 
obvious effect of our persisting would have been to risk the existence of the present 
government, and with it the whole of our system both at home and abroad." 
Sorel (II, 204-208) adopts the same view and adds the information that the rapid 
development of public opposition was due to the energy of the Russian envoy in 
London, Rostopochine, who busied himself in the dislribution of articles, hand- 
bills, and monographs, and subsidized crowds to protest against the war. Bourgoing 
(I, 294-298) briefly mentions Grenville's opposition, and states that this was based 
mainly on his anxiety over the menacing state of France and the fear of a spread 
of revolutionary principles, an idea clearly disproved by the Dropmore MSS. On 
the other hand, Malmesbury (II, 441) wrote on October 14, 1791, to Portland: "It 
appears very clear to me, from some confidential communications which were 
made to me, that Lord Grenville was the cause of Mr. Pitt's giving way, and that 
he acted not from the reason which was given, the nation's being against it, but 
from its being his fixed opinion that we should not interfere at all in the affairs 
of the Continent." The correct view seems to be that Pitt was weakened in his 
opinion by the attacks of Grenville, and that the ill-will of Parliament furnished 
the last and convincing argument. 

§ Leeds's account was that on refusing to sign the new instructions, he suggested 
that Grenville do so, thus indicating his knowledge of the person chiefly responsi- 
ble for the change. Political Memoranda of the Duke of Leeds, 156-158. 

II From December, 1790, to May, 1791, Keith had not had a line from Leeds. He 
was rejoiced, therefore, at the vigor with which Grenville took up the duties of his 
office. Keith, II, 418, 423. 



14 THE INFLUENCE OP GRENVILLE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

friendship. A uew negotiator, Fawkener, was despatched to St. Peters- 
burg, and Ewart, who had been absent on leave in lyondon, was hurried 
back to Berlin. It now became the purpose of English diplomacy to 
secure favorable terms for the Ottoman government, if possible, but if 
Catherine II proved obdurate, to acquiesce in a Russian acquisition of 
territory. In this connection England's relations with her ally, Prussia, 
were of the first moment. Ewart' s instructions were : first, to forward 
an English- Austrian-Prussian alliance with the view of forcing Russia 
to make peace with the Turks on the basis of the status quo existing 
before the war ; second, if this failed, to " unite with the allies in re- 
quiring that the territory between the Bog and the Dniester • • • • 
be reduced to the state of a desert " ; third, if Austria refused to join, 
to consent to a cession of a part of the district of Ochakov to Russia, 
" provided both banks of the Dniester be preserved to the Porte."* 
These instructions, then, still looked toward some limitation upon the 
demands of Russia. In this spirit they were cordially accepted f by 
the Prussian King, to whom Ewart had been instructed to appeal per- 
sonally.! In fact, Frederick William II had just been informed by 
Leopold II of the possibility of a friendly alliance with Austria and had 
consented to opening negotiations through Bischofswerder.§ Gren- 
ville, on being informed of this opening, sent Elgin to Italy, where the 
Emperor then was, offering in effect admission to the Triple Alliance. 
The purpose of both England and Prussia was to isolate Russia, and 
so force her to yield in the projected treaty with the Turks, but the 
result was exactly the reverse. The Polish coup d' Hat of May 3, 1791 , 
^neutralized the friendly advances of Austria, while Elgin's disclosures 
convinced Leopold II that under no circumstances would England 
undertake a war. Acting upon this belief, Austria drew nearer to her 
late ally, Russia, and increased her demands at Sistovo.|| Grenville 
was in truth determined not to risk a war, and although Parliament as 
yet knew nothing of the change of policy, H he was instructing Ewart 
that ' ' in the case of a total rejection of all modifications of the status quo, 

* Memorandum by Ewart. Dropmore, II, 49. 

t Ewart to Pitt and Ewart to Auckland, April 30, 1791 ; Ewart to Grenville, May 
13. 179^- Ibid., 61, 68, 73. 

j Grenville to Auckland, April 19, 1791. Ibid., 51. 

§ For a general discussion of these negotiations see Sybel, I, 274-297. 

II Sorel, II, 222 ; Sybel, I, 295 ; Keith, II, 436. Keith wrote to Grenville on June 
9, 1791, the day of the seeming disruption of the conference at Sistovo : " Certain it 
is ■ ■ * ■ that from the moment Prince Kaunitz could form a tolerable guess 
respecting the objects of Lord Elgin's last journey, he redoubled the haughtiness 
and inflexibility of his instructions to Baron Herbert." 

Tl As late as May 9, Grenville was still asserting in the House of Lords the neces- 
sity of British preparation for a war with Russia. Pari. Hist., XXIX, 435. Pitt 
kept up the pretense much later in the House of Commons. 



RUPTURE OF THE TRIPI.E ALI.IANCE. 15 

• • • • it would Still be desirable that the Turks should conclude on 
this basis, and look for their future security to the guarantees of other 
powers * ' ■ • " * For the same reason Grenville refused to pre- 
pare a fleet for the Black Sea, a measure strongly urged by Prussia,t 
and a little later definitely destroyed Frederick William's hopes of ever 
obtaining any benefit from the Triple Alliance by his answer to a request 
for aid in case war should ensue between Prussia and Austria. War 
did not indeed appear imminent, although the momentary friction 
between Prussia and Austria, due to the unexpected revolution in 
Poland, had cast a decided shadow on the previous friendly approaches. 
In answer to the Prussian inquiry, Grenville wrote to Ewart on July 6 : 
' ' I will freely own to you that I entertain a strong persuasion that 
matters will not come to extremities with the Emperor. ' * • "It 
is a painful situation to be measuring one's expressions between the 
fear, on one hand, of holding out expectations to Prussia which we 
could not perform and others would not, and on the other hand of con- 
veying an impression disadvantageous to our national good faith. The 
whole of our line is summed up in a few words. His Majesty's present 
servants will certainly advise him at all risks to perform the engage- 
ments of his alliance, if the case exists ; but there is every reason in 
the situation of this country, and quite independent of any motive 
personal to ourselves, to wish that the case may not exist. We can 
answer for our conduct, but we can not answer for our success." % 
It is evident that this communication was intended to convey an argu- 
ment similar to that previously used by Pitt in withdrawing from the 
proposed English-Prussian ultimatum to Russia, § namely, that to 
give the support asked for would result in driving Pitt's ministry from 
ofl&ce, and that with the return of the opposition to power the system 
of the allies would fall to the ground. The repetition of this argu- 
ment, now used in an entirely new connection, could not fail further 
to impress Frederick William II with the valuelessness of the Triple 
AlHance to Prussia. Grenville was right in thinking the danger of 
war remote, but the incident had not been used to England's advan- 
tage, and it assisted the Austrian party at Berlin in inclining the King 
toward an Austrian alliance. 

The stubbornness of Catherine II and the diplomatic abiHty of 
I^eopold were more than a match for the poorly combined efforts of 
England and Prussia. I^eopold dalHed with the Prussian proposals and 

* Grenville to Ewart, May 24, 1791. Dropmore, II, 78. "^ 
t Ewart to Grenville, May 17, 1791. Ibid., 74 ; Lecky, V, 294. 
X Dropmore, II, 124. 
§ lyecky, V, 293, and see ante, p. 13, foot-note %. 



1 6 THE INFI^UENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

increased his demands at Sistovo until it was certain that Russia would 
secure a satisfactor}^ peace. The English and Prussian diplomats at 
St. Petersburg with little delay yielded to the inevitable, and on July 22 
signed an agreement acquiescing in the terms fixed by Catherine II and 
even pledging that pressure would be brought to bear upon Turkey 
to enforce their acceptance.* A little later the discussions at Sistovo 
were resumed and here also little difficulty was encountered in reaching 
a conclusion, though one more favorable to Austria than had at first 
been intended. f In the meantime, Frederick William's disgust with 
English diplomacy had resulted in pushing him into a hastily conceived 
alliance with Austria. On July 25 the Vienna Convention was signed 
by Bischofswerder and Kaunitz for their respective states. X Grenville 
had hoped to bring Austria into the system of the Triple Alliance, and 
to isolate Russia, and even after it became evident that Russia could 
not be coerced, he looked to the realization of his project and urged 
Ewart to press it upon the court of Berlin. § Auckland had written of 
this alliance : "I think it eligible for the Emperor, and highly eligible 
for us, but it seems to be evidently against the Prussian interests, "|| 
but Grenville in reply stated : ' ' and yet even to his [the King of 
Prussia's] interests rightly understood, a system of peace and a security 
for the continuance of the present state of power in Europe would 
surel}^ be beneficial ; and such I conceive would be the effects of this 
scheme, supposing it to succeed to our most sanguine expectations. ' ' ^ 
Grenville' s hopes were soon dashed to the ground. An alliance was 
signed, but England was not a party to it and found herself powerless 
to prevent it. "The Vienna Convention," wrote Grenville, "is ratified. 
We have thought it infinitely the best way to take the thing with a good 
grace, keeping ourselves out of the complicated difficulties into which 
His Prussian Majesty is plunging himself. "** Yet the reverse to Eng- 
lish diplomacy was unmistakable, and every Englishman acquainted 
with the situation must have agreed with Auckland in the statement 
that "it is impossible not to feel to private conviction that the alliance 
between Austria and Prussia suspends in a great degree the cordiality 
and, in some measure, the effect of our alliance with the latter. "ff 

*Kocli, XIV, 500-503. Prussia disclaimed any responsibility for the treaty, but 
did not disavow Goltz, her representative at St. Petersburg, who had signed it. 
t Keith to Grenville, Aug. 4, 1791. Keith, II, 469. 

I Koch, IV, 186 ; Sorel, II, 236-239 ; Sybel, I, 301/?^. The Vienna Convention was 
preliminary to the definitive treaty of Berlin, Feb. 7, 1792. 

§Gren\-ille to Ewart, July 26, 1791. Dropmore, II, 141. 

II Auckland to Grenville, July 13, 1791. Ibid., 129. 
f Grenville to Auckland, July 22, 1791. /bid., 135. 
** Grenville to Auckland, Aug. 26, 1791. /bid., 177. 

tt Auckland to Grenville, Aug. 31, 1791. /bid., 180. ■ 



RUPTURE OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE. 1 7 

Kngland, not Russia, was isolated by the outcome of Grenville's 
first efforts as the head of the Foreign Office. He alone directed the 
diplomacy of England during the negotiations,* but he alone was not 
responsible, for Pitt was his steadfast supporter in the Cabinet, agree- 
ing perfectly in the necessity for each step taken. Pitt indeed made 
light of the diminution of English influence, though he thought the 
result not very creditable. f Other Englishmen, and in particular 
English diplomats, were more bitter in their expressions. Keith, 
while refusing to criticize his government, deplored England's isola- 
tion. X Malmesbury was vexed with English supineness, and pointed 
out to his political friends the opportunity for harassing the ministry.§ 
Ewart was embittered at the overthrow of the diplomatic structure he 
had been so largely instrumental in building, and could not find words 
harsh enough to characterize Grenville's policy. 1| Other rulers than 
those directly concerned regarded England as withdrawing from the 
theater of European politics.!! These judgments were not unfounded. 
The first six months of Grenville's diplomacy had, in truth, resulted 
in failure, and the Triple AUiance ceased to be a factor in European 
politics. It was fortunate for the reputation of Grenville and for the 
continuance of his influence in English foreign policy that the wars of 
the French Revolution nullified every diplomatic prophecy and, creating 

* Burges wrote to Ewart May 6, 1 791 : "Our foreign politics • • • • are solely 
and exclusively those of Lord Grenville's. • • • • By everything I can see, His 
Ivordship is very rapidly gaining a preeminence which promises to place him much 
higher than anyone at present suspects. • • • • Pitt gives way to him in a man- 
ner very extraordinary. • • • • One prime cause of the sudden turn we have 
experienced was owing to the influence of Lord Grenville." Burges, 172. Up to 
April, 1791, Pitt had kept up personal communication with English diplomats. 
After' that date, such interchange of letters almost entirely ceased. Everything 
now passed through Grenville. 

t Pitt to Rose, Aug. 10, 1791. Rose, I, no. 

X Keith felt the humiliation of his position at Vienna. February 4, 1792, he wrote 
Grenville : "A man in my situation, who is carefully debarred by the Austrian 
ministry from the smallest share in their secrets, has a very difficult task * • • '. " 
Keith, II, 498. 

I Malmesbury to Portland, Oct. 14, 1791- Malmesbury, II, 440. 

II During the progress of the negotiations, Ewart wrote to Keith, June 18, 1791 : 
"• • • • What a dreadful change has taken place ! Our influence was all-pow- 
erful as long as it was maintained with the necessary vigor ; and the moment we 
flinched all the Powers, as if by common consent, turned the tables upon us, and 
from having had the certainty of restoring peace in our power, there seems now to be 
the greatest wish of a general confusion. • • • • It is impossible to suffer greater 
mortification than I do at this moment. • • • • The Empress of Russia and Potem- 
kin are striving who can throw most ridicule on England and on our ministers at 
Petersburg. Their evident intention is to gain time, and to push their operations 
on the Black Sea. Oh ! how my blood boils, my dear sir ! " Keith, II, 447. 

^Gustavus III to Baron d'Armfelt, June 16, 1791 : "Toutce qu'on me mande 
d'Angleterre me prouve ses embarras et sert ame convaincre qu'elle ne met aucune 
suite dans sa politique exterieure." Gustave III, V, 212. 



1 8 THE INFLUENCE OP GRENVILLE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

new and unaccustomed combinations, saved England from the fruits 
of his errors. But neither Grenville nor any other English diplomat 
with whom he corresponded foresaw this change or counted upon it. 

The humiliation resulting from the negotiations at St. Petersburg 
would seem to have been sufficient ground for Pitt's resuming that 
direct control of foreign policy which he had been accustomed to exer- 
cise while I,eeds was in office. There is no evidence, however, that he 
was in anyway distrustful of Grenville' s ability or inclined to exercise 
his authority. On the contrary, such indirect evidence as exists tends 
to show a complete control by Grenville of his special department. 
Under Leeds's administration Pitt had been in constant personal com- 
munication with English diplomats at foreign courts, receiving letters 
from them that should have been written to Leeds, and returning pri- 
vate answers that should have gone through the Foreign Office. On 
one occasion, when Leeds had offered Keith the choice between with- 
drawing what he considered an insulting letter or being recalled from 
Vienna, Pitt had forced Leeds to retract this threat and had gratified 
Keith with marks of honor and increased pay. * Under Grenville, 
Pitt in general ceased to write directly to the English diplomats, and 
in but one notable instance, to be considered later, did he attempt to 
conduct an indirect correspondence with an English agent who was 
nominally acting under instructions from the department of foreign 
affairs. 

In his relations with his subordinates Grenville knew his rights and 
assumed them without opposition. The recall of Ewart well illus- 
trates this ; for Ewart, more than any other, had created the English 
influence at Berlin which permitted the realization of Pitt's most bril- 
liant stroke of diplomacy, the formation of the Triple Alliance. Yet 
Grenville recalled Ewart in October, 1 791, unjustly, though not openly, 
making him responsible for the failure of the Russian negotiation, retired 
him on a pension, and after his death sent an agent to seize his papers, 
fearing disclosures embarrassing to the government and to the prestige 
of the foreign department if these papers became public. When Ewart 
was recalled Pitt did not try to prevent the unmerited disgrace of 
a faithful servant, and Ewart himself recognized the futility of an 

*A series of letters from Keith to Leeds and to Pitt from April, 1788, to Novem- 
ber, 1789, discloses a conflict between Keith and Leeds illustrative both of Pitt's 
control and of Leeds's carelessness. Keith complained in an official letter to the 
Foreign Office of having been kept in ignorance of the project of the Triple Alli- 
ance, and even of having received instructions from Leeds which, if carried out, 
would have been directly opposed to that project. He demanded that his letter be 
placed on iile. Leeds returned it, and gave Keith the option of withdrawing the 
letter or resigning. Keith sent the letter back again, and traveled to London to 
appeal to Pitt, who sustained him in the controversy. Keith, II, 225-24S. 



WAR WITH FRANCE. 1 9 

appeal to tlie Prime Minister.* In the letters passing directly between 
Grenville and his chief there is no mention whatever of those details of 
administration with which Pitt busied himself while I^eeds was his 
Foreign Secretary. Such letters are indeed infrequent, and wherever 
occurring are concerned with general questions of foreign policy. 
Grenville understood the dignity of his position and his rights in per- 
sonal control, while Pitt was well content to shift the burden of petty 
management to responsible shoulders. 



WAR WITH FRANCE— THE MANIFESTO AND THE TOULON DECLARATION. 

October to November, 1793. 

Since midsummer of 1 791 'no great question of foreign policy had 
arisen to excite the interest of Englishmen or to test the comparative 
control of Pitt and Grenville. Gradually attention was centering on 
the threatening cloud from France that endangered England's neu- 
trality. The events of the loth of August, 1792, long prophesied, yet 
unexpected after all, momentarily threw into confusion British govern- 
mental circles, and incidentally furnished an illustration of the degree 
of dependence now felt by Pitt in the management of foreign affairs. 
Grenville was absent from London upon his wedding j ourney . He was, 
however, in constant touch with his departmental work, for Burges 
kept him regularly informed of each day's budget of news, and both 
Pitt and Dundas wrote him with a frequency indicating their anxiety 
for his advice, t Matters not requiring immediate attention were referred 
to him for decision, and copies of all despatches from abroad were 
forwarded. When the news of the excesses committed in France 

* Ewart's recall deserves more attention than has been given to it in history, 
both as the ending of a definite epoch of English diplomacy and as the conclu- 
sion of the career of a very able diplomat. Auckland's efforts to secure Ewart's 
disgrace, Grenville's willingness to make him a scapegoat, and the seizure of Ewart's 
papers, as brought out in the Dropmore MSS. , do not reflect much credit on the 
English government. The letters relating to the seizure of the papers are in 
Dropmore, II, 253-256. Grenville increased Mrs. Ewart's pension in order to get 
them, but this was not known even to Auckland. Mrs. Ewart afterward received 
the offer of a round sum from the opposition for these same papers, and made the 
amusing reply that she must reject the offer as she " considered them [the papers] 
as a sacred deposit belonging to her son. ' ' Auckland, II, 435. Ewart's importance 
and his great influence at Berlin are asserted in a letter from St. Helens to Croker, 
written November 2, 1836. Croker, 11, 95-97. 

t Letters from Pitt, Dundas, and George III to Grenville indicate that all the 
more important despatches were forwarded to Grenville for his advice. Drop- 
more, II, 310-315 . Burke also wrote two letters to Grenville at this crisis, protesting 
against the government's policy of neutrality, as in effect a sanction of the crimes 
in France. The first letter was written August 18, 1792, when news of the events of 
the loth reached England, but was not sent Until September 19, when Burke wrote 
out his views after an interview with Grenville. Ibid., Ill, 463-467. 



20 THE INFIvUENCE OF GRENVII.I,E ON PITT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

reached L,ondou, the government was thrown into a fit of consternation 
and feared that its representative in Paris, Lord Gower, might suffer 
personal injury. A despatch was immediately sent recalling him. It 
was deemed unwise to delay until Grenville could be consulted, and 
Pitt himself drew up the despatch, writing also to Grenville of what he 
had done and adding : "I wish we could have had time to know your 
sentiments first, but that seemed impossible." * Pitt was anxious that 
Grenville should return to assume charge of foreign business during 
this crisis, and Grenville accordingly made a hurried trip to lyondon.f 
A short stay sufiiced to calm the excitement of his fellow-ministers and 
to put affairs in order in his department. Burges wrote : ' ' Lord Gren- 
ville came to town on Wednesday evening, and of course business begins 
to flourish." X No definite line of policy was determined upon, for it 
was evident that time was necessary to see the recent events in a true 
light. Pitt's dependence and Grenville' s control of details are, however, 
forcibly brought out, for twice more Grenville was hurriedly re- 
called when Pitt disliked to assume the sole responsibility, and finally, 
in November, Pitt's desire that Grenville should formulate the line of 
policy most likely to deter France from attacking Holland forced the 
latter to resume his customary duties.. § 

The interesting and much-discussed question of whether England 
followed the wisest policy in determining upon war with France, and 
whether, indeed, war could have been avoided, must here be passed 
over, for there is no proof whatever that Grenville was at this period 
more favorable to war than was Pitt. In truth, Grenville' s entire 
policy had thus far been based on the necessity of peace for England. || 
The events of the loth of August had not stirred him from his belief 
in the possibility of maintaining England's neutrality, and even the 
King held to the same view, though he is usually regarded as having 
been desirous of war.^y Before two months had passed, however, a 

*Pitt to Grenville, Aug. 17, 1792. Dropmore, II, 302. 

fPitt to Grenville, Aug. 18, 1792. /bid., 303. Aust to Miles, Aug. 18, 1792. 
Miles, I, 329. 

J Burges to Auckland, Sept. 21, 1791. Auckland, II, 446. 

§ Pitt to Grenville, Nov. 5-12, 1792. Dropmore, II, 328. There are more letters 
from Pitt to Grenville in the fifteen days when the excitement in England was at 
its height than in the previous eighteen months. 

11 Immediately after the signing of the peace of Sistovo, Grenville wrote : " I am 
repaid by the maintenance of peace, which is all this country has to desire. We 
shall now, I hope, for a very long period indeed, enjoy this blessing, and cultivate 
a situation of prosperity unexampled in our history." Grenville to Buckingham, 
Aug. 17, 1791. Court and Cabinets, II, 196. 

Tl Brunswick had asked in August, 1792, for a declaration b}'^ England of her 
intentions. Grenville, through Dundas, instructed Murray, who was with 
Brunswick's army, to state that England would maintain her neutrality and could 
not make a declaration, though approving the purpose of restoring a responsible 
and peacefully inclined government in France. Dropmore, II, 313. George III 
approved the draft of this answer. Ibid., 310. 



WAR WITH FRANCS. 21 

great change took place in ministerial sentiment, due not so much to 
anxiety for the situation of royalty in France as to the astounding and 
rapid successes of French arms. From a nation about to be crushed 
by a superior military force, France became at a bound a great revolu- 
tionary power, pushing its doctrines and its armies beyond its own 
frontiers. French victories in Italy, on the Rhine, and in Belgium 
forced England to recognize that she must gird herself for war in de- 
fense of Holland. This was the determination reached by the English 
ministry early in November, 1792.* A little later it is evident from 
Grenville's instructions to Auckland and others that in Cabinet circles 
at least there was a definite purpose to restrain, and if possible to 
overthrow, the revolutionary principles enunciated by the French 
government,! though the final and public defense for the inauguration 
of war was the opening of the Scheldt and the defense of Holland. | 

So far, then, as the adoption of a war policy is concerned, there is no 
question of comparative influence between Pitt and Grenville. It is 
true that after September, 1792, the King was eager for arupture'with 
France, and it is probable that Grenville more readily came to this view 
than did Pitt, but both were convinced of the necessity of war and were 
acting in perfect harmony. During the first months of preparation and 
endeavor, no important question of policy arose. Grenville was busy 
in detailed diplomatic negotiations with England's allies. Pitt labored 
with Dundas to perfect a scheme of military operations. But when 

'*'This is shown b)^ a letter from Buckingham to Grenville, Nov. 18, 1792. "I 
am very glad that you have taken your line as to Holland. . • • • i think it 
probable that you will be forced, in case of the conquest of the Netherlands, to in- 
.terfere; and you cannot do it more wisely than by choosing for the ground of the 
quarrel one so very essential to us, and upon which the minds of the people of 
England have been so lately made up." Dropmore, II, 336. 

t January 15, 1793, Grenville wrote to Auckland in regard to the proposed pub- 
lication of a letter from Fagel outlining the Dutch ideas of the attitude of Holland 
to France: "It is, I doubt not, adapted to the present temper of the Republic, but 
the expressions of still hoping to preserve peace by adhering to neutrality would 
be construed here to exclude all measures to be taken on the general view of affairs, 
and for the object of restraining the progress of French arms and French princi- 
ples, even though we should not be the immediate objects of attack." Ibid., 366, 
Almost the same words are used in the Cabinet minute of Jan. 25, 1793, containing 
St. Helens's instructions in proposing an alliance with Spain. The object here is 
stated to be "to establish a concert to prevent the progress of French arms and 
principles." Ibid., 373. 

X The most exhaustive and critical analysis of the questions that led to war is 
Oscar Browning's " England and France in 1793 " in the Fortnightly Review for 
February, 1883. The Dropmore MSB. bear out in the main all of Browning's con- 
tentions,_ though the tenor of Grenville's letters after November 15, 1792, is that 
the war is practically decided upon and that only a most unexpected giving way by 
France can avert it. If this be true, the numerous and involved negotiations sub- 
sequent to that date lose mtich of their importance and significance. They were 
continued rather with the idea of gaining time for preparation, and in order to 
conciliate Holland, than with any real hope of a peaceful adjustment. 



22 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PiTT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

the counter-revolutions in France, the risings in Vendee, and the cap- 
ture of Toulon gave promise of a rapid victory for the allies, it became 
necessary for England to manifest more clearly than she had as yet 
done her ideas in regard to the proper form of government and the 
proper political conditions to be established in France. It was in this 
connection that the first difference of opinion on the conduct of the 
war arose between Pitt and Grenville. While Pitt proceeded to draft 
a declaration to be published at Toulon, Grenville drew up a manifesto 
to be approved by the allies and to set forth England's objects in the 
war. The former was primarily a military proclamation, the latter a 
document of state, but both necessarily were drawn on similar lines. 
Pitt at first wished to postpone any general declaration until some con- 
siderable time after the issue of that from Toulon, but he soon yielded 
to Grenville's insistence, and the documents were ultimately issued in 
the reverse order from that desired by Pitt. Concerning the subject- 
matter of Grenville's manifesto, Pitt wrote to Grenville on October 5 : 

" With respect to your paper, the most material suggestion which I 
have stated is that which proposes a more pointed recommendation of 
monarchical government with proper limitations. I do not see that we 
can go on secure grounds if we treat with any separate districts or 
bodies of men who stop short of some declaration in favour of monarchy ; 
nor do I see any way so likely to unite considerable numbers in one 
vigorous effort, as by specifying monarchy as the only system in the re- 
establishment of which we are disposed to concur. This idea by no 
means precludes us from treating with anj^ other form of regular gov- 
ernment, if, in the end, any other should be solidly established ; but it 
holds out monarchy as the only one from which we expect any good, 
and in favour of which we are disposed to enter into concert. ' ' * 

It is evident that the mental reservation here suggested by Pitt in 
favor of " any other form of regular government, if, in the end, any 
other should be solidly established," could not be included in the public 
declaration. If so included, the reservation would in itself negative 
the ' * specif5dng monarchy as the only system in the re-establishment 
of which we are disposed to concur. ' ' Yet to issue the declaration in 
the form proposed by Pitt, without the insertion of the saving clause, 
would just as effectively tie the handsof the British government, whether 
in future negotiations or in Parliamentary discussions, as if no reserva- 
tion had been intended. Pitt also insisted on the insertion of a clause 
which demanded the restoration of the "ancient judicature," and 
was unquestionably influenced by Burke and to a lesser degree by the 

*Pitt to Grenville, Oct. 5, 1793. Dropmore, II, 438. 



WAR WITH FRANCE. 23 

information supplied him by Miles.* Grenville stoutly resisted the line 
of policy proposed, and his objections were so far effective that Pitt 
yielded the main point, though still clinging to the " ancient judica- 
ture " clause, t The result was in some sense a compromise, in which 
monarchy in France was given a greater prominence than was desired 
by Grenville, but was distinctly not stipulated as an essential to peace. 
This was the solution for both the general manifesto and the Toulon 
declaration, though the latter, drafted by Pitt, was much more em- 
phatic in favor of the restoration of monarchy than was the former. 
The two documents well illustrate the temper of mind of the two leading 
Knglish statesmen at the time. Grenville' s manifesto was published 
October 29, 1793. In regard to the government of France, it stated : 

' ' The King demands that some legitimate and stable government 
should be established, founded on the acknowledged principles of uni- 
versal justice, and capable of maintaining with other powers the ac- 
customed relations of union and peace. His Majesty wishes ardently 
to be enabled to treat for the reestablishment of general tranquillity 
with such a government, exercising a legal and permanent authority, 
animated with the wish for general tranquillity, and possessing power 
to enforce the observance of its engagements. ' * " " It is for 
these objects that he calls upon them [the people of France] to join 
the standard of an hereditary monarchy ; not for the purpose of decid- 
ing, in this moment of disaster, calamity, and public danger, on all 
the modifications of which this form of government may hereafter be 
susceptible, but in order to unite themselves once more under the 
empire of law, of morality, and of religion • * ' '." X 
The Toulon declaration of November 20, 1793, said : 
** His Majesty ardently wishes the happiness of France, but by no 
means desires, on that account, to prescribe the form of its government, ' ' 
but " His Majesty does not hesitate to declare that the reestablishment 
of monarchy, in the person of I^ouis XVII and the lawful heirs of the 

* Miles had considerable influence as a public writer and was occasionally em- 
ployed by Pitt in that capacity. He was apparently thoroughly honest, but since 
his employment abroad by Pitt in 1787 and in 1790 he had grown to consider him- 
self as an important ex-officio adviser of the government. Pitt evidently believed 
him possessed of unusual means of information about France. On September 16, 
1793, Miles wrote to Pitt urging the printing and distribution in France of Hood's 
proclamation of August 28 announcing that Toulon had been taken in trust for 
Louis XVII. Miles, II, loi. The authority of Miles for exact statements must, 
however, be taken with great caution. He was one of those conscientiously argu- 
mentative persons who are always in the right. His perfect sincerity renders it 
doubly difficult to distinguish between the true and the false. 

fPitt to Grenville, Oct. 11, 1793. Dropmore, II, 443. 

iParl. Hist., XXX, 1057- 1060. 



24 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PiTT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

crown, appears to him tlie best mode of accomplishing these just and 
salutary views. ' ' * 

Grenville used monarchy as a rallying cry ; Pitt asserted that it 
would be the best solution of difficulties in France. But in the docu- 
ment of neither does monarch}^ appear as ' ' the only system in the 
re-establishment of which we are disposed to concur," nor, indeed, is 
there any mention of the restoration of the " ancient judicature." 

Grenville' s foresight had in truth saved Pitt from a serious tactical 
blunder. Had England issued a declaration upon the lines originallj^ 
proposed by Pitt, the government would have been forced but a little 
later to the humiliation of pleading a secret reservation, in the terms 
of an energetic public document, or would have found itself com- 
pelled to maintain an absolute bar to any peace negotiation. England 
had declared her opinion that monarchy was best suited to France, yet 
she was not pledged to support that form of government alone. Burke 
and the ultra- royalists were indignant at the declarations made,t but 
the allies were satisfied, and indeed so strong was the impression abroad 
that England had specified monarchy as an essential to peace that 
nearly every continental historian has stated it as a fact.]. In Parlia- 
ment itself the opposition constantly harped upon the same theme, 
though Sheridan was frank enough to admit that no pledge had been 
given, § and in every debate upon this topic up to 1797 it is noteworthy 
that the arguments of Fox and others were invariabl}^ based upon the 
Toulon declaration and not upon Grenville's manifesto. Pitt, at first 
apologeticall}^, later triumphantlj", denied the implied pledge, and was 
able to support his arguments by a reference to the strict letter of the 
documents. For this he had Grenville to thank. Thus at the very 

"^ Pari. Hisi.,X.X.l^, 1060. 

t Burke wrote to Grenville October 27, 1793, asking to be heard on the manifesto, 
but was too late, for it had already been sent to the foreign powers. Dropmore, 
II, 450. Sir Gilbert Elliot temporarily alienated Burke at this time by acquiescing 
in the ministerial policy and accepting the mission to Toulon. Burke regarded the 
royalists as abandoned. Burke to Elliot, Sept. 22, 1793. Elliot, II, 169, 403. 
Elliot himself wished more favor shown to the ro3'alists and desired Monsieur to 
come to Toulon to raise the royalist standard. Elliot to Dundas, no date, and 
Elliot to Lady Elliot, June i, 1797- Ibid., 189, 403. This proposal was, however, 
thwarted by Grenville through the agency of Malmesbury and the Comtesse de 
Balbi. Grenville to Malmesbury, Dec 9, 1793. Dropmore, II, 476. Malmesbur}"- 
to Comtesse de Balbi, Dec. 27, 1793. Malmesbury, III, 32 ; Sorel, III, 503. 

X Sorel falls into this error. In discussing the Vendean risings, he interprets the 
manifesto of October 29, 1793. to mean that England will insist on a restoration of 
constitutional monarchy. Sorel's sources on this subject are all French or Aus- 
trian. Ibid., 500-503. 

\Parl. Hist., XXX, 1226, Jan. 21, 1794. 



THE PRUSSIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WAR. 25 

outset of the Revolutionarj^ wars, the influence of Grenville had proved 
all-important in saving the administration from a compromising dec- 
laration.* 

THE PRUSSIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WAR. 

October, 1793, to September, 1794. 

At the very moment when England was outlining a plan of treat- 
ment for a conquered France, she was confronted with the danger of 
desertion by one of her allies, for Prussia, distracted by troubles in 
Poland, was threatening to withdraw her troops, urging as her excuse 
a bankrupt treasury. Shortly after the declaration of war by France 
Yarmouth had been sent to the continent f with the purpose of decid- 
ing upon some common ground of action with Prussia and Austria, 
and on July 14, 1793, he had. signed a treaty with Prussia at Mayence, 
pledging both countries to continue in arms against France. X A sim- 
ilar agreement with Austria was signed in L^ondon, August 30, though 
the latter contained in addition a mutual guaranty of territory as 
against France. § These treaties amounted to no more than pledges 
of good faith, 1 1 and neither contained any exact specifications of the 

* Fox led the attack upon what he termed Pitt's monarchical policy. "If we 
look at the declaration to the people of PVance, the first idea presented by it, 
although afterwards somewhat modified, but again confirmed by the declaration 
of Toulon, is that the restoration to monarchy must be the preliminary to peace." 
Pari. Hist., XXX, 1260, Jan. 21, 1794. The arguments of the opposition on this 
point do not bear the stamp of sincerit}'. They were put forward more to embar- 
rass the government than for any other purpose, for it was impossible for Pitt to 
deny that the restoration of monarchy was at least an object hoped for. To have 
done so would have disgruntled the allies and have lessened the chances of a 
royalist rising in France. In the first debates in the Ivords, therefore, Grenville 
wholly evaded the subject, while Pitt in the Commons pursued a like policy until 
pinned down by a direct question from Fox. Later, as the hopes of monarchy 
dwindled, both Pitt and Grenville exalted the wisdom of the ministry in not having 
pledged England to an impossible policy. 

t Yarmouth went to Prussia in July, 1793. He thought Prussia could easily be 
brought to more active participation in the war by promising (i) that no idea of a 
Bavarian exchange would be brought forward at the conclusion of the war ; (2) that 
England would " not endeavour to interrupt the King of Prussia in the enjoyment 
of his new Polish acquisitions " — -i. e., a negative guaranty of the partition of 1792. 
Beauchamp to Pitt, June 24, 1793. Dropmore, II, 399. 

t-Koch, IV, 236; Debrett, I, 18. 

%Ibid., 19 ; Sorel, III, 460. 

II Bourgoing, III, 161, makes an entirely erroneous statement of the London con- 
vention of August 30, 1793. He says that secret articles provided that " I'Autriche 
recevait comme compensation de ses sacrifices pendant la guerre, une indemnite 
territoriale aux depens de la France, a savoir, la Lorraine, I'Alsace, la Flandre; 
elle renongait a toute pretention sur la Baviere, et I'Angleterre en echange lui 
garantissait la possessione des provinces beiges. ' ' The Dropmore letters disprove 
this and in fact show that while exact stipulations were under discussion they 
were all postponed because of the difi&culty of reaching an agreement upon Dutch 
demands for indemnities. See also Morton Eden to Auckland, Nov. 16, 1793, 
Auckland, III, 144, and Auckland to Van der Spiegel, Jan. 24, 1794, ibid., 173. 



26 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

assistance to be rendered ; but Prussia was bound by other treaties 
to furnish certain stipulated succors to England and Holland, and 
these Lucchesini asserted it was now impossible for her to render longer, 
unless England would grant a subsidy and guarantee Prussia's Polish 
possessions.* The news reached England September 30. Grenville 
immediately asserted that neither demand could be complied with, but 
Pitt, while agreeing that the Polish guaranty was out of the question, 
was inclined to argue in favor of some sort of subsid}', provided the 
King of Prussia was first made to acknowledge that under existing 
treaties he could not honorably withdraw the troops already in the 
field. t Pitt further suggested that Malmesbury might be sent to 
Berlin to unravel the tangle in which Yarmouth's lack of ability had 
involved English interests ; % but for the moment he yielded his own 
opinion, and in a Cabinet meeting on October 9 both guaranty and 
subsidy were refused, though the language of the note drawn up by 
Grenville was materially softened. § 

Grenville was already convinced that Prussia had no intention of 
continuing the war, and he objected to the subsidy both on the ground 
that Prussia had no right to ask it, and also because he did not believe 
that it would insure vigorous action by Prussian armies. Accordingly 
he recalled Yarmouth, || and only withdrew that recall to please Yar- 
mouth, who still believed that he could be of service in Berlin. ^f But 
the English government had underestimated the strength of the anti- 
war party at Berlin. Instead of intimidating the Prussian court by 
insistence on the fulfilment of existing treaties, the English govern- 
ment was itself thrown into consternation on the receipt of an angry 
and threatening communication from Jacobi, the Prussian minister in 
London.** Pitt at once reverted to his original plan, and this time the 
Cabinet was with him, while Grenville acquiesced in the proposed 
subsidy, prophesying nevertheless that no good would result from it.ff 
Malmesbury was despatched to Berlin to arrange the terms of a sub- 
sidy, but was instructed that the King of Prussia must first be made 
to acknowledge that the existing situation was a casus fcederis under the 
terms of the alliance of 1788.JI On this point Frederick William II 

*Burges to Grenville, Sept. 30, 1793. Dropmore, II, 430. 

t Pitt to Grenville, Oct. 2, 1793. (Two letters. ) /(^/o'., 433, 434. 

jpitt to Grenville, Oct. 4, 1793. Ibid., 503. The date given for this letter in 
the MSS. is Feb. 4, 1794, but tlie context shows that this is an error. The letter is 
exactly 70 pages out of place in the order of arrangement used in the MSS. 

§Pitt to Grenville, Oct. 10, 1793. Ibid., 441. 

II Grenville to Yarmouth, Oct. 17, 1793. Ibid., 446. 

^Yarmouth to Grenville, Nov. 6, 1793. Ibid., 453. 

■** Yarmouth to Grenville, Nov. 24, 1793- Ibid., 470. 

tt Grenville to Malmesbury, March 7, 1794. Ibid , 516. 

jl Grenville to Malmesbury, Nov. 20, 1793. Malmesbury, III, i. 



THE PRUSSIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WAR. 27 

satisfied the Englisli envoy at their first interview,* but the terms 
of a subsidy treaty were not easily agreed upon, and it was not until 
Haugwitz and Malmesbury had repaired to The Hague that a conven- 
tion was signed on April 19, 1794, between England, Prussia, and 
Holland.! Malmesbury, who was enthusiastic in the pursuit of his 
object, had ventured to exceed the exact letter of his instructions, X 
resting rather upon his knowledge of Pitt's general purposes than 
upon the instructions received from Grenville. Pitt was wholly 
pleased with the result, § but Grenville was still distrustful of Prussia, 
though publicly expressing his satisfaction, || and his suspicions were 
speedily confirmed by the actual progress of events. Prussia refused 
to move her troops until the first subsidies were paid, and England 
was slow in making the payments. Frederick William II was in fact 
again yielding to the influence of that party in Berlin which saw 
Prussia's real interests in the exploitation of Poland, and by June, 
1794, even Malmesbury had reached the conclusion that effective Prus- 
sian aid was not to be expected. TI Nevertheless both he and Pitt clung 
to the remote hope of honesty in the Prussian government and success- 
fully opposed Grenville' s proposition of an immediate withdrawal of 
subsidies if the Prussian troops did not at once begin their march to 
the Rhine.** Grenville yielded with good grace, for the time had now 
come, as he hoped, for the realization of his own essential line of policy. 
While, therefore, Malmesbury was hurrying from post to post in the 
vain effort to infuse some energy into the Prussian camps, and while 
Mollendorf was secretly opening those negotiations with the French 
that were to lead to Prussia's complete withdrawal from the war, Gren- 
ville had brought Pitt and the English Cabinet to accept a project for 
an Austrian alliance that should go far in compensating for the treacherj' 
of Prussia, ft The plan as originally outlined did not necessarily mean 

* Diary, Dec. 26, 1793. Malmesbury, III, 28. 

t For analysis, see Koch, IV, 269-271. For text, see Pari. Hist., XXXI, 433. 

X Malmesbury to Grenville, March 13, 1794. Malmesbury, III, 77. 

§ Pitt to Grenville, April 24, 1794. Dropmore, II, 552. 

II In the Parliamentary debate on the treaty on April 30, 1794, there is nothing to 
indicate Grenville's opposition to the project. Indeed, he seems unnecessarily 
explicit in stating his personal approval, as if denying a rumor that he was opposed 
to it. ' ' He was free to say that he never had had two opinions on the question, 
whether he should confine the aid to the stipulated succour of the former treaty, or 
extend it to that which was now secured." Pari. Hist., XXXI, 453. 

If Malmesbury to Grenville, June 21, 1794. Dropmore, II, 577. 

** Pitt to Grenville, June 29, 1794. Ibid., 592. Portland to Malmesbury, July 23, 
1794. Malmesbury, III, 124. 

ft Auckland wrote to Henry Spencer on September 18, 1794 : " The moment for 
Lord Grenville making his proposed great arrangement is at hand, for the mes- 
senger went last Saturday with the final instructions to Lord Spencer and Mr. 
Grenville • • • •." Auckland, III, 241. The terms used here and elsewhere 
on diplomatic projects indicate Auckland to mean that the Austrian project was 
due wholly to Grenville. 



28 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POIvICY. 

the withdrawal of Prussia, but as it was gradually developed came to be 
regarded as an alternative proposition to be executed in case of the fail- 
ure of Malmesbury's mission.* In the latter part of July, 1794, Spencer 
and Thomas Grenville were despatched to Vienna, while Merc)^ received 
orders from Thugut to proceed to London. f As soon as he learned of 
this new negotiation, Malmesbury, already disheartened, definitely gave 
up hope of realizing his object and asked to be recalled.! This was 
not at once granted, Grenville' s purpose being apparently to use his 
known activities as a lever at Vienna, and it was not until October 24, 
some days after the Prussian subsidies had been officially stopped, that 
the recall was sent.§ By that time it was evident that England and 
Austria could not as yet agree upon the terms of a treaty.]] Grenville 
had expected to find a willingness at the court of Vienna to accept 
English direction in the conduct of the war, provided only a liberal 
subsid)^ and a specific guaranty of conquests were granted. Instead, 
his diplomats found a suspicious court and a changeable policy, while 
Grenville was hampered by his very loyalty to his Dutch ally, whose 
preposterous demands for indemnities vexed the Austrian ministers. 
Austria was anxious to exchange the Netherlands for Bavaria, and in- 
directly sounded the English ministr)' on this point, but did not venture 
to propose it openly. "jf Other considerations complicated the negotia- 
tion, and the English ministry, apparently frightened at the whirlpool 
of diplomacy in which it was in danger of being involved, hastened to 
withdraw its agents. 

A few months later the rapid march of French armies forced England 
to acquiesce in a request for peace by Holland.** It was a time of hu- 
miliation for the English government. England had entered upon the 
war fully convinced that a speedy victory would follow the combined 
efforts of the allies, and thus the attention of both Pitt and Gren\dlle 
was at first directed principall}' to the form of government to be estab- 
lished in France and the nature of the indemnities to be secured. The 
essential feature of the English plan was the restitution of Belgium to 
Austria, that it might constitute a bulwark in defense of Holland. It 

*For Pitt's memoir on the plan, July 15, 1794, see Dropmore, II, 599. Thomas 
Grenville to Grenville, Aug. 4, 1794. Ibid., 609. 

t Grenville to Hertford, July 17, 1794. Ibid., 601. 

J Malmesbury to Grenville, Sept. 20, 1794. Ibid., 633. 

? The subsidies were stopped on October 19. For a resume of the Prussian point 
of view, see Grenville's note on a memorial presented b}'^ Jacobi. Ibid., Ill, 536. 

II Court and Cabinets, II, 259-317 ; Sybel, III, 24S-251. 

^Ibid., 248-251. Both Buckingham's Court and Cabinets and the letters in 
Dropmore (II, 600-640) leave the impression of surprise and dismay at the difficulty 
of the Austrian negotiation and the diversity of subjects to be considered. 

"* Cabinet minute of November 18, 1794. Dropmore, II, 646. 



THB NEW PRUSSIAN PROPOSALS. 29 

was natural, therefore, that Grenville, uninformed of the real indiffer- 
ence of Austria to the Netherlands, and personally suspicious since 1791 
of the methods and purposes of the Prussian court, should be inclined 
to an Austrian rather than to a Prussian alliance. Pitt, on the other 
hand was, by the credit attaching to his diplomacy m virtue of the 
Triple Alliance of 1788, more favorable to a close friendship with 
Prussia After the withdrawal of Prussia in 1794 no hope was seri- 
ously entertained of effective aid from that quarter, though in moments 
of desperation Pitt, and at times even Grenville, renewed futile attempts 
to secure it. These divergences of opinion in the Cabinet had not as 
yet amounted to a real disagreement, but the divergence existed and 
was in some degree at least a factor in determining the diplomatic 
action of the English government. The Prussian withdrawal was m 
no sense the result of Grenville's hostile attitude, but the quick turn to 
Austria was a distinct victory for a line of policy long considered and 
now matured by him. Momentarily, however, an Austrian convention 
seemed impossible of achievement, due not to any opposition by Pitt, 
but to the inability of the two governments to agree upon terms. 

PORTLAND'S ACCESSION AND THE NEW PRUSSIAN PROPOSALS. 

JUI.Y, 1794, TO February, 1795. 

While events rather than personal ascendency were thus bringing 
Grenville's foreign policy into the foreground, an incident of home 
politics disclosed the fact that Pitt was the master in that field at least, 
and that he did not have so high a regard for Grenville's diplomatic 
services as to be unwilling to sacrifice him to the needs of party organi- 
zation Tentative suggestions in July, 1792, for the accession of the 
Portland wing of the Whig party had resulted in November of that 
year in definite proposals by Pitt for a coalition.* These were refused, 
and it was not until July, i794, that the breach between Fox and Port- 
land had reached the point where complete rupture was inevitable. 
Portland headed a defection of Whig politicians composed of men who 

*The neeotiations for a coalition with Portland in 1792 have not been proyed to 
theltSion of historians. Oscar Browning in ''Enganda„dFnc^^^^^^^ 
concludes that no definite proposals were made by Pitt, a"^". ^^f /^-^^^^f^^'^'^L^ 
account is untrustworthy, being based wholly on Loughborough's statements The 

ham to Grenville, Nov. 27. Dropmore, II, 294, 299, 335, 344- 



30 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POUCY. 

could no longer uphold the radical doctrines of Fox, and in order to 
reward them for their support and bind them to his policy Pitt was 
compelled to make a number of Cabinet changes. This rearrangement 
was not difl&cult except in the case of Portland, to whom it v/as neces- 
sary to give one of the chief departments. Pitt was in a quandary and 
in his perplexity turned to Grenville, who had been urgent for the 
inclusion of Portland. He found no other solution than that Grenville 
should resign the Foreign Department to Portland, receiving in its place 
the Home Department, but without the conduct of the war, which was 
to be retained by Dundas.* Immediately upon the receipt of Pitt's 
letter suggesting the arrangement, Grenville replied : 

" I and my situation are, as you well know, entirely and always at 
your disposal, and • • • • besides, I agree with you in thinking 
the expedient you propose the best to avoid an alternative which seems 
either way embarrassing. Under these circumstances I do not ask 
myself whether what is proposed is oris not a sacrifice on my part, but 
am ready at once to say that no consideration could reconcile to my 
mind the standing for a moment in the way of your wishes, or of so 
great a public object as is in question." f 

Two days later, however, Pitt found that the Foreign Office would 
not be agreeable to Portland, and finally concluded the rearrangement 
by dividing Dundas' s department, Portland assuming the direction of 
home and colonial affairs, while Dundas continued to manage the War 
Office, t The incident had, then, no immediate effect whatever on 
foreign policy, though it unquestionably gained Grenville the grateful 
confidence of the more solid portion of the new element in Pitt's min- 
istry. It does indicate, however, that Pitt did not regard Grenville 
as indispensable in the department of foreign affairs, and at the same 
time it well illustrates the intimacy existing between the two men. 
Grenville' s willingness to sacrifice his own personal preferences in 
order to insure party success § could but increase Pitt's respect and 
incline him to listen to Grenville' s advice, and it was in this very 
intimacy that Grenville' s influence chiefly lay at this period. Differ- 
ences as to policy were as yet the differences in private of warm per- 
sonal friends and had not developed into Cabinet controversies. 

It was as a result of the introduction of this Whig element into the 
Tory ministry that Grenville soon began to assume a more independent 

*Pitt to Grenville, July 5, 1794. Dropmore, II, 595. 

t Grenville to Pitt, July 5, 1794. Ibid., 596. 

jpitt to Grenville, July 7, 1794. Ibid., 597. 

§ In October, 1794, Grenville voluntarily offered to resign if it would assist Pitt 
in making arrangements for the recall of Westmorland from Ireland to make room 
for Fitzwilliam, but Pitt would not consider it. Stanhope, II, 284. 



THE NEW PRUSSIAN PROPOSALS. 3! 

attitude on questions of foreign policy. Portland and his friends 
had joined Pitt because they believed in the necessity of the war and 
could no longer support the tactics of Fox in opposition to that policy. 
Gradually Grenville and Pitt grew apart, the former becoming more 
warlike in his sentiments, the latter more pacific. In the end Gren- 
ville was supported by the Portland Whigs as against Pitt, while in 
general Pitt found that the addition of the Whigs tended to destroy 
that unanimity which had heretofore been so marked a characteristic 
of his ministry. This development was not yet foreseen, nor had it 
been fully accomplished when next a difference of opinion arose be- 
tween Pitt and Grenville. The failure of Grenville' s Austrian nego- 
tiations in November of 1794 had momentarily set aside the thought 
of a close military alliance with any power, but in December George III 
himself revived the Austrian project,* the chief obstacle to which was 
Thugut's demand for a substantial loan. The financial distress in 
England made it impossible for the ministry to promise such a loan 
until it had had the opportunity of laying the matter before Parlia- 
ment, but meanwhile an unsatisfactory arrangement was made by 
which temporary advances were given to Austria. While the whole 
question of a systematic alliance with Austria was thus being neces- 
sarily postponed, it daily became more evident that Prussia was fast 
turning toward peace with France. Pitt, vexed with Thugut's stub- 
bornness in demanding a burdensome loan and convinced that Prussia 
was the only power able to render efficient aid in a proposed recon- 
quest of Holland, determined to bring forward again the plan of a 
Prussian subsidy. Already in December of 1794 Malmesbury, who 
was at Brunswick, deriving from an unpromising despatch by Paget a 
faint hope that Prussia might yet reenter the war, had written a final 
letter of appeal to Haugwitz,f though in explaining to Grenville 
this unauthorized communication he described his letter as one of 
indignant upbraiding. I On February 3, 1795, Malmesbury informed 
Grenville that Prussia was vexed at the excessive demands of the 
French and was about to renew war.§ A few days after this letter 
should have been received in London, Pitt brought forward his plan 
of a new Prussian subsidy to infuse new energy into the war and to 
keep Prussia from making peace with France. |j Grenville 's opposition 

* George III to Grenville, Dec. 7, 1794. Dropmore, II, 650. 

t Diary, Dec, 1794, and Malmesbury to Paget, Dec. 25, 1794. Malmesbury, III, 
184-185, 228. 
JDec. 23, 1794. Dropmore, II, 653. 

I Malmesbury, III, 240. 

II This plan has been vaguely suspected by historians, but is customarily omitted 
in narratives of the period for lack of satisfactory proof. The fact that the details 
of this episode are for the first time brought out by the Dropmore MSS. seems to 
justify a more extended examination than the incident would otherwise require. 



32 THK INFI^UENCE OF GRENVII^LE ON PiTT'vS FOREIGN POLICY. 

was instant and determined, and he informed Pitt that in case the plan 
was insisted upon he must resign from the Cabinet. Pitt was much 
agitated at the thought of a rupture with Grenville, though he cannot 
have been unaware that the latter' s inclination to an Austrian alliance 
and his distrust of Prussia would cause him to oppose the project. In 
the last week of February Pitt wrote to Grenville : 

"I have been trying to put together what, according to mj' ideas, 
should be the instruction on this unfortunate subject of Prussia, and 
have desired a Cabinet to be fixed for twelve tomorrow. I should 
wish much to see you first, and will be at leisure whenever you please 
at eleven. The more I think on the business the more uneasiness I 
feel at what 5^ou seemed likely to determine, and I want much to talk 
it over with you at large. I cannot help thinking that the real point 
of honour and duty in such difi&culties as the present lies the other wa^^ ; 
and, at all events, I am sure you will not wonder at m}^ anxiety to tell 
you all that on reflection strikes me." * 

Grenville' s objections to a Prussian subsidy were drawn up in a long 
memoir,"!" i^ which he reviewed former relations with Prussia and 
found in them and in the known interests of that state conclusive 
reasons against an English offer of subsidy. He argued that Frederick 
William II and his ministers were untrustworthy, that the money 
offered was not sufficient, that Prussia's preponderance in Holland and 
her rivalry with Russia were best served b}^ a French alliance, that 
honest cooperation was not to be hoped for, that Prussia would use an 
offer from England merely to get better terms from France, and that 
Pitt's government would be discredited at home unless the treaty should 
prove an entire and unqualified success. In the course of his memoir 
Grenville exhibited his conviction that Austria was England's true 
ally. The real solution of all Prussian policy, he asserted, was the 
fear of Austria : ' ' What other clue will so naturally explain the 
whole political conduct of the King of Prussia since the commence- 
ment of the war, as a determination to prevent the acquisition of a 
barrier to Austria on that side [the Netherlands], while that object 
was in question ; and afterwards a determination to hinder the recovery 
of those Provinces. ' ' Prussia must be let go that Austria and Russia 
may be firmly bound to England. " The hope of uniting those three 
Courts [Prussia, Russia, and Austria] in one common system is one 
which neither our pa.st experience nor any view of their present situation 
and disposition towards each other seem to justify. If this cannot be 
done, the option must be made, and being made, must be adhered to." 

*The date of this letter is between Feb. 20 and 28, 1795. Dropmore, III, 25. 
t Ibid. , 26-30. 



THE NEW PRUSSIAN PROPOSAI^S. 33 

Grenville's determination to resign was unciianged, though it is not 
evident that any one save Pitt was aware of it. Pitt was profoundly 
disturbed at the disagreement and on March 2 wrote to Grenville : 

' ' It would be useless to tell you on how many accounts I am misera- 
ble at what appears to be your determination. I am not at all sure, 
however, that the decision [of the Cabinet] will not be different to- 
morrow, and if it is, tho' I shall feel comfort in one respect, I am not 
sure, that with my view of the question, I shall not be at least as ill 
satisfied as now." * 

In any case, Pitt was anxious that Grenville should postpone his res- 
ignation until the end of the Parliamentary session, his reason being 
that the proposal for a new Prussian subsidy was as yet a Cabinet secret. 

Meanwhile the opposition in the Commons were basing their argu- 
ments against an Austrian loan upon the failure of the previous sub- 
sidy to Prussia, t and as yet no opening in regard to the new plan had 
been made at Berlin. At the same time Grenville was pushing his 
plan of a closer alliance with Austria, and thus attempting to weaken 
Pitt's determination. On March 8, Stahremberg, the Austrian ambas- 
sador in England, wrote privately to Grenville urging a plan of cam- 
paign which omitted all idea of Prussian aid, but required more effective 
Austrian assistance and more substantial help given to the French 
royalists. I Grenville referred this to Cornwallis,§ who approved it, 
and Pitt also took it under consideration. || In spite, therefore, of his 
previous insistence, nothing was done by Pitt to realize his project until 
news from abroad seemingly increased the hope of a change in Prussian 
sentiment. The negotiations at Basle between France and Prussia had 
been begun on January 13, but on February 5 Goltz, the Prussian 
negotiator, died ver)^ suddenly, and nothing was done until March 8, 
when Hardenberg reached Basle. ^ In the course of his journey to 
Switzerland, Hardenberg contrived an indirect communication with 
Malmesbury, in which he said that Prussia would be glad to reenter the 
war in case England would come forward with a subsidy.** Malmes- 
bury at first thought this a mere intrigue to bring pressure to bear on 
France, tt but on March 24 he was told by the Duke of Brunswick that 

*Dropmore, III, 30. 

t See the speeches of Fox on February 23 and May 28, 1795. Pari. Hist., XXXI, 
1315-1321, XXXII, 38-41. 
J. Dropmore, III, 31. 

i Cornwallis to Grenville, March 19, 1795, Ihid., 34. 
|l Cornwallis to Grenville, March 31, 1795. Ibid., 45. 

\ For dates and resume of the negotiations at Basle, see Koch, IV, 294-300. 
** Malmesbury to Harcourt, March 16, 1795. Malmesbury, III, 253. 
tt Diary, March 24, 1795. Ibid., 213. 



34 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PiTT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

Prussia was decidedl)^ in earnest. Malmesbury was then on his way 
to England, and immediately after his arrival in London, on April 4, 
Pitt resumed with enthusiasm his scheme of a Prussian subsidy. In- 
structions were drawn up ordering Spencer at Berlin to open negotia- 
tions with the King in person.* On April 8, four days after Malmes- 
bury' s arrival, Grenville fulfilled his intentions by announcing his 
resignation to George III,t though conformably to Pitt's request this 
action was not made public. On April 10 Malmesbury wrote to L- 
Crawford from the Secretary of State's ofiice, inclosing a letter to Har- 
denberg notifying him of what England proposed to do and urging 
him to delay signing a treaty with France until he had heard from 
Berlin ; X but Pitt was too late. The peace of Basle had been signed on 
April 5, and as soon as the news reached London all hope of Prussian 
aid was put aside. Fortunately for Pitt's reputation, the English 
agents to whom instructions had been sent were wise enough to defer 
their execution and to write for further instructions. § Spencer had 
indeed sought an interview with the King of Prussia, but had made no 
disclosure of Pitt's proposals. Grenville' s resignation was withdrawn, 
and the incident was closed without comment, for in England it w^as 
entirely unknown outside the Cabinet, || while on the continent only 
Hardenberg and Frederick William II had an}^ suspicions of it. Even 
here all that was known was that Spencer had intrigued for a hearing, 
and Hardenberg could not enjoy the satisfaction of feeling that his 
diplomatic intrigue — for such alone it was — had uearl}^ disrupted Pitt's 
Cabinet.Tl 

*This is shown by Spencer's letter to Grenville of April 24, 1795. Auckland, III, 
298. Charles Arbuthnot, writing to Croker February 22, 1845, states that " Mr. 
Dundas (Ivord Melville) acted for a short time as Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, and sent the instructions to Berlin." Croker, II, 371. 

t Dropniore, III, 50. The reply of George III, on April 9, shows that the King 
had at first agreed with Grenville, but that he had been won over to the side of 
Pitt by repeated Austrian reverses. 

X Malmesbury, III, 254. 

? Spencer to Grenville, April 24, 1795. Auckland, III, 298. 

II Miles, who was a very shrewd collector of information, was entirely ignorant 
of the Prussian subsidy plan ; yet he thought himself informed of what was going 
on in the Cabinet. From December, 1794, to March, 1795, he was corresponding 
on his own account with Barthelemy, and was constantly writing to Pitt that France 
was favorable to a peace with England ; but no attention was paid to him. Miles, 
II, 217-243. The debates in both houses of Parliament during the period exhibited 
an entire ignorance of Pitt's plan either by the opposition or by the governmental 
supporters not included in the Cabinet. 

^ Spencer's overture at Berlin has been treated by historians in various ways. 
Sybel, who covers the Treaty of Basle very thoroughly, makes no mention what- 
ever of an English offer to Prussia. Bourgoing (IV, 165) states that one of the 
reasons why Barthelemy exceeded his instructions and signed the treaty of Basle 
was that he knew England was reverting to the idea of subsidizing Prussia, but no 
authority is given. Schlosser (VI, 607) says: " lyord Henry Spencer, who came 



THE NEW PRUSSIAN PROPOSALS. 35 

As time passed, it became perfectly clear to Pitt that there had been 
at no time any chance for the success of his proposed subsidy to Prussia. 
The signing of the Treaty of Basle completely weaned him from his 
inclination toward Prussia, and thereafter he was even more hesitant 
than Grenville of making advances to that power. Grenville, on the 
other hand, though fully as distrustful of Prussian sincerity as formerly, 
came to regard the Prussian court as one that could be bought if the 
price were sufficiently attractive, and on several occasions attempted to 
purchase its aid, not by money, but by promises of territorial acquisi- 
tion. In the EngHsh Cabinet itself the incident clearly redounded to 

from Stockholm to Berlin expressly for that purpose, dared to offer 100,000 dollars to 
the Countess of Lichtenau for an audience, and a very large sum to the King, if he 
would consent to decline the peace." Schlosser's sole authority is the Memoires 
d'un Homme d'Etat, III, 135-137, drawn from Hardenberg's papers. Schlosser 
is thoroughly untrustworthy on English politics, for he is both unfamiliar with Eng- 
lish sources and exceedingly prejudiced. Sorel asserts that Spencer had opened at 
Berlin suggestions of a subsidy before Hardenberg's departure for Basle (IV, 255), 
notes Hardenberg's communication with Malmesbury, at Frankfort, March 16 
(IV, 279), and leaves the impression that Hardenberg did delay affairs at Basle as 
long as he dared. Thus Sorel states positively that the English subsidy plan was 
in the air. Incidentally he confuses Lord Henry Spencer with Earl Spencer, a 
member of the Cabinet, stating that the latter was at Berlin. A comparison of the 
correspondence of Auckland, with whom Spencer was very intimate, and the Drop- 
more MSS. proves conclusively that there was no positive knowledge on the con- 
tinent of Pitt's plan, and that no offer was made to Frederick William II. Thus 
Spencer, far from going to Berlin " expressly for that purpose," was chosen for the 
Prussian position as early as September, 1794 (Dropmore, II, 621 ; Grenville to 
Malmesbury, Aug. 16, 1794), and he left Stockholm on December 13, before Pitt 
had brought forward his plan. Spencer, when he reached Berlin, did not even 
know that negotiations were about to be opened at Basle. Auckland, III, 279 ; 
Spencer to Auckland, Jan. 6, 1795. On February 23 Spencer wrote to the English 
Foreign Ofl&ce that the Treaty of Basle would surely be signed, Prussia "not 
receiving any offers from England." Ibid., 287; Spencer to Auckland. The 
resume of the Cabinet situation in the body of this article shows that no decision 
had been reached in England at this time, and no instructions sent to Spencer. 
If, then, Spencer made any opening to Hardenberg, as Sorel states, it was on his 
own initiative solely, and was merely suggestive. On March 30 Spencer wrote to 
Grenville : "From the present appearance of things on the Continent, I take it for 
granted that it is not the intention of his Majesty's ministers to prevent, by any 
new overtures or proposals, the final conclusion of the treaty which this Court is 
now negotiating with the French Convention." Dropmore, III, 561. He also 
asked for a leave of absence, conclusive proof that up to April, 1795, no hint of 
Pitt's purpose had reached him. The Cabinet decision to make an offer to Prussia 
was reached on April 8. Dropmore, III, 50 ; Grenville to George III. At some 
time between that date and April 17, when the news of the Treaty of Basle reached 
London, instructions were sent to apply to the King of Prussia, as is shown by 
Spencer's letter to Grenville of April 24. Auckland, III, 298. It also appears from 
the same letter that Spencer had so far carried out his instructions as to secure an 
interview with Frederick William II, but that, already aware of the Treaty of Basle, 
he did not disclose Pitt's plan, and merely expressed England's regret at Prussia's 
action. It is possible that Hardenberg, after his interview with Malmesbury, had 
an idea that England might again come forward with a subsidy. It is probable 
that Spencer did bribe the Countess of Lichtenaii in order to secure a personal in- 
terview with the King, for such bribery was customary at the Prussian court ; but 
it is certain that no opening to the King was made before the Treaty of Basle was 
signed, and that no offer was made al any time. 



36 THK INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POI.ICY. 

the credit of Grenville, and it is from this moment that he could count 
upon a distinct following among its members. At the same time Pitt 
himself recognized the service that Grenville' s stubborn opposition had 
rendered and was happy to resume relations of confidence and trust 
with his foreign minister. 



FIRST OVERTURES OF PEACE TO FRANCE. 

October, 1795, to April, 1796. 

The confident expectation of victory with which Grenville entered 
upon the campaign of 1795 was not fulfilled. An alliance with Russia 
had been signed February 18, 1795, and on May 20 the protracted 
negotiations with Austria resulted in a formal treaty. From the Rus- 
sian treaty not much was expected, but Grenville believed that in 
alliance with Austria, England would secure a rapid victory. In 
attacking the colonies of France and her allies, England was indeed 
successful and rejoiced in the conquest of Ceylon and the Cape of Good 
Hope, but on the continent the failure of the Quiberon expedition and 
the inaction of the Austrian forces on the Rhine tended to discourage 
the ministry. Spain, too, made peace with France, while the war of 
factions in Paris failed to encourage the English government, for in 
Ivondon itself tumults and riots were the order of the day. 

Moreover, England and Austria were equally suspicious of each 
other's motives and diplomacy. Wickham, Grenville's most trusted 
ao-ent, was writing from SAvitzerland that offers were passing between 
Vienna and Paris.* Thugut, earnest for the war yet hampered by the 
Polish situation, could not be convinced that the English ministers were 
not responsible for Hanover's acceptance of the Prussian scheme of 
neutrality. t Thus various conditions, combined with the establish- 
ment of the Directorate in France, giving some promise of an orderly 
and stable government, brought about a readiness to treat for peace, 
and by September this readiness had expanded into a definite inten- 
tion on the part of the ministry to make at least an opening in that 
direction. 

The first step looking toward peace was the determination by the 
English Cabinet to send Pelham to Vienna to sound the Austrian gov- 

* Wickham to Grenville, Aug. 12, and to Morton Eden. Aug. 18, 1795. Wickham, 
I, 152, 155. On Carletti's intrigues see Sybel, III, 43i#, and Sorel, IV, 302. 
' t Morton Eden to Auckland, May 15, 1796: "It appears impossible for me to 
convince any one that' his Majesty's English ministers have no influence over the 
counsels of his Hanoverian Government." Auckland, III, 335. 



FIRST OVERTURES OF PEACE TO FRANCE. 37 

ernment.* At the same time instructions were given to Morton Eden 
to try to come to some clear understanding with Austria on the subject 
of war or peace. Portland objected to this despatch, though more from 
the effect it would be likely to have on Austrian military action than 
from opposition to peace, and^ whether from this reason or some other, 
Pelham was not sent. f Grenville wrote to Morton Kden on October 10: 

" In our present situation, we might possibl}^ not find it very diffi- 
cult to make either war or peace with advantage, if Austria will set her 
shoulders to the work in earnest." J 

A series of unexpected Austrian victories in October somewhat 
changed the situation. The King considered the action of the Cabinet 
to have been premature, for on October 27 he wrote to Grenville : 

" No attempt ought to be encouraged of opening a negotiation, which 
ever has the effect of destroying all energy in those who ought to look 
forward to the continuance of war." § 

And on November 30 he wrote again : 

' ' I think no problem in Euclid more true than that if the French are 
well pressed in the next year, their want of resources and other inter- 
nal evils must make the present shocking chaos crumble to pieces. "|| 

Nevertheless, Pitt and Grenville were still determined to draw up 
instructions to Austria on the lines already indicated, and in the King's 
speech at the opening of the Parliamentary session on October 29 the 
statement was made that, if the changes in France brought into exist- 
ence a government desirous of peace, England would be willing to treat 
on terms satisfactory and honorable to herself and her allies, f This 
was received with unbelieving derision by the Parliamentary opposi- 
tion, but on December 8 a message from the throne proposed a vote in 
favor of a negotiation for peace, and Pitt asserted his sincerity and 
expressed his belief that a satisfactory treaty was now possible.** The 
vote was given as requested and on January 30 instructions were sent 
to Morton Eden at Vienna, and to Wickham at Berne, in accordance 
with which the latter was to open communication^ with Barthelemy, 
the French agent in Switzerland, ff England expressed her desire for a 
general peace and asked the French government to suggest the means 
and conditions of a congress. 

* Grenville to George III, Sept. 21, 1795. Dropmore, III, 134. 
t Portland to Grenville, Sept. 23, 1795. Ibid., 135. 
Xlbid., 137. 

I Ibid., 143. 

II Ibid., 149. Another objector was the Earl of Mornington. See letter to Gren- 
ville, ibid. 

\Parl. Hist., XXXII, 142. 

** Ibid., 570-603. 

ft For text of note to Barthelemy and the French answer see Debrett, IV, 254-256. 



38 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

The proposal of peace made to France in January of 1796 has usually 
been regarded as a mere ruse on the part of Pitt and as intended 
wholly for the benefit of the partisans of peace among his own fol- 
lowers.* The vigorous English preparations for a continuance of the 
war and the extreme retrocessions insisted upon by Pitt if peace were 
made are cited in support of this view ; but those who hold it have 
failed to appreciate the real hope Pitt felt that the convulsions in 
France were about to end in the establishment of a government in- 
clined to give up the territories acquired during the last few years in 
return for an acknowledgment of its own stability and permanence. 
Pitt knew nothing of the sentiment rapidly developing in France 
tending to identify patriotism with the retention of the left bank of 
the Rhine. t He honestly believed that the French government ought, 
if sensible, to be satisfied with recognition within its ancient limits, 
and thus believing, he hoped for peace. His excessive ideas as to the 
extent of the necessary retrocessions were therefore due to a failure 
to appreciate the actual situation, and are not an evidence of a lack of 
good faith. In regard to the continuance of military preparations, 
Pitt's fixed idea was that he could use them to awe France into signing 
a peace,! ^^^ ^^ ^^Y ^^.se it would have been the height of folly to 
limit England's readiness for war before a negotiation was actually 
begun. The relations of England and Austria in the summer and fall 
of 1795 are evidence that Pitt really desired and hoped for peace, for 
although Pelham was not sent to Vienna, Morton Eden was instructed 
repeatedly to secure from Thugut a definite answer as to whether he 
wished to recover the Netherlands, and Jackson in September was 
despatched as a special envoy to confer upon this point. Thugut re- 
fused an explicit answer, § and the suspicions of Austria's duplicity, 
constantly forwarded by English agents abroad, caused the English 
ministry to fear that Austria was preparing to yield the Netherlands 
to France in return for territory elsewhere. France was in fact offer- 
ing Bavaria to Austria in compensation for the left bank of the Rhine. || 
The central point of English policy at this time was that France should 
not be permitted to retain Belgium, and Pitt was eager to press this 
solution while Austria was still in alliance with England. In England 

* For example see Sybel, IV, 140^. 

t Sorel, IV, 374 : " C'est un brevet de ' patriotisme ' que de se prononcer pour le 
barriere du Rhin." But J. H. Rose controverts this. See article iu English His- 
torical Review, April, 1903, p. 287. Rose also maintains the genuineness of the 
English offer of peace. 

X Pitt to Addington, Oct. 4, 1795. Stanhope, II, 328. 

§ Morton Eden to Auckland, Nov. 8, 1795. Auckland, III, 320. 

II Sorel, IV, 425. 



FIRST ove;rtures op peace to prance, 39 

itself those in close touch with the government appreciated that a 
tendency to peace was growing in the ministry. Auckland, who at 
this very time was in constant communication with Pitt upon the 
details of the great financial showing that was to awe the French gov- 
ernment, pubHshed in October, 1795, a carefully written pamphlet 
stating the arguments in favor of peace, Auckland in private was 
always an advocate of peace, but was essentially a party man and far too 
careful of his own political interests ever to venture an open struggle 
against the prevailing current of opinion, Burke regarded Auckland's 
pamphlet as an indication of a change in the intentions of the ministry, 
and was accordingly bitter and despondent.* 

But if Pitt was hopeful that the time had arrived when a satisfactory 
peace might be concluded, Grenville was far from that opinion. There 
was no disagreement between the two men as to the advisability of 
that peace, if it could be secured upon the extreme terms demanded 
by the English government. The difference was rather one of tem- 
perament and of judgment, Pitt eagerly hoped for peace ; Grenville 
had no hope, but was willing to try the experiment. Pitt would gladly 
have accepted the Directorate as a satisfactory government in France, 
though he was not sure of its permanence ; Grenville would grudgingly 
have tolerated it. Pitt regarded the influence of peace proposals on 
home politics as of secondary importance ; Grenville considered this 
the essential benefit of the negotiation. When in December the King's 
message had requested a Parliamentary vote in favor of opening nego- 
tiations with France, Grenville had hastened to allay the fears of 
Austria, and to instruct English agents that the vote in question 
meant no more than that England recognized in France a government 
with which it was possible to treat, if so desired, f Eater, when it was 
determined to despatch the note to Barthelemy, Grenville wrote to the 
King that personally he was strongly in favor of the proposal, and that 
it ' ' could not but produce the most advantageous effects both at home 
and abroad. If it should, in the result, produce from France such an 
answer as it seems most reasonable to expect, from what is know^n of 
the views and dispositions of the present rulers there, it would, as Eord 
Grenville hopes, give additional energy and animation to the public 
mind here, and would probably lead to much discontent and demur in 
France, ' ' % Grenville added that if France should really prove amenable 
to reason, he would also be grateful. 

* Auckland sent his pamphlet to Burke, who replied October 30, 1795, Burke's 
Works, V, 355. 

t Grenville to Wickham, Dec. 25, 1795. Wickham, I, 227. Stahremberg to 
Grenville, Dec, 1795. Dropmore, III, 165. 

J Jan. 30, 1796, Ibid., 169, 



40 THE INFI^UBNCE OP GRENVIIvLE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

This letter was in part a plea to overcome the King's opposition, 
but that it represents Grenville's real sentiments is unquestionable, 
for on February 9, 1796, in sending the overture to Barthelemy, he 
wrote Wickham in much the same terms and betrayed the same lack 
of faith in the negotiation.* There was then, beyond question, no 
disagreement between Pitt and Grenville, though the latter probably 
preferred war to peace with the existing government of France. He 
could not, however, openly object so long as Pitt's ideas of peace were 
fixed to a restitution by France of the territories she had conquered, 
together with a retention by Kngland of a part at least of her recently 
acquired colonies. The offer to France, acquiesced in by Austria, f 
received the answer that the Directory was prohibited by law from 
negotiating upon the cession of any part of the French Republic. The 
undiplomatic terms of the French note were construed as an insult to 
the English nation and were in some measure effective in rousing the 
English public. At once new and more energetic plans of campaign 
were put forward in conjunction with Austria. Thus the principal 
benefits which Grenville saw in the negotiation were realized. 



GFIENVILLE PLANS TO RECOVER PRUSSIAN AID. 
February to August, 1796. 

The fact that while Pitt really hoped for peace, Grenville looked 
toward a continuance of the war is further borne out by two contem- 
porary considerations, the first of which bore a direct relation to the 
proposal of peace, while the second involved the opening of a plan, 
distinctly Grenville's own, for increasing the forces that might be used 
against France. The first was the question of continuing aid to the 
royalists of France. The failure of previous efforts to organize the 
royalists still in France and the disasters experienced by the expedi- 
tions sent out from England had convinced Pitt that little was to be 
expected from such enterprises. When, therefore, the hope of peace 
began to gain ground in England, Pitt became unfavorable to further 
expenditure in aid of the royalists, and he thought that the money 

* Wickham, I, 269. 

t Whether Austria actively joined in the proposal to France is a disputed point. 
Pitt stated in the Commons on May 10, 1796, that the step was taken " in concert 
with them [England's allies], though they were not formally made parties to the 
proposal." Pari. Hist., XXXII, 1135. Sybel says Thugut refused to join. Sybel, 
IV, 152. But Morton Eden wrote to Auckland on June 13, 1796, in a private letter, 
that Thugut sent a separate note to France, similar to Wickham's, and received 
a very insolent reply which he preferred to keep secret. Auckland, III, 345. 



GRENVII.LE PLANS TO RECOVER PRUSSIAN AID. 4 1 

could be mucli more wisely spent in an attack on the French colonies 
recently acquired by the treaty of peace with Spain.* Windham, the 
determined advocate of the French nobility, appealed to Grenville, 
urging that it would be dishonorable for England to desert those 
whom she had encouraged to insurrection, and folly to withdraw the 
assistance already pledged. f Grenville became at once the champion 
of the royalists, X and was indeed at the moment concerting with Wick- 
ham a great royalist movement from Switzerland. § Accordingly he 
opposed that part of Pitt's plan which involved the discontinuance 
of royalist efforts within the borders of France, and although Pitt still 
thought that the Count of Artois should be informed of the possibility 
of a treaty of peace between England and the Directorate, || he yielded 
to Grenville' s insistence and the preparations for renewed risings were 
continued. H Windham had written to Grenville on October 11 : 

" We shall really risk something more than injury to a cause which 
includes all other causes, if, as long as we maintain the war, and till we 
formally apprize the Royalists that they must no longer count upon 
our support * * ' ' we do not continue to afford them all such 
assistance as we cannot show to be actually out of our power. ' ' ** 

Grenville strongly supported this view, and it was his reference to 
Pitt of Windham's letter, together with a statement of his own entire 
approval, that persuaded Pitt to yield. 

A second incident, contemporaneous with the proposal of peace made 
to France and indicating Grenville's expectation of the continuance of 
hostilities, was the initiation of a plan by which he hoped that Prussia 
might be induced to renounce her neutrality and to reenter the war. 
As early as December, 1795, Elgin was instructed by Grenville to 
sound the Prussian government on the idea of resuming hostilities 
with France, but Elgin's reply was unfavorable, ff and it was not until 
February, 1796, that the matter was again taken up. On February 8, 
at the very time the Cabinet approved the note addressed to Bar- 
thelemy, a proposal was made by Grenville to seek a renewal of the 
Prussian alliance. The Cabinet adopted the suggestion, although it 
involved a decided departure from England's previous line of policy, 

* Pitt to Chatham, Aug. 3, 1795. ^tanhope, II, 349. 
t Windham to Grenville, Oct. 11, 1795. Dropmore, III, 137. 
J Buckingham to Grenville, Aug. 9 and 17, 1795. Ibid., 95, 99. Windham to 
Grenville, Aug. 16, 1795. Ibid., 98. 

f Wickham to Grenville, Sept. 6, 1795. Ibid., 129; also Wickham, I, 155-225. 

II Pitt to Grenville, Oct. 16, 1795. Dropmore, III, 140. 

11 Pitt to Grenville, Oct. 18, 1795. Ibid., 141. 

**Ibid., 138. 

tt Elgin to Grenville, Dec. 26, 1795. Ibid., 163. 



42 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLR ON PITT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

since it proposed the partitioning of weaker states among the greater 
powers. According to Grenville's plan, Prussia was to be won to a 
warhke activity by a promise of the WestphaUan provinces and the 
Netherlands, while Austria was to be compensated by the acquisition 
of Bavaria.* The King vigorously opposed the adoption of such a 
policy, terming it a disgrace to England that she should sink to the 
level of continental powers in proposing an unjustifiable spoliation of 
minor states. But while the plan as outlined was agreed to by the 
Cabinet, nothing appears to have been done at the time toward exe- 
cuting it. Grenville himself was doubtful if the time had arrived for 
making an offer to Prussia and distrusted the suggestions which had 
evidently been made by that power as merely intended to wring some 
concession from France, f while Elgin considered it so little likely that 
any overtures were to be made to Prussia that on May i he asked for 
leave of absence on the ground that there was nothing to do at Ber- 
lin. | In the meantime, however, various considerations had brought 
the matter to the front again. Late in April the news of Bona- 
parte's astonishing Italian victories reached England. Early in May 
Bentinck, who had for some months been investigating the likelihood 
of a rising in Holland in favor of the Stadtholder, became convinced 
that nothing was to be done without the aid of Prussia, and was hope- 
ful that Prussia was about to offer that aid.§ At the same time the 
mutual suspicions of England and Austria were renewed, and Gren- 
ville feared that Austria was secretly preparing to make a separate 
peace with France, j] He therefore refused Elgin's request for a leave 
of absence, hinting that important instructions might soon be ex- 
pected. If Bentinck' s hopes in regard to Prussia were based on rumors 
of difficulties with France, and these had existence in fact, though they 
did not tend to the solution desired by England. Prussia was striving 

* George III to Grenville, Feb. 9, 1796. Dropmore, III, 172, 173. 

t Grenville to Elgin, Feb. 9, 1796. Ibid., 174. 

Xlbid., 198. 

%Ibid., 150-159, 176, 208-211. Bentinck's correspondence with Grenville fills a 
large place in volume III of the Dropmore MSS. In December of 1795 he was very 
hopeful of a revolution in Holland, but as the months went by without any active 
steps being taken to bring this about, he became more and more convinced of the 
necessity of Prussian intervention, if anything was to be accomplished. His letters 
furnish excellent material for a study of conditions in Holland and of the political 
intrigues there. 

II Grenville to Morton Eden, May 24, 1796. Ibid., 206. The idea was widespread 
in England that Austria was arranging a separate peace- See opinions of Sheffield, 
Perregaux, Crauford, and Rose. Auckland, III, 347, 351, 352. See also Hudson 
to Charlemont, May 29, 1796. Charlemont, II, 273. Thugut was as suspicious of 
England as Grenville was of Austria. Morton Eden to Grenville, June 13, 1796. 
Dropmore, III, 208. 

^Grenville to Elgin, May 17 and June 23, 1796. Ibid., 206, 215. 



GRENVII.I,E PIvANS TO RECOVER PRUSSIAN AID. 43 

in the spring of 1796 to force France to yield her claim to the left 
bank of the Rhine and had gone so far as to form an army of observa- 
tion in Westphalia, but she had no serious intention of breaking with 
France.* Grenville was ignorant of Prussia's real purposes, and on 
receipt of an encouraging letter from Elgin he determined to risk an 
offer to the court of Berlin, though he was by no means confident of 
its success, t 

This new combination and the proposed means of accomplishing it 
originated entirely with Grenville. Pitt was not unwilling to make 
the experiment, but he did not count upon its success, and his real 
conviction was that England would soon be deserted by her allies in 
the contest with France. On June 23 he wrote to Grenville : 

"I can conceive no objection in the mind of any of our colleagues 
to see whether the arrangement to which you have pointed can be 
made acceptable both to Austria and Prussia. But though I think it 
should be tried, I do not flatter myself with much chance of success." J 

In the course of the following month the reports of English agents 
abroad strengthened Grenville in his determination to apply to Prussia. 
Bentinck furnished still further evidence in support of his idea that the 
court of Berlin was preparing to intervene in Holland. § Wickham 
announced the complete collapse of the system of ' ' partial insurrec- 
tions" in France, and foresaw that he would soon be forced to leave 
Switzerland. 1 1 Elgin reported the strong impression made at Berlin 
by the arguments of Gouverneur Morris, and experienced himself a 
more friendly intercourse with the Prussian ministers. H Morris,** who 

*Sybel, IV, 239-246. Koch, IV, 385. 

t Grenville to Buckingham, Aug. 14, 1796. Court and Cabinets, II, 348. 

JDropmore, III, 214. 

§ Bentinck to Grenville, July 5, 1796. Ibid., 217. 

II Wickham to Grenville, July 19, 1796. Ibid., 223. 

f Elgin to Grenville, July 28, 1796. Ibid., 225. 

** Morris had come to L,ondon in June, 1795, and almost immediately gained the 
ear of Grenville, to whom he outlined his vast ideas of continental combinations 
against France. In June, 1796, he journeyed to the continent, ostensibly going to 
Switzerland, but in reality traveling to various courts in the interests of England. 
He did not know the exact terms to be offered, but was aware of their general char- 
acter, and in a sense acted as an advance agent for England. Grenville and Morris 
agreed that the latter' s best line of argument was to show that Prussia was doomed 
to destruction if France was permitted to dictate terms of peace to Europe, and to 
exhibit Prussia's material advantage in an alliance with England and Austria. 
Grenville wrote of Morris, August 23, 1796 : "Great use may, however, I believe 
be made of him there [at Berlin]. • • • • His leanings are all favourable to us, 
and you are not ignorant how much they may be improved by attention and a 
proper degree of confidence." Ibid., 238. The letters between Grenville and 
Morris given in Dropmore are duplicates of those given in Morris's Diary and in 
Jared Sparks's Life of Gouverneur Morris. The latter book includes two letters 
not given elsewhere, the first of which is important, as it contains Granville's sug- 
gestions to Morris as to what he should urge at Berlin. Sparks, III, 89. 



44 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POLICY, 

seems to have exercised considerable influence in determining Gren- 
ville to attempt a new Prussian arrangement and who was in fact act- 
ing as an unofi&cial English agent, reported that the Prussian ministers 
were by no means disinclined to listen to overtures, and believed a new 
combination perfectly possible. Before all of this information reached 
lyondon it had finally been determined to send Hammond, an under 
secretary of state, to Berlin to outline the proposed exchanges and to 
offer a definite alliance.* George III was still bitterly opposed to the 
project, and unwillingly yielded to Grenville's argument that France 
could in no other way be deprived of the Netherlands than by giving 
them to Prussia, and that this necessarily involved compensating Aus- 
tria with Bavaria, t Meanwhile Austria was not informed of what was 
taking place, and when Thugut at a later date learned of the proposal 
he was highly indignant, t though it is unHkely that Grenville would 
have followed Morris's suggestion of coming to terms with Prussia 
without waiting for Austria's consent. § 

Morris left Berlin a few days before Hammond arrived, believing 
that he had paved the way for a successful negotiation ; but when on 
August 17 Hammond had a long interview with Haugwitz, he was 
convinced that the veiled proposals he was instructed to make were a 
complete surprise to the Prussian minister, while the embarrassed re- 
ply given him equally convinced him that nothing was to be expected 
from the Prussian court. || Haugwitz might well be surprised and em- 
barrassed, for on August 5, less than a fortnight before Hammond's 
interview, Prussia and France had signed a secret treaty committing 
Prussia to a system of neutrality. The English offer received no 
encouragement whatever,1I and upon the receipt of Hammond's report 
Grenville set aside for the time being all thought of a new combination 
that should include Prussia. 

* Grenville to George III, July 29, 1796. Dropmore, III, 227. Nominally this 
proposal outlined the exchanges preparatory to a general peace ; in reality it 
meant an alliance to force France to accept the terms agreed on. 

t Grenville to George III, July 31, 1796. Ibid., 228. 

jvSybel, IV, 318. Morton Eden to Auckland, Dec. 9, 1796. Auckland, III, 368. 

^ Morris to Grenville, Aug. 10, 1796. Dropmore, III, 563. 

IJ Hammond to Grenville, Aug. 17, 1796. Ibid., 235. 

\ Elgin to Grenville, Aug. 23, 1796. Ibid., 238 ; Pitt to Chatham, Sept. 4, 1796. 
Stanhope, II, 381. 



PITT'S SECOND PEACK PROPOSAI,. 45 

PITT'S SECOND PEACE PROPOSAL AND MALMESBURY'S MISSION 

TO PARIS. 

September to December, 1796. 

With the failure of Grenville's plan to secure the aid of Prussia the 
pendulum of English foreign policy swung back again to ideas of 
peace, though Grenville himself was in no wise inclined to discontinue 
war. Pitt, however, oppressed by the knowledge of the rapidly in- 
creasing financial difficulties of the English government, and believing 
that a change was imminent in the sentiments of the French Directory, 
reasserted his authority in the Cabinet and resolved to attempt once 
more a negotiation for peace. In August, 1796, he had had a number 
of secret conversations with one Nettement, a Frenchman claiming to 
represent a pacifically inclined faction of the Directory.* Nettement 
gave a detailed and truthful analysis of the political situation in France 
and urged that England should propose to France a negotiation for 
peace in so frank a way that the Directory ' ' should be forced to de- 
clare openly if it desires peace or wishes to continue the war."t The 
plan of negotiations proposed by this French agent was based more 
upon the idea of assisting the moderate party in Paris to gain control 
of the Directorate than upon any fixed belief tliat peace would be 
assured by such a result, but Pitt's readiness to listen to these indirect 
suggestions evinces his real interest in the main question. Throughout 
the summer of 1796 the English partisans of peace were active in push- 
ing their policy. Auckland urged Pitt to renew overtures to France 
and was corresponding with friends in Paris, by whom he was informed 
that the exact moment had arrived when a proposal from England 
must be listened to if made immediately, t while in non-political circles 
the rumor was current that the Cabinet had already reached the decision 
to end the war. It was even asserted that the ministrj^ and the oppo- 

* Smith MSS., 369. The papers of Joseph Smith, Pitt's private secretary, show 
that Sir R.Woodford brought Nettement and Pitt together and state the substance 
of conversations. 

■\ Ibid., 370-371. On August 15 Nettement returned to France, but before leav- 
ing wrote out his advice. He believed the Directory to be opposed to peace, 
but that it was afraid of the moderate party which advocated it, and that if the 
Directory "should haughtily reject the conditions of peace proposed by England, 
I should not be surprised by a union between the Moderates, who wish for peace, 
and the Jacobins, who do not love the Directory, in order to replace them by other 
governors. But as long as the British Administration has not made known its 
views in an authentic manner, they will be protected from every sort of inj9.uence, 
and will govern the armies and the people despotically " (p. 370). Nettement also 
adAHsed a protracted negotiation, and it is interesting to note that the methods he 
proposed were those actually employed in Malmesbury's negotiation at Paris. 

J Auckland to Pitt, July 30, 1796. Auckland, III, 352-354. 



46 THE INFI.UENCE OF GRENVIIvI/E ON PITT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

sition, Pitt and Fox, were to join hands in a great, friendly coalition 
whose patriotic unanimity should terrify France and so secure an 
honorable treaty.* The rumors of coalition were without foundation, 
but those prophesying a renewal of overtures to France were shortly 
realized in a Cabinet decision, for on September 2 it was agreed that 
an offer should be made through the medium of Wedel, the Danish 
minister at London, and in a letter to the King Grenville outlined the 
terms that might reasonably be expected if the negotiations were suc- 
cessfully concluded.! These were : to give to France Savoj^ Nice, and 
all of the Rhenish conquests not belonging to Austria, and all French 
colonies captured bj'- England ; to restore to Holland all colonies except 
the Cape, Ceylon, and Cochin ; to secure for Austria the status quo ante 
bellum ; but if France absolutely refused to return the Netherlands, and 
Austria was willing to accept the Bavarian exchange, England would 
consent to the transfer, provided the new ruler of the Netherlands was 
not too closely bound to France. 

The details of this plan are of interest as determining just how far 
Pitt was ready to go in order to secure peace. Grenville, discouraged 
at the outlook for the allies, was in entire harmony with his chief % 
and seems to have yielded momentaril}^ his personal convictions. 
Events soon revived his hopes, for immediately after the message had 
been forwarded through Wedel news was received of the retreat of 
Pichegru and Jourdan before the Austrian army under the Archduke 
Charles, while Thugut notified Grenville that Russia would place 
60,000 men in the field against France if a small English subsidy were 
granted. § Bentinck wrote from Holland that he was nearly positive 
that a new and secret treaty had recently been signed between France 
and Prussia. || If this were true, there was little likelihood of the 
adoption of a peace policy by the government of France. The influ- 
ence of these events on English foreign policy was immediate. It was 
still determined to continue overtures to France, but at the same time 
greater vigor was displayed in preparing for war. Russia was offered 
the island of Corsica and was promised a small subsidy, and Austria 

■" Halliday to Charlemoiit, Aug. 7, 1796, and Charlemont to Halliday, Sept. 12, 
1796. Charlemont MSS. , 11, 278, 2S3. 

t Dropmore, III, 239. 

X George III to Grenville, and Pitt to Grenville, Sept. 4, 1796 ; and Pitt to Gren- 
ville, Sept. 5, 1796. Ibid., 242. 

§ Russia voluntarily proposed to Austria August 21, 1796, to put this force in the 
field. Sybel, IV, 321^^^ Thugut referred it to Grenville on September 10. Drop- 
more, III, 246. Thugut had no knowledge at the time of the English offer to 
France through Wedel, but was hopeful that the Russian offer would wean Gren- 
ville from his scheme of a Prussian alliance. 

II Bentinck to Goddard, Sept. 13 and 20, 1796. Ibid., 250, 253. 



PITT'S SKCOND PEACE PROPOSAL, 47 

was assured that England had no intention of concluding peace with- 
out the full concurrence of her ally.* 

The French answer to the English overture seemed ' ' insolent ' ' to 
George III,t but the ministry determined to make another effort, and 
sent a direct message to France, under a flag of truce, with the result 
that a negotiation was arranged to be held at Paris. Grenville's atti- 
tude was distinctly changed. While no definite declaration of his 
determination to oppose a treaty of peace is to be found, the entire 
tenor of his letter to the King in explanation of the renewed offer under 
flag of truce J and of his private correspondence with his brother is 
indicative that he regarded the continuance of negotiations as of value 
solely for the benefit to be derived from them in their influence on the 
political situation in England. He wrote to Buckingham that to his 
view the peace proposals were justifiable, since ' ' in the present moment, 
the object of unanimity here in the great body of the country, with 
respect to the large sacrifices they will be called upon to make, is para- 
mount to every other consideration." § Yet Pitt was still sincere in 
his offer to France || and was still supported by the majority of his col- 
leagues. Grenville therefore directed his energies toward drafting the 
instructions of Malmesbury, the English negotiator, in such a fashion 
as to preclude the hasty conclusion of a treaty and to prevent any 
sacrifice of English interests. Malmesbury, as Fox pertinently stated 
in a later discussion of the negotiations, was given ' ' full powers to 

*The English ministry sent an order on August 31, 1796, for the evacuation of 
Corsica. The resolution to offer Corsica to Russia was taken on October 19, but 
the new orders did not reach Jervis and Elliot in time. Corsica was evacuated 
October 26. Elliot, II, 355-361. 

t George III to Grenville, Sept. 23, 1796. Dropmore, III, 255. 

j Grenville to George III, Sept. 23, 1796. Ibid., 256. 

§ Sept. 24, 1796. Court and Cabinets, II, 350. 

II Pitt's sincerity is generally asserted by English historians and denied by French 
writers. The impression received from this study is that he was certainly sincere 
up to November 7, but that after that date, as will be shown, he permitted Gren- 
ville to resume his ascendancy in foreign affairs. Sybel thinks Pitt sincere, or at 
least that he saw equally the advantages of peace and the benefits of a refusal by 
France of the opening made. Sybel, IV, 322. Mr. Dorman, in the first volume 
of his recent History of the British Empire in the Nineteenth Century (pp. 31-36), 
maintains the thesis that the sole object of Malmesbury's mission was to secure in- 
formation about France, but this conclusion is based on a superficial study of but 
a small part of the available English sources. Sorel, in his fifth volume, asserts 
that the English government, in both 1796, at Paris, and 1797, at Lille, was deter- 
mined that peace, if signed, must include the separation of the Netherlands from 
France. This is certainly a great error for 1797, and probably so also for 1796, and 
inasmuch as it is upon this thesis that Sorel rests his whole conception of the rela- 
tions of France and England, the error becomes a vital one. Sorel in fact knows 
nothing of English sources for this period, as has been very clearly shown by R. 
Guyot and P. Muret, in their critical examination of the documentation of Sorel's fifth 
volume. Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine , XV, Janvier, 1904, p. 255. 



48 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT S FOREIGN POLICY, 

conclude • • • • but was allowed no latitude to treat." * More- 
over, Grenville particularly emphasized the point that ' ' by the conven- 
tion signed with the Court of Vienna in the beginning of the war, the 
King is bound not to make peace without the consent of Austria, except 
on the terms of procuring for that power the restitution of all it may 
have lost in the war. ' ' f No mention was made in these instructions 
of the possibility of a Bavarian-Netherlands exchange. 

The conditions which still determined Pitt to bring the war to an 
end, if possible, were the difficulty of raising further loans in England, 
the coolness which existed between England and Austria, and the 
threatened revolution in Ireland. A financial crisis in England, due, 
according to Fox and Sheridan, to the repeated advances made to 
Austria,! greatly hampered the government. Austria demanded an 
increased loan and was irritated at receiving the answer that it must be 
postponed for a time, § Thugut also thoroughly disapproved of the 
sending of Malmesbury to Paris and refused either to despatch any 
Austrian diplomats to treat for peace or to commission Malmesbury to 
act for Austria. Although he was compelled to acknowledge that 
Austria could not refuse a peace that fulfilled the terms of the alliance 
with England, he was sincere and earnest in arguing in favor of the 
continuance of war.|| In Ireland the effect of the recall of Earl Fitz- 
william had been to arouse a serious discontent, and there was real 
danger of a widespread rebellion. Pitt knew also of Hoche's projected 
invasion for the purpose of assisting the disaffected Irish. These con- 
ditions, then, were operative at the moment when Malmesbury, on 
October i8, left Dover for France. 

The impression received from Malmesbury' s correspondence and 
diary is that he undertook his mission in the full conviction that Pitt 
seriously desired peace, H and also in the belief that such a peace was 
possible if France would but listen to reason. Grenville had instructed 
him to insist on the customary forms of diplomacy, but Malmesbury, 
fearing that insistence on such forms would lead to a sudden rupture, 
passed over in silence various slights put upon him. Thus the answer 
of Delacroix, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the first note 
presented by Malmesbury was couched in terms of recrimination, but 
Malmesburj' ignored this, choosing to consider it as due to unf amiliaritj'^ 



* Pari. Hist., XXXII, 1476. 

•(•Grenville to Malmesbury, Oct. 16, 1796. Dropmore, III, 260. 
XParl. Hist., XXXII, 15 18-1524. 

§ Grenville to Stahremberg, Nov. 13, 1796. Dropmore, III, 267. 
II Morton Eden to Auckland, Nov. 16, 1796. Auckland. Ill, 362 ; Sybel, IV, 
3^8-333. Malmesbury to Pitt, Oct. 17, 1796. Malmesbury, III, 266. 
^Malmesbury to Pitt, Oct. 17, 1796. Ibid. 



PITT'S SECOND PEACE PROPOSAL. 49 

with diplomatic usage. Greuville, however, despatched in answer to 
Delacroix a written memorial, which Malmesbury was instructed to hand 
in without change. The wording of the memorial, beginning ' ' Quant 
aux insinuations offensantes et injurieuses que Ton a trouve dans cette 
piece," * did not foreshadow a happy ending for the negotiation. 

By November 7, the date upon which this despatch was written, 
Grenville was again the leader in directing England's foreign policy, 
for the events of the week previous had greatly strengthened the force 
of his arguments. In that week came the news of the organization of 
' ' patriotic societies ' ' in Ireland, and the fear of a general rebellion passed 
away.f In that week, also, Pitt gained a decided Parliamentary vic- 
tory on questions of home defense, I while intelligence from Austria 
indicated a revival of energy in that government. Pitt found that he 
had overestimated the force of the English clamor for peace and, though 
personally averse to the war, yielded to Grenville' s insistence that the 
negotiations should be carried on in such a way and for such an end as 
at least to require all of England's original demands. On November 5 
he wrote a general letter of commendation to Malmesbury, § but one 
containing no suggestion of concessions to France, while two days later 
Canning || also wrote, hinting that Pitt would have been better pleased 
had Malmesbury taken a stiffer tone in response to the insulting lan- 
guage of Delacroix. H Canning was Under Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs and, perhaps more than any other at the time, was acquainted 
with Pitt's real sentiments and purposes. In the same mail Canning 
despatched Grenville's instructions and memorial, and these, with Pitt's 
letter, reached Malmesbury November 10. The entry in Malmesbury 's 
diary for the next day is brief, but illuminative : ' ' Writing — thinking 
over my new instructions— ^^^z, cosi. ' ' ** Malmesbury understood per- 
fectly from the tenor of Grenville's instructions the part he was now to 
play, and he understood also from his private letters that they were in 
truth new instructions. That they were new to Malmesbury goes to 
prove that he had up to this time believed Pitt desirous of making 
peace, and in fact Malmesbury, on December 20, in an interview with 
Sandoz-Rollin, the Prussian minister in Paris, accused Grenville of 

* Malmesbury, III, 301. 

tCharlemont MSS., II, 284-294. 

J Pitt to Malmesbury, Nov. 5, 1796. Malmesbury, III, 295. 

§ Pitt to Malmesbury, Nov. 5, 1796. Ibid. 

\lbid., 297. 

il Masson pictures Delacroix as utterly without knowledge of proper diplomatic 
language or customs, and as permitting himself to be put entirely in the wrong by 
Malmesbury. Yet he also states that Delacroix merely followed the instructions 
of the Directory in these negotiations. Masson, 390-395. 

** Malmesbury, III, 305, 

4 



50 THE INFLUENCE OP GRENVIIvLE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

having thwarted Pitt's purpose.* From November ii Malmesbury's 
conduct in negotiation, his reports to Grenville, and his letters to Pitt 
and Canning exhibit an entirely different attitude from that previously 
assumed. He now sought merely to put France in the wrong, and to 
cast upon her the blame for an inevitable rupture of the negotiations. 
The diplomatic maneuvers became in fact a contest for the advantage 
of position, for the Directory had been at no time sincere in its accept- 
ance of the English overture.! The actual issue was a victory for 
England, for Malmesbury, presenting Grenville' s principle of "com- 
pensatory restitutions," prohibiting any connection between France 
and the Netherlands, asked that the Directory either accept this as the 
basis of a treaty or bring forward a counter-project. The Directory 
refused to do either and sent Malmesburj'- his passports, greatly to the 
advantage of the English ministers, who now recovered a wavering 
Parliamentary constituency by disclosing the ' ' honorable and sincere 
offer of peace made to France, and the insulting refusal of that country 
to consider it. " X 

* "Aujourd'hui matin, Malmesbury m'a fait proposer ou de passer chez lui ou de 
me voir dans une tierce maison. J'aiprefdre le dernier parti. Son d^but m'a etonn^: 
'Sachez, m'a-t-il dit, que j'ai bien plus k me plaindre du ministere britannique que 
du Directoire ; sachez encore que je le publierai a Londres et que je me plaindrai au 
chancelier Pitt de la mauvaise tournure que le lord Grenville a donn^e a la negocia- 
tion ; il a fait retomber sur I'Angleterre tout I'opprobre de la continuation de la 
guerre.' ' Mais lesieur Pitt voulait-ildecidement la paix? ' ai-je interrompu. 'II 
la voulait, j'en suis certain ', a-t-il replique avec chaleur, 'tout comme je suis cer- 
tain que la n^gociation sera reprise en moins de trois semaines de temps. ' ' ' Bericht 
von Sandoz-Rollin aus Paris, Dec. 20, 1796. Bailleu, I, 106. 

t According to Barras's Memoirs^ Carnot, previous to Malmesbury's arrival, had 
expressed the opinion that the Netherlands were not essential to France, but this 
was not agreed to by other members of the Directory (II, 265). Barras shows that 
it was only due to the political situation in France that the English overture was 
accepted, and he believed that that overture had no other purpose " than to expose 
the Directorate to odium " (II, 2S8) . He pictures himself and Larevelliere-Ivdpeaux 
as demanding Malmesbury's dismissal, Rewbe'.l desiring delay, Letourneur anxious 
to continue negotiations, and Carnot standing by Barras's opinion, but hesitatingly ; 
and in the result Barras asserts that France experienced a wave of patriotic enthu- 
siasm from Malmesbury's dismissal. 

Jin the debates in Parliament on Malmesbury's negotiation the great effort of 
both Pitt and Grenville is to prove England's sincerity. Fox denied this, and 
hinted that Malmesbury was himself deceived. ' ' I know that some weeks ago a 
very confident report was circulated with respect to the probability of peace. It 
would be curious to know how far Lord Malmesbury at that period was influenced 
by any such belief." Pari. Hist., XXXII, 1473 

Grenville's resum^ of the negotiations and defense of the government is in ibid., 
i^oSff. An abstract of the Directory's version as published in t)iQ Ridacteur is in 
t(^/ar., XXXIII, 398#. 



GR:eNVII,IvE'S SECOND OVERTURE TO PRUSSIA. 5 1 

GRENVILLE'S SECOND OVERTURE TO PRUSSIA AND HAMMOND'S 

JOURNEY. 

November, 1796, to May, 1797. 

In the episode just narrated the view taken is that up to November 
7, 1796, Pitt was really sincere in the proposals made to France, while 
Grenville was sincere only so long as he saw no hope of any other than 
a peaceful solution, and that with his very first instructions to Malmes- 
bury he was planning a renewal by England of a vigorous war policy. 
An additional proof of this purpose on Grenville 's part and of his re- 
sumption of authority in foreign affairs is that on November 7, the day 
that his memorial to the Directory was despatched, he reopened with 
Austria the idea of securing Prussian aid.*^ His plan was, as formerly, 
that Austria should cede the Netherlands to Prussia, and herself take 
Bavaria. In December, 1796, and again in January, 1797, Morris 
wrote of rumors of Prussian willingness to enter into the proposed ex- 
changes,! but Thugut's dislike of a Prussian alliance and his earnest- 
ness in maintaining Austrian war preparations led Grenville to set the 
plan aside for the moment. But in February Prussia herself made 
advances to England. These were caused by the suspicion prevalent 
at Berlin that France was offering a separate peace to Austria, involv- 
ing the sacrifice of Bavaria in return for the Rhenish frontier. The 
offer had in fact been determined upon by the Directory, and, though 
the terms were not positively known at Berlin, the old Prussian 
jealousy of Austria was aroused. J The overture made to England 
was apparently for an agreement as to the terms of a general peace to 
be imposed on France, § but the refusal of France to accept such terms 

*Sybel, IV, 327. 

t Morris to Grenville, Dec. 21, 1796, from Vienna, and Jan. 26, 1797, from Dresden. 
Dropmore, III, 2S7, 294. In December Morris urged upon Thugut the necessity 
of securing Prussian aid (Morris, II, 62), and on January 31 he proposed to Gren- 
ville that England should offer Hanover to Prussia. Ibid. , 257-264. This last letter 
is not in Dropmore. 

t Sybel states that in the middle of January, 1797, France desired to make peace 
with Austria on these terms : i, to restore Lombardy to the Emperor ; 2, to give 
Bavaria to Austria in exchange for Belgium ; 3, France to keep the left bank of the 
Rhine. Sybel, IV, 464. Barras details a long discussion by the Directory on Janu- 
ary 15 of Clarke's offer to Austria. The terms of Carnot's despatch to Clarke 
coincide with the points given in Sybel. Barras, II, 312. The Berlin rumor also 
included a cession of the Netherlands to England. Morris, II, 275. 
" § Grenville wrote to Morton Eden on March 3, 1797, in regard to the proposals of 
Prussia, " It is very material to observe that the basis of this plan is the scheme 
of peace already offered by the allies." Dropmore, III, 298. This must mean the 
separation of the Netherlands from France, but coming from Prussia could not have 
involved an exchange for Bavaria. At this same time Prussia was urging France to 
be permitted to propose to Austria and to England the holding of peace conferences. 
France objected to any such suggestion being made to England, and repeatedly 
asserted that French interests demanded a continental, but not a general, peace. 
Berichte von Caillard aus Berlin, Feb. 18 and March 4, 1797. Bailleu, I, 451-453- 



52 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

would have necessitated Prussia's abandonment of her neutrality. 
George III distrusted the Prussian court and termed its proposals 
" insidious advances," * and even Grenville himself thought an attempt 
was being made to weaken the strength of the alliance between Austria 
and England, t Nevertheless he instructed Elgin to confer freely with 
the ministers at Berlin, informed Thugut of the Prussian opening, :{: 
and outlined a plan of alliance. But the hopes aroused at this juncture 
were suddenly dashed to the ground when, on March 30, he received 
from Elgin a copy of the secret treaty of August 5, 1796, between 
France and Prussia. § All expectations of a change in Prussian policy 
or of honor in the Prussian court were abruptly set aside, and Gren- 
ville, temporaril}^ at least, became wholly convinced of the uselessness 
of further efforts in that quarter. || 

The dismay aroused in England upon learning the terms of the secret 
treaty between Prussia and France was almost immediately increased 
by the news of Bonaparte's rapid and decisive victories in Italy and 
the Tyrol. It was evident that Austria must yield and yield soon, or 
experience the dishonor of a French occupation of Vienna. Even 
Grenville was dispirited and hopeless ^ and passively submitted to Pitt's 
determination to hurry an envoy to Vienna in time to take part in the 
peace negotiations. On April 9 it was decided b}^ the Cabinet to send 
Hammond with full powers to enter into a negotiation with France and 
Austria.** Hammond's instructions permitted him to offer France all 
colonies taken during the course of the war except the Cape, Ceylon, 
and Trinidad, and to acquiesce in any territorial arrangement on the 
continent acceptable to Austria, ff Thus England was at last ready to 
recognize the incorporation of Belgium with France, and Pitt specific- 
ally approved both this and the continued dependence of Holland on 
France, if only peace were secured, JJ while Grenville had yielded his 
own opinion under the first impressions created by the discouraging 
news from Austria. George III, recognizing Grenville' s discourage- 

* George III to Pitt, Feb. 28, 1797. Stanhope, III, Appendix, p. 11. 

t Grenville to Elgin, March 2, 1797. Dropmore, III, 298. 

j Grenville to Morton Eden, March 3, 1797. Ibid. 

§ George III to Grenville Ibid., 304. 

II Grenville to Woronzow, March 30, 1797. Ibid., 306. 

^Grt-nville to George III, April 9, 1797. Ibid., 310. 

'•■* Minutes of Cabinet meeting. Ibid. 

ttSybel, IV, 493. The exact terms of the instructions to Hammond are in a de- 
spatch of April II, 1797, to Sir Morton Eden, being No. 24, in volume 49 of the 
British Foreign Office Records for Austria. The English proposal was to keep 
Ceylon and the Cape from Holland, and either Martinique from France or Trinidad 
from Spain, and Tobago or St. Lucia from France. These terms are of interest 
as indicating Pitt's first decision in turning toward peace. Later he lowered 
these conditions very nearlj' to the point of demanding nothing at all. 

JJ George III to Pitt, April 9, 1797. Stanhope, III, Appendix, p. iii. 



GRENVIIvIvE'S SECOND OVERTURE TO PRUSSIA. 53 

ment and knowing him to be an obstinate opponent of peace, showed 
plainly that he regarded Pitt as solely responsible for what was, to the 
King's mind, a dishonorable policy.* Buckingham stated openly to 
Grenville that he preferred an honorable war to a dishonorable peace and 
hoped Hammond would not arrive in time to enter upon negotiations, f 
In reply, Grenville exhibited his own despondent attitude. ' ' I hardly 
know," he wrote, "how to tell myself, under these circumstances, what 
I wish about Hammond's mission, because the panic here is so dis- 
graceful that the country will not allow us to do them justice." | 

Hammond's instructions as first drawn up had looked toward the 
intervention of Russia as a mediator in proposing negotiations for a 
general peace. If on arriving at Vienna he found that time was lack- 
ing to secure such mediation, he was first to strive for a general armis- 
tice, if possible ; but if this failed also, he was given full powers, in 
conjunction with Morton Eden, to sign a definitive peace. § Appar- 
ently there was at first no suspicion in the English Cabinet that Ham- 
mond might find peace already concluded on his arrival at Vienna, 
but shortly after he had left England the belief arose that such an 
event was possible, and supplementarj'- instructions were hurried after 
him, directing him, in case he found that Austria had signed a sepa- 
rate peace with France, to proceed to Berlin and there accept an offer 
previously made to act as mediator in a general peace. He was also 
to notify Russia of this act and ask her joint mediation with the court 
of Berlin, stating as England's reason for the step that the chief ob- 
stacle to the acceptance of the Prussian offer had now been removed 
by Austria's signature of a separate treaty of peace. || 

On April 18, the very day this despatch was written, before Ham- 
mond had landed at Cuxhaven even, the Preliminaries of Leoben had 
been signed, and peace between Austria and France was an accom- 
plished fact. Hammond went on to Vienna, but once there made no 
attempt to bring England into the peace, and did not disclose to Thugut 
his supplementary instructions for the court at Berlin.T[ In the mean- 
time Grenville had recovered somewhat from his first depression and 
was striving to create a revulsion of opinion in the government. Thugut 
at first refused to disclose to his late ally the terms of I^eoben, and 

* Stanhope, III, Appendix, pp. xwff. Several letters between Oeorge III and 
Pitt. The King speaks also of the " reluctance " of a portion of the Cabinet, 
t April 13 and May 4, 1797. Dropmore, III, 313, 317. 
% April 28, 1797. Court and Cabinets, II, 376. 

§ Despatch to Morton Eden, April 11, 1797. Records, Austria, 49. 
'I Despatch to Hammond, No. 5, April 18, 1797. Ibid. 
"j Hammond to Grenville, May 9, 1797. Dropmore, III, 322. 



54 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

although this greatly irritated Grenville,* the latter was anxious to 
keep the discourtesy of Austria from the public and to uphold Austria's 
honor for future use. He urged this upon Woronzow, the Russian 
ambassador in England, writing also : 

" Quelle que soit la paix qu'on a faite, notre union n'en deviendra 
que plus necessaire. II faudra bien nous attendre pour empecher 
que les principes Revolutionnaires ne deviennent le droit public de 
I'Kurope. C'est pourquoi je desire de menager I'honneur de la Cour 
de Vienne meme au moment ou elle parait avoir le plus oublie ce 
qu'elle doit a nous et a elle-meme." f 

In this connection Grenville now feared the effect upon Austria of 
Hammond's secondary instructions for the Prussian court. Even in 
the despatch outlining the acceptance of the Prussian offer of mediation 
Hammond had been directed to emphasize in his communications to 
Russia the desire of England to maintain the system of alliance with that 
country and with Austria ' ' for future security against France suppos- 
ing it should be found that the Court of Vienna remains disposed to act 
on that principle. ' ' | Hammond himself expressed doubts of the advis- 
ability of carrying out his instructions at Berlin and decided not to open 
the matter there until he received further orders from England. § Gren- 
ville thoroughly approved this violation of previous instructions, and May 
26 Hammond was directed to ' ' avoid [at Berlin] any particular discourse 
or communication of the sentiments or views of His Majesty's Govern- 
ment but only express in general terms the King's continued readiness 
to lend Himself to Negotiations for general Peace in any proper manner 
and on such grounds as may be consistent with His Dignity and the 
Honour and Interests of His Crown. ' • ' * As the greatest indus- 
try will probably be used at Berlin to discover the footing on which His 
Majesty stands as with respect to the House of Austria you will be 
particularly careful not to let any expression fall from you which may 
tend to commit His Majesty's Government in that respect." || Thus 
Grenville, struggling against peace, was attempting to preser\^e the 
conditions essential to a possible future renewal of the coalition. 

* George III to Grenville, May 5, 1797. Dropmore, III, 318. 

tMays, 1797. Ibid., 320. 

j Despatch to Hammond, April 18, 1797. Records, Austria, 49. 

§ Hammond to Grenville, May 13, 1797. Dropmore, III, 326. 

II Despatch No. 8 to Hammond, May 26, 1797. Records, Austria, 49. 



THE NEGOTIATIONS AT LILLE. 55 

GRENVILLE'S OPPOSITION TO THE NEGOTIATIONS AT LILLE. 

May to October, 1797. 

The recall of Hammond was the first step in a policy which Grenville 
was now determined to urge looking toward a continuance of the war. 
He soon found, however, that the spirit of the English ministry and 
nation was not sufficiently restored to support the idea of a war in iso- 
lation against France, and his preparatory efforts were brought to a 
full stop" by the decision of the Cabinet to make a separate offer of 
peace. Pitt was thoroughly disheartened, and was at last determined 
to impose his authority in the conduct of foreign affairs. 

The negotiations of 1797 brought out the final conflict of opinion 
between Pitt and Grenville, on the great question of war or peace, and 
in their progress revealed both the extent of Grenville' s influence and 
the sources from which it was derived. The decision of the Cabinet 
was reached on May 31.* Since April conditions in England had 
created a widespread movement for peace. The mutiny in the fleet, 
an army riot at Woolwich, insurrections in Ireland, the low state of 
the funds, the withdrawal of Grattan and his party from the Irish 
Parliament, and the threatened withdrawal of Fox from the English 
Parhament, all combined to increase the panic raised by the news of 
Ivcoben, and brought even the friends of Burke to think of peace.f 
In Parhament the opposition was regularly supported by double the 
number of members it could previously count upon, and between March 
27 and June i five distinct motions of censure and dismissal were 
pressed against the government. At the same time a large body of 
independents under the leadership of the Earl of Moira attempted to 
make a coalition with the Foxites, minus Fox, in order to turn out the 
ministry. X Fitt was a sturdy political fighter, ever ready to stand up 
for his own opinion, but in this case his personal predilection coincided 
with that of his opponents, and it is therefore not surprising that after 
the failure of Hammond's journey he renewed overtures of peace to 
France. Grenville, as stubborn as ever in his opposition to peace, 
bent before the storm and did not object to the initial communications 
with France, though even from the first he was seeking to renew 
friendly relations with Austria in the hope that the conference which 
the latter was to hold with France at Berne would result in a rupture. § 

* Grenville to George III, May 31, 1797. Dropmore, III, 327. 
fSir Gilbert Elliot to I^ady Elliot, May 12, 1797. "A speedy peace seems to 
have become extremely necessary." Elliot, II, 392. 

Jlyetter from Moira to McMahon, June 15, 1797. Pari. Hist., XXXTII, 1210. 
§ Grenville to Stahremberg, June 2, 1797. Dropmore, III, 327. 



56 THB INPL,UENCE OF GRENVII.LE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POI^ICY. 

The reply of the French Directory to the opening made by England , 
received on June 1 1 , seemed to Grenville extremely insolent and its 
terms such as should have precluded any further negotiations. The 
Directory sent a passport for an English diplomat who should be ' ' fur- 
nished with the full powers of his Britannic Majesty for the purpose of 
negotiating, concluding, and signing a definitive and separate treat}^ of 
peace with the French Republic ••••"* Thus the very conditions 
upon which negotiations were to be begun involved the recognition 
by England of the existence of the Republic — a point Grenville would 
have deferred until the formal conclusion of a definitive peace. But 
Grenville objected still more to the humiliation of England in accept- 
ing the arbitrary conditions imposed, and, though in a minority in the 
Cabinet, earnestly combated Pitt's purpose to send a negotiator. He 
was outvoted, and on June i6 he wrote to George III in regard to the 
proposed reply to France : 

* ' Lord Grenville would not discharge his duty to your Majesty as 
an honest man or as an attached and dutiful servant if, with the opin- 
ion which he cannot help entertaining on the subject of that paper, he 
omitted to declare to your Majesty without reserve how it appears to 
him to fall both in tone and substance below what the present situa- 
tion of your Majesty's kingdoms, even under all the pressure of the 
moment, might have entitled your Majesty's Government to assume when 
speaking in your Majesty's name ; and how much even the object of 
peace itself is endangered by a line of so much apparent weakness. ' ' 

Under ordinar}^ circumstances, Grenville stated, he would have re- 
signed at once, but the mutiny in the fleet deterred him : " the crisis 
of the present hour is such that the withdrawing even of the most in- 
significant member of the Government might weaken it in the public 
opinion at a moment when every good man must wish it strengthened. ' 'f 
Grenville may have been honest in withholding his resignation while 
the mutiny in the fleet was under way ; he certainly was not sincere in 
the fear that the line taken by Pitt would endanger peace itself. Un- 
questionably the most influential motives that actuated him were the 
hope of so conducting negotiations as to render difficult a final agree- 
ment with France and the belief that time would restore his influence 
over the mind of his chief. George III, who was in entire sympathy 
with Grenville' s opposition to peace, perfectly understood the situation. 
In reply to Grenville' s letter, he wrote on June 17 : 

' ' However it may be irksome to Lord Grenville to hold the pen on 

* Pari. Hist., XXXIII, 911. fDropmore, III, 329. 



THE NEGOTIATIONS AT LII.LE. 57 

this occasion, I must feel at this particular moment his remaining in 
his situation absolutely essential, for he will be able to stave off many- 
farther humiliations that might be attempted from having shown a mind 
jealous of what seems in the outset an attempt to draw us into future 
embarrassments. ' ' * 

Unlike previous similar contests, the struggle in the Cabinet was this 
time generally known in political circles, and surmises were frequent as 
to the exact attitude of each member, f Meanwhile Austria had finally 
informed England of the terms of lycoben,! but Grenville was unable to 
use this to restore confidence in Austria, for the entire Cabinet, Gren- 
ville included, was angered by Thugut's doubts of Austria's ability to 
repay the loans advanced during the war.§ Grenville was thus forced 
to fight his battle on the merits of the French negotiation, separate and 
distinct from any other question of foreign policy or alliance. 

Malmesbury was again the negotiator selected by Pitt, and he set out 
for lyille, where the conferences were to be held, fully convinced that 
Pitt was thoroughl)'- in earnest in his proposals and that this time 
the concessions he was instructed to offer to France would speedily result 
in a treaty of peace. || Pitt and his protege, Canning, were equally 
hopeful, II and Pitt had given Malmesbury full powers to sign without 
reference to I,ondon, if the English terms were accepted.** The exact 
extent to which the English government was prepared to go cannot be 
stated authoritatively, but it seems probable that in compensation for 
French acquisitions in Belgium, Germany, and Italy, Pitt would have 
demanded, in the last resort, no more than Cejdon.ff Malmesbury's 
first offer to the French negotiators specified also the Cape of Good 

"Dropmore, III, 330. 

t Elliot wrote to Lady Elliot June 17, 1797: "Pitt differs with Lord Grenville 
and Dnndas with both ; in short, all is in ^reat confusion." Elliot, II, 408. Later 
Elliot thoughi Dundas occupying middle ground between Pitt and Grenville in 
holding out for the retention of the Cape and Cejdon, which Pitt would have 
yielded. Ibid., 410. 

J Grenville to Woronzow, June 17, 1797. Dropmore, III, 331. 

§ Grenville to Stahremberg, July 4, 1797. Ibid., 332. 

II Of Malmesbury's going to Lille, the editor of Malmesbury's memoirs says : 
" Lord Grenville was decidedly opposed to this step, and long argued it with Pitt ; 
but the latter remained firm, repeatedly declaring that it was his duty as an Eng- 
lish Minister and a Christian, to use every effort to stop so bloody and wasting a 
war. He sent Lord Malmesbury to Lisle with the assurance that ' he (Pitt) would 
stifle every feeling of pride to the utmost to produce the desired result ; ' and Lord 
Malmesbury himself went upon his Mission, anxious to close his public life by an 
act which would spare so much misery, and restore so much happiness to mankind. " 
Malmesbury, III, 369. 

II Canning to Leigh, July 12, 1797. Ibid., 393. 

** Malmesbury to Pitt, July 6, 1 797. Ibid. , 378. 

tt While not definitely stated anywhere in the documents and memoirs pertaining 
to Lille, the indirect references to terms bear this out. See also Maret, 210, and 
Rose, I, 189. 



58 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

Hope, Cochin, and Trinidad, but this was met on the part of France 
by the presentation of a note involving three preliminary points which 
it was asserted the English government must yield before an}^ other 
questions were raised. These were the renunciation of the ancient 
claim to France included in the King's title, the restoration of the ships 
seized at Toulon or the payment of a satisfactory indemnity, and the 
release of all claim to the revenues of the Netherlands founded on the 
English loan to Austria. The latter point was of no importance, for 
the English loan was based on the revenues of the Austrian Empire, 
not, as the French supposed, on those of the Netherlands alone.* Nor 
is it probable that the first and second points would ever have been 
permitted to stand in the way of a final treaty ; but the annoyance felt 
because of the French demand for a preliminary concession by England 
aroused a feeling of irritation in the Cabinet and encouraged Grenville 
to believe that peace might j^et be averted. While he was careful to 
write privately to Malmesbury in such terms as to indicate a personal 
desire for peace, the undercurrent of feeling evident in his letters and 
the haughty tone of his official despatches evince his real sentiments. 
Keenly alive to every shift of political opinion in England, he now 
sought to hold Pitt to his original instructions to Malmesburj', in the 
hope that these, if adhered to, would prevent the completion of a treaty. 
A few days later Grenville' s position was strengthened by an assertion 
on the part of the French negotiators that they were unable to discuss 
the colonial acquisitions desired by England, inasmuch as the Director}- 
had pledged itself in a treaty with Holland ' ' not to surrender Dutch 
colonies without the consent of the Dutch government." j In regard 
to the three points, Grenville at once w-rote to Malmesbury that the 
French opening did not seem favorable to peace, J but Canning, who 
did not take the French demands seriously, wrote to Ellis : 

" Which of us is there that does not feel it grating to have to con- 
trive modes of concession, instead of enforcing the justice of de- 
mands ? • • • • But we cannot and must not disguise our situation 
from ourselves. If peace is to be had, we must have it ; I firmly 
believe we must, and it is a belief that strengthens every day. " ' * 
But though I preach peace thus violentl)', do not imagine that I am 
ready to take any that j^ou may offer. • • • • Give us then some- 
thing to shew as an acquisition but remember • • • • th^t what 
may be very splendid as an acquisition, would be very insufficient as a 

* Grenville to Malmesbury, July 13, 1797. Malmesbury, III, 394. 
t Fitzpatrick's introduction to Dropmore, III, xlviii-1. This presents a very 
clearly stated and compact r^sumd of the negotiations at Lille. 
J Grenville to Malmesbury, July 13, 1797. Ibid.^ 333. 



THE NEGOTIATIONS AT I^ILIvE. 59 

cause of quarrel. We can break off upon nothing but wliat will rouse 
us from sleep and stupidity into a new life and action, what ' will 
create a soul under the ribs of death ! ' for we are now soul-less and 
spiritless; and what would, do this, except the defence of Portugal • • • • 
or the preservation of our integrity, • • • • x know not. All beyond 
this we shall like to have, but we never shall fight for it." * 

In spite of this readiness to concede all, the immediate effect of the 
French stand on the question of the Dutch colonies was to stiffen the 
attitude of the English government. On July 20, a week after the 
letter just quoted, Canning wrote to Malmesbury that, if the French 
remained fixed in the determination to refuse any Dutch colony and 
remained also as offensive in their manner of stating it, the negotia- 
tions would have to terminate,! while Grenville, in much more vigorous 
language, stated the same opinion. | 

Grenville now not only exhibited greater hauteur in his official com- 
munications, but also began actively to combat Pitt in the Cabinet. A 
source of strength to Pitt was the public disinclination to continue 
the war. Grenville discovered that the events of the negotiation were 
known in I^ondon almost as soon as received by the ministers, § and 
proposed in the Cabinet a vote imposing secrecy upon its members. 
This was passed and, according to Canning, ' ' was devised by Lord 
Grenville to tie up Pitfs tongue alone, whom he suspected of communi- 
cating with other persons, and fortifying himself \wi\h. out-of-door 
opinions against the opinions which might be brought forward in 
Council by those with whom he differed in his general view of the 
Negotiation. I am not sure that he did not suspect him further of 
sounding the public sentiment through the newspapers as to the terms 
which it might be proper to accept, and the concessions which it might 
be excusable to make for the sake of peace." || Grenville had in fact 
secured a tactical victory over Pitt. Every resolution of the Cabinet 
that involved a decision not wholly agreeable to Pitt was a step toward 
Grenville' s resumption of influence. So also every event that in- 
creased the impression of French insolence and of English humiliation 
was magnified by Grenville in his effort to renew the courage of the 
English government, and in this connection Malmesbury had unwit- 
tingly assisted the war party in the Cabinet, for he had dwelt much 

* July 13, 1797. Malmesbury, III, 396. Ellis was Malmesbury's right-hand man 
at Lille and was a close friend of Canning's. Thus Pitt and Malmesbury were in 
close touch through their younger intimates. 

■\ Ibid., 416. 

j Grenville to Malmesbury, July 20, 1797. Dropmore, III, 33^. 

§ Ibid. 

I| Canning to Malmesbury, July 20, 1797. Malmesbury, III, 416. 



6o THE INFLUE^fCE OF GRENVIIvLE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

in his despatches upon the excessive character of the French demands 
and had forwarded those demands in such order as to create a steadily 
increasing irritation with the insolence displayed. The report for- 
warded to London of the three preliminary stipulations made by 
France, followed almost immediately by the French refusal to consider 
the cession of any Dutch colony, had resulted in a victory for Gren- 
ville in the Cabinet. Pitt did not openly assert that he was ready to 
make peace under the extreme conditions proposed by France, but he 
opposed stating immediately to France that these conditions were inad- 
missible. Grenville urged an immediate reply notifying France that 
such conditions, if insisted on, would render a treaty impossible, and 
his opinion prevailed. The defeat of Pitt and the anxiety felt among 
the friends of peace is clearly brought out in a letter from Canning to 
Ellis, in which the former blames Malmesbury for the character of the 
despatches stating the French demands and for having sent them with- 
out delay to England. "The second messenger," he wrote, "was 
despatched too soon, and brought the proposition of the Directory in a 
shape in which it was the most difl&cult to discuss it. " * To this 
Ellis indignantly replied : "If I understood Mr. Pitt right, you want 
either a tolerably good peace, or the most unreasonable requisitions, "f 
thus defending the despatches in question on the ground that they 
conformed to the latter consideration. Canning's rejoinder unveiled 
the controversy in the Cabinet. Referring again to Malmesbury 's 
immediate transmittal of the French demands and its unfortunate con- 
sequence, he wrote : 

"You will, however, have understood, that what I said upon that 
point belonged rather to the state of things here than that at Eisle — to 
the triumph procured by the particular discussion to those whom I wish 
not to triumph, over those to whom I wish to maintain an ascendancy, 
which they have so recently obtained, and of which I am not yet sure 
that they have more than a precarious and temporary possession ; and, 
upon my conscience, I believe the safety and welfare of the country 
hereafter to be involved in their maintenance and exercise of this as- 
cendancy. And, though I am not so unreasonable as to wish or expect 
that the great work about which you are employed can be squared in 
the whole, or altogether in any one part, with a view to circumstances 
of this nature at home, yet I do not think it an inconsiderable object to 
soften as much as can be done, without hazarding truth and substance, 
the roughnesses of the work to be done here to those who are deter- 

* Ellis to Canning, July 25, 1797. Malmesbury, III, 430. Ellis quotes the phrase 
from Canning's letter, but the letter itself is not to be found. 
t Ibid. 



THE NEGOTIATIONS AT I<ILI.E. 6 1 

mined to go through with it ; and to give as little opportunity as can be 
helped to those who hate the work to revile the master workman. ' ' * 

In spite, therefore, of the nature of the instructions last sent to 
Malmesbury, Pitt still proposed to fulfil his original intentions, and 
waited only for that lowering of the demands of France, of which he 
felt confident, to reimpose his authority upon the English Cabinet. 
Whatever the wavering of his fellow-ministers, Pitt himself had not as 
yet yielded his belief in the necessity of peace or increased the limited 
concessions he was prepared to ask from France. Outwardly the rela- 
tions of Pitt and Greuville rested upon their customary basis of cordial 
cooperation; in reality they were in opposition, and their intercourse 
lacked that friendly character which had formerly constituted so large 
a part of Grenville's influence. 

England's refusal to acquiesce in the French demands was presented 
by Malmesbury at Lille on July 25, and upon its becoming evident that 
France would not abate one jot of her pretensions, the negotiation stood 
in danger of coming to a full stop and even to a rupture ; but in these 
circumstances Maret, one of the three French diplomats at Lille, acting 
through a friend, Pein, who entered into friendly conferences with the 
English secretary of the mission, George Ellis, sought and arrived at 
a private understanding with Malmesbury. Maret explained that no 
further proposals could be made by the French representatives at Lille 
until the issue of a bitter conflict then secretly waging in the gov- 
ernment at Paris was clear. Of the five members of the Director}^, 
Barras, Rewbell, and Larevelliere-Lepeaux, aided by the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Delacroix, were opposed to peace. The two remain- 
ing members, Carnot and Barthelemj^, supported by a majority of the 
Councils, were in favor of a fair arrangement with England, and, if in 
the result this party should gain the control of affairs, Maret believed 
that pressure would be put on Holland to force an acquiescence in the 
cession of some, if not all, of the colonies captured by England during 
the progress of the war.f Maret also stated that the first move of the 
Carnot party would be the substitution of Talleyrand for Delacroix 

* Canning to Ellis, July 27, 1797. Malmesbury, III, 437. 

t Ernouf , the author of Maret, Due de Bassano, makes no reference to the secret 
portion of Maret's labors at Lille, yet the book was published after the Malmes- 
bury diary. Sybel also passes over this feature in silence, though giving as a 
principal foot-note reference " Malmesbur}', III. " Maret's honest desire for peace 
is unquestioned, for it is proved by his letter to Barras urging that policy (in Maret, 
Due de Bassano), and also by Barras's dislike and suspicion of Maret (Barras, II, 
263). Barras's Memoirs at this period are concerned chiefly with the details of the 
struggle in Paris and touch but incidentally on foreign affairs, but where these are 
mentioned they show that the Directory had no thought of making peace on any 
terms, and was in fact displeased with the attitude of its representatives at Lille. 



62 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILIvE ON PiTT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

in the Department of Foreign Affairs. Malmesbury was convinced 
of Maret's honesty and advised his government to await the issue 
of the struggle at Paris. All knowledge of Maret's disclosures and 
of the frequent communications which passed between Malmesbury 
and Maret during the ensuing month was, at the suggestion of Can- 
ning, kept from the English Cabinet, Pitt and Grenville alone being 
cognizant of what was taking place. Canning's avowed reason for 
this secrecy was the necessity of protecting Maret's good name,* but, 
in the light of his letter to Ellis, it seems reasonable to suppose that 
he had also in view the prevention of a recurrence of those acrimonious 
debates in the Cabinet which had lately resulted in a temporary victory 
for Grenville. If so, his plan, while successful in the direct object 
sought, was hazardous in its effect upon the main question of peace, 
for it necessitated a renewal of that personal and private intercourse 
between Grenville and Pitt which recent events had tended to prevent. 

While the negotiations at lyille were thus delayed until some solu- 
tion was reached at Paris, it was still necessary to preserve the usual 
diplomatic forms of a conference, and in forwarding instructions to 
Malmesbury Grenville clearly revealed his opposition to peace. Al- 
though acknowledging the probability that Maret was dealing honestly 
with Malmesbury,! he wrote the latter on August i8 : 

" I greatly doubt whether the period of peace is yet arrived. There 
seems so much insolence, and such an overbearing opinion of their own 
consequence and power even among those who profess themselves the 
best disposed, that I fear it will be impossible yet to obtain such terms 
as we must require." X 

His language in communicating with the King, of whose sympathy 
he felt confident, was more open. As to what terms of peace might 
be expected if Maret's plan was successful, he wrote on August 4 : 

' ' It appears however that nothing had passed on that head beyond 
the general expression of reasonable terms, and an implied concession 
that your Majesty was entitled to some compensation, but without 
intimating anything of its nature or amount. lyord Grenville does not 
therefore flatter himself that much more results from this communica- 

* Canning to Grenville, July 31, 1797. Dropmore, III, 337. By the plan fol- 
lowed, Malmesbury's despatches used numerals for names, in mentioning Maret and 
others whom Maret employed in communicating with Malmesbury, and they are 
thus given in the Dropmore MSS. But the actual names were long ago printed in 
Malmesbury's diary. The King was aware of and consented to the withholding 
of these despatches from the rest of the Cabinet. Ibid., 343. Malmesbury himself 
saw no reason for such secrecy, though he wished to protect Maret. Malmesbury 
to Canning, Aug. 14, 1797. Malmesbury, III, 465. 

t Grenville to MaJmesbur}', Aug. 9, 1797. Dropmore, III, 352. 



THS NEGOTIATIONS AT I.ILI.E. 63 

tion than that the moderate party were desirous to prevent the nego- 
tiation from being abruptly terminated pending the struggle at Paris ; 
but, if they should succeed, there seems no sufficient ground to rely 
on their being actuated by any other disposition for peace than what 
would arise from a motive to the operation of which their adversaries 
would, under the like circumstances, be equally, or even more exposed, 
the great difficulty which they would find in continuing the war. ' ' * 

Pitt, however, was hopeful, basing his expectations upon Malmes- 
bury's confidence in Maret's integrity, and for a month longer the 
negotiation waited upon the turn of events in Paris. Malmesbury, on 
his part, sought to follow Canning's injunctions in regard to the con- 
flict in the English Cabinet, going so far even as to conceal such parts of 
Ellis's conversations with Pein as departed from a stiff maintenance of 
English demands, t and writing on August 14 : "This messenger will 
not, I think, carry over any materials for a Cabinet discussion." X 

Malmesbury 's precautions were unavailing, for an unexpected event 
soon revived the conflict of opinion in England, and in its consequences 
almost convinced Malmesbury himself that Pitt was yielding to the 
influence of the war party. Malmesbury learned August 12 that a 
treaty between France and Portugal had been signed at Paris by which 
Portugal agreed to assume a position of neutrality in any war between 
France and England, and not to permit more than six ships of either 
nation in her ports during the continuance of that war.§ This treat)'^ 
was disavowed when it was forwarded to lyisbon, but in the meantime 
it had greatly angered the English government. Grenville instructed 

'^ Dropmore, III, 343. 

fThe reports sent to England, of the conversations between Ellis and Pein, and 
later between Malmesbury and Maret, are given in Dropmore. Comparing these 
with the reports made by Ellis to Malmesbury (as given in Malmesbm-y) , it is evi- 
dent that the accounts sent to Grenville were carefully edited. In the following 
illustration the portions enclosed in parentheses were in the original report by Ellis 
to Malmesbury, while the report as actually sent to Grenville is to be read by 
omitting the enclosed portions. Ellis said "that the Cape (I was very sure, was not 
an object of profit to any nation ; that it was necessary, like Ceylon, for the pres- 
ervation of our territory ; and that, from the little I had heard on the subject, I saw 
no reason for believing that we attached such importance to it as to let it stand 
in the way of the attainment of any great national object, but that it) was ours at 
present, and that he had not heard a shadow of reason why we should part with it. 
I^astly, that our demand of Cochin was only in return for Negapatnam, which was, 
he conceived, of much higher value to the Dutch. Here le Pein said, (with much 
eagerness, " Vous m'^tonnez beaucoup. Oh,) si vous vouliez rendre le Cap, je suis 
bien persuade qu'il ne tiendrait qu'a vous de signer la paix dans quinze jours." 
Malmesbury, III, 470-471, and Dropmore, III, 348. It is evident that the omissions 
in the report to Grenville were made solely because the full conversation would 
have given ground for a new controversy with Pitt. Many such omissions are found 
by comparing Malmesbury and the Dropmore MSS., and most of them were made 
for similar reasons. 

t Malmesbury to Canning. Malmesbury, III, 465. 

§ Malmesbury to Grenville, Aug. 14, 1797. Idid., 461. 



64 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

Malmesbury that England could not submit to any such stipulation, 
and that articles in regard to it must be inserted in the treaty to be 
signed at Lille.* At the same time Grenville exhibited resentment to 
a published declaration by the Directory to the effect that England was 
delaying peace negotiations, and ordered Malmesbury to hand in a 
formal note demanding an explanation. The instructions in both of 
these cases revealed a temper and an attitude little likely to be of aid 
in procuring peace. Pitt also wrote to Malmesbury in regard to the 
Portuguese treaty in much the same sense as had Grenville, but in 
gentler language. f He made no mention, however, of the Directory's 
declaration. Malmesbury ventured to disobey his instructions, in that 
he did not present a formal note of complaint, but merely talked over 
with the French negotiators the declaration in question. | He was also 
greatly vexed at the stand taken by England in regard to the Portu- 
guese treaty, thinking that the consideration of it might well have been 
delayed in the interests of the conference at Lille. On August 29 he 
wrote to Canning, " I consider the Portuguese peace, from the manner 
in which it has been taken up, as an event very likely to break off the 
Negotiation, "§ and Canning himself was of the same opinion. || 

Malmesbury in fact could no longer remain blind to the change 
taking place in the temper of the English government and wrote again 
to Canning on the same day : 

' ' You must have perceived that the instructions and opinions I get 
from the Minister under whose .orders I am bound to act, accord so little 
with the sentiments and intentions I heard expressed by the Minister 
with zvhom I wish to act, that I am placed in a very disagreeable 
dilemma. If I do not conform to my instructions, I am guilty of 
diplomatic mutiny ; if I do strictly and up to the letter of them, I am 
guilty of what is worse, by lending myself to promote a measure I 
think essentially wrong. ' ' Tl 

He then states that he is of course perfectly ready to resign his own 
opinion as to the best method of securing peace, and declares : 

' ' But if another opinion has been allowed to prevail — if the real 
end is to differ from the ostensible one — and if I am only to remain here, 
in order to break ojff the Negotiation creditably, and not to tenm?iate it suc- 
cessfully, I then, instead of resigning my opinion, must resign my 

*Aug. 19, 1797. Malmesbury, III, 489. 
tAug. 19, 1797. Ibid., 491. 

:f Malmesbury to Grenville and to Canning, Aug. 22, 1797. Ibid., 494, 497. 
%Ibid., 512. 
\lbid., 516. 

^The language of Grenville's despatches had, in fact, convinced the French 
Directory that England did not desire peace. Barras, II, 520. 



THE NEGOTIATIONS AT tlLLE. 65 

office. • • • • I hope, after all, I may be wrong in my misgivings, 
and that the war party in the Cabinet have not surprised the religio?i of 
the pacific one." * 

Malmesbury was in a state of excited distrust not customary with 
him, for on the same day, August 29, he wrote still a third letter to 
Canning : " For Heaven's sake, do not let the only person in England, 
perhaps in Europe, who seeing right can act with effect, be seduced 
to wander from the principle he laid down two months ago." That 
these letters were intended for Pitt's eye is shown by the concluding 
sentence : "I never object to anything being shewn to Pitt • • • • 
I do not write to him, because I could say nothing I have not said to 
you. ' ' t Three days later Malmesbury talked the matter over with ElHs 
and noted in his diary Pitt's "weakness in regard to Lord Grenville." % 

Although the policy of the war party in the English Cabinet was not 
yet predominant to the extent feared by Malmesbury, it was at least so 
far victorious as to render Pitt unwilling to risk a direct challenge of 
authority. On August 29 Canning informed Malmesbury that an offi- 
cial approval of his violation of instructions in not handing in a formal 
note of complaint to the French negotiators would have been sent to 
him " if I had been quite sure myself, or if the one person with whom 
I consulted upon the subject could have answered it to me, that a 
thorough approbation of this omission would be given • • • • j 
vehemently feared, and so did my opposite neighbour [Pitt] ,§ that the 
warlike spirit was too strong in that quarter [Grenville' s] to expect a 
perfect acquiescence. "|| It is thus evident that though Grenville was 
still hampered by the controversy with Austria as to the payment of the 
loans, Tf he had succeeded in forming a party in the Cabinet stoutly an- 
tagonistic to peace, and one whose strength was daily increasing. The 
temper of the country was also steadily rising, and there is some reason 
for thinking that Pitt, recognizing his weakness in the Cabinet, had 
already determined to sacrifice his opinion to Grenville ' s . Malmesbury ' s 
three letters of August 29 must have reached London by September 4, at 
the latest,** and, had Pitt now been in earnest to fulfil his first instruc- 
tions to Malmesbury, it is certainly presumable that either he or Can- 
ning would have hastened to relieve Malmesbury' s uncertainty and agita- 
tion. Pitt did finally write to Malmesbury on September 1 1 that ' ' on the 

* Malmesbury, III, 517. 

■\Ibid., 518. 

%Ibid., 521. 

§ Pitt and Canning lived in opposite houses on the same street. 

II Malmesbury, III, 520. 

I Grenville to Morton Bden, Sept. 8, 1797. Dropmore, III, 369. 

** The time usually required in transit was from two to four days. 



66 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

main points in question in the Negotiation my opinions remain unalter- 
ably what I stated to you in our last conversation ; that, on that hne, I 
shall at all events act, and WioX collateral difficulties may, I think, always 
be overcome by a mixture of firmness and temper. ' ' * And again on 
September 14 he wrote to Malmesbury : " On all material points in the 
whole of ^--our negotiation, my opinion will remain unaltered (though 
my hopes are rather more sanguine), and my ultimate determination 
will be what I think you know."t These letters would constitute 
excellent evidence of Pitt's firmness of determination, if it were not for 
the fact that between the probable date of the receipt of Malmesbury's 
letters, September 3 or 4, and the date of Pitt's first letter, September 
1 1 , news had reached London of the conclusion of the struggle in Paris 
in the overthrow on September 4 of the peace faction, and the victory 
of Barras, Rewbell, and the war party. J If Maret's analysis of the 
situation was correct, and of this neither Malmesbury nor Pitt had any 
doubt, all hope of peace through the negotiations at Lille was destroyed 
by the coup d" itat of the i8th Fructidor in Paris. Moreover, the hope 
expressed by Pitt in his letter of September 14 referred to a secret nego- 
tiation unknown to Malmesbury, in which Pitt believed the way open 
to the purchase of a favorable peace by the bribery of Barras, and not 
to any confidence felt in the probable outcome at Lille. In the light 
of Pitt's failure to reply to Malmesbury until after the knowledge of 
events in Paris had reached him, his letters seem indeed the assertions 
of a man who, knowing his original plan defeated, was yet, owing to 
an event foreign to the ground upon which that defeat had been sus- 
tained, fortunately able to assert the fixity and integrity of his purpose. 
The new government in Paris quickly brought the negotiation at 
Lille to an end. Maret and his colleagues were at once recalled, and 
two new negotiators appeared in their stead with a demand so insolent 
and extreme that Malmesbury had no other option than to refuse it. 
Ignoring the results of all previous conferences, the new French diplo- 
mats insisted that as a preliminary to any negotiation whatever, Malmes- 
bury must state explicitly whether or not he was " authorized to treat 
on the principle of a general restitution of every possession re?)iaini?ig in 
His Majesty's hands, not only belonging to them [the French] , but to their 
Allies. ' ' § An immediate answer was required, and Malmesbury'-, recog- 

' Malmesbury, III, 554. 

■\ Ibid., 560. 

X The news reached Londou by September 9, at least. See Malmesbury to Gren- 
ville, Sept. 9, 1797, and Grenville to Malmesbury, Sept. 11, 1797. Dropmore, III, 
370, 372. 

§ Malmesbury to Grenville, Sept. 17, 1797. Malmesbury, 111,562. 



THE SECRET PROPOSAL OF PEACE. 67 

nizing the futility of further pacific overtures, sought merely to direct 
the conferences into such a channel as would display the honor and 
dignity of his government to the disadvantage of France. In this, 
thanks to his superiority in diplomatic maneuvering, he was entirely 
successful and forced the French diplomats to state their proposals in 
terms most unreasonable and in manner most offensive, while English 
honor and sincerity were sustained in Malmesbury's proud refusal to 
disclose his instructions. Grenville was elated at this outcome, writ- 
ing to Buckingham, " The Directory have done everything they could 
to play our game. ' ' * Malmesbury, on his arrival in England, was 
surprised to find a complete change in the temper of the public, and 
that in the Cabinet nearly every one rejoiced f that the negotiations 
had been broken off, while Pitt himself seemed relieved. | Malmesbury 
was convinced by several conversations with Grenville that he had been 
correct in his early suspicion of Grenville's attitude, and that the latter 
was ' ' invariably against peace from the beginning. ' ' § 



THE SECRET PROPOSAL OF PEACE. 

August 10 to October, 1797. 

During the period immediately subsequent to Maret's secret pro- 
posals of delay, another and still more secret negotiation was begun in 
I/ondon. In this also Grenville, exhibiting now grudging acquiescence, 
now stubborn refusal, played an important part in determining the 
final outcome. The London proposal apparently had no connection 
whatever with that of Maret at Lille, save as the French agents em- 
ployed in the former made use of their knowledge of what was taking 
place at Lille to convince Pitt of their relations with the French gov- 
ernment and hence of their ability to sell peace to England. Before 
Malmesbury left England a man named Potter had suggested to the 
government in London that peace on favorable terms to England might 
be assured if a secret bribe were paid to certain members of the Direc- 
tory. Potter claimed to be authorized to conduct such a transaction, 
but his offer was not seriously considered. Later, on August 22, 

*Sept. 20, 1797. Court and Cabinets, II, 383. 

t Malmesbury's diary, Sept. 20, 1797. Malmesbury, III, 580. 

jSept. 27, 1797. Ibid., 591. 

§ Oct. 4, 1797. Ibid., 595. Lord Ashburton, in writing of these events in 1845, 
speaks of " the desponding view of affairs taken both by him [Pitt] and Canning, 
checked by the dogged obstinacy of Grenville." Croker, II, 238. 



68 THE INFI^UENCE OF GRENVILtE ON PlTT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

Malraesbury wrote a long letter to Grenville,* describing a visit paid 
him by one Melville, who brought forward a similar suggestion, stating 
that he was acting for Barras, but who also, like Potter, could not pro- 
duce any proof of the authenticity of his offer. Malmesbury thought 
these overtures were but intrigues in some stock-jobbing operation, 
yet considered them of suf&cient importance to report them in detail to 
Grenville. He also received from Maret the information that both 
Barras and Rewbell were venal, f though Maret did not believe Mel- 
ville authorized to make the proposal in question. Melville proceeded 
to IvOndon and there laid his project before Pitt himself, t Pitt was at 
first suspicious, but becoming convinced that Melville was really com- 
missioned by Barras, wrote Grenville to that effect, § and wrote also to 
the King on September 6, saying : 

" The sum he names is a very large one, amounting to four hundred 
and fifty thousand pounds ; but it seems not to be more than would be 
wisely employed if he can make good what he proposes as the condition 
previous to its being paid, namely, that the treaty shall be signed and 
ratified without delay, leaving this country in possession of the Cape, 
Cejdon, Cochin, and Trinidad, and exacting nothing in return. • • • • 
The sum might without material difficulty, it is conceived, be supplied in 
part from the territorial revenues of India, and the remainder from secret 
service, without the necessity of ever disclosing the transaction." || 

Pitt proposed to conduct this remarkable transaction through the 
medium of Malmesbury at Lille, but before the arrangement could be 
perfected the rupture of negotiations at that place had occurred. Gren- 
ville appears to have had no connection as yet with these overtures, 
except that he was kept informed of them by Pitt. Probably he did 
not choose to oppose them, because he did not believe them to be 
authentic, but when later in September an offer of a similar nature 
came through a much more responsible channel, he was roused to state 
his disapproval and to use his skill in criticism. Mehdlle's offer had 
included so large a concession to England as to seem preposterous. 
The offer that now came through Boyd, a prominent banker, was limited 
to a cession of Ceylon and the Cape, while the bribe demanded was 
increased to ^2,000,000, or ;j^i,2oo,ooo for Ceylon alone. H Pitt could 
not hope to withdraw secretly so large a sum from the revenues, and 

* Dropmore, III, 356. 

t Malmesbury to Grenville, Aug. 22, 1797. /did., 35S. 

jPitt to Grenville, Aug. 28, 1797. Ibid., 360. 

§Sept. 2, 1797. /did., 368. 

\\ /bid., 369. 

ii The letters in Dropmore, considered alone, have caused the editor of the MSS. 
to confuse slightly two distinct offers. See letter quoted, p. 69, note *, from Stan- 
hope. 



THE SECRET PROPOSAL OF PEACE. 69 

Stated to the King that he had ' ' distinctly explained to the person 
through whom the proposal comes, that enough must be stated to Par- 
liament, in order to procure the grant of the money, to satisfy them 
that it was really employed for secret service on the Continent, with a 
view to the settlement of peace. ' ' * On October 7 the affair had reached 
a point where Pitt, acting with Dundas, but with no other member of 
the Cabinet, despatched to Paris a virtual acceptance of the proposal. 
On the same day Pitt informed Grenville that " the offer (if it is real) 
seemed both to Dundas and me so tempting, and the time pressed so 
much to an hour (lest an answer should be given in the interval to our 
last note which would preclude all chance) that we did not hesitate to 
desire Boyd to write to his correspondent immediately to the purport 
of the enclosed memorandum." f Grenville immediately replied : "I 
cannot deny to you that the whole of that transaction is so disagree- 
able to mj^ mind that I am very glad to have been saved the necessity 
of deciding upon it." He then, while not specifically opposing the 
purchase of peace, further states his own feeling : 

" I shudder at what we are doing, and believe in my conscience that, 
if this country could but be brought to think so, it would be ten thou- 
sand times safer (and cheaper too, which they seem to consider above 
all other things) to face the storm, than to shrink from it. And above 
all I dread the loss of consideration which must, I fear, infallibly result 
from any mode oi purchashig our safety, and such this is, and will be 
felt to be, let us say or do what we will." % 

Having thus expressed his own convictions, Grenville brought for- 
ward in the same letter a criticism of the terms of the memorandum 
so hastily forwarded by Pitt through Boyd. He pointed out in par- 
ticular that the memorandum promised that Malmesbury would be sent 
back to lyille, "with no other security for his future treatment than 
results from the private understanding established," and that, in case 
of the very possible failure to conclude peace, this could but result in 
humiliation and dishonor to England. He urged then, as all-essential 
to any public renewal of negotiations, some public official declaration 
from France to enable Malmesbury to return to lyille. The point was 
well taken, and Pitt at once recognized its importance, while time and 
reflection made him less inclined to hasty action. § When, therefore, 
on October 17, a reply to Pitt's memorandum arrived at I,ondon 
still secretly promising all that was desired, but still unaccompanied 

* Pitt to George III, Sept. 22, 1797. Stanhope, III, Appendix, p. vn. 

t Dropmore, III, 377. 

jOct. 8, 1797. Ibid., 378. 

§ Pitt to Gren\nlle, Oct. 13, 1797. Ibid., 380. 



70 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

by any "ostensible act on the part of the French Government to justify 
lyord M [almesbury] 's return," the exact point upon which Lord Gren- 
ville had insisted, Pitt altogether lost confidence in the intrigue and 
urged Grenville to hasten the preparation of a public resume of the 
negotiations at Lille.* 

From this time no further thought was given to ideas of peace, but 
every energy was directed toward a vigorous preparation for national 
defense and the continuation of the war. Though the actual result 
of the negotiations at Lille had been decided rather by the outcome 
of the conflict in Paris than by any decided change in Pitt's own senti- 
.ments, Grenville, by his sturdy opposition and skillful maneuver- 
ing, had prevented Pitt trom expanding his original concessions to 
France, had saved him from a dangerous trap in the secret overtures, 
and had revived the spirit of the Cabinet. The dignity and honor 
with which England emerged from the negotiations, due primarily to 
the proud tone of Grenville' s official despatches, proved of great service 
to the government both in Parliament and with the public. Pitt's 
ministry was never stronger. Grenville quietly resumed his former 
predominance in the determination of foreign policy, while the old 
conditions of friendly intercourse and confidence with his chief were 
at once renewed. 

*Pitt to Grenville, Oct. i8, 1797. Dropmore, III, 381. It is stated by Stan- 
hope (III, 61) that the offers came from Barras, but no sufl&cient proof of this has 
ever been produced. In Barras's Memoirs (II, 576) mention is made of " Potter the 
Englishman ' ' who has just come from London, July 20, 1797. Potter seems to have 
been a French spy. Such a man was hardly likely to have been entrusted with the 
offer in question. Maret believed Melville to be of like character, and a mere in- 
triguer, planning things he had no authority to propose. Malm^sbury to Grenville, 
Aug. 22, 1797. Dropmore, III, 356. The offer through Boyd bore more marks of 
authenticity, because of the character of the person employed, but taken all together 
no positive assertion that Barras was implicated is possible. 



THK RKSUIvTS OP GRENVIIylvE'S VICTORY. 7 1 



THE RESULTS OF GRENVILLE'S VICTORY. 

Malmesbury's estimate of the changed sentiment of the English 
nation was not a mistaken one. The resume of the I^ille negotiations, 
drawn up by Grenville and presented to Parliament November 3, was 
received with favor,* and the government now bent all its energies 
toward preparation for a continuance of the war with France. An 
address to the throne, November 8, pledged the British nation to unre- 
mitting hostility to the expansion of French power, and in the attend- 
ant debate Grenville stood forward as the great champion of patriotic 
England. His speech f contained no word of regret for the failure of 
peace negotiations ; he rejoiced, rather, that now at last all men must 
see the desperate determination of France to overthrow the constitu- 
tion and law of England. Pitt's speech in the Commons on Novem- 
ber ID was much less vigorous ; but while ' ' lamenting and deploring 
the failure to secure peace, he acknowledged that he had gone too far 
in his original offer to France and explicitly stated that he could not 
now regard that peace as honorable which involved a retrocession 
of all that England had acquired. J The address to the throne was 
passed in both houses without division § and was soon followed by the 
preparation of measures intended to arouse the inherent patriotism 
of the people, to appeal to the nation in fact as France had appealed 
to its people, but on different lines and for a different purpose. The 
organization of the volunteer forces was the first step which was taken 
in this direction, and its great popularity furnished excellent proof 
of the political wisdom of Grenville' s stubborn opposition to peace. 
In his own department Grenville resumed his customary activity in 
diplomatic correspondence, interest in which had lagged during the 
negotiations at Lille. 

* Pari. Hist., XXXIII, 906-962. This resume contained most of the official 
despatches and correspondence relating to Lille, but omitted all mention of the 
part played by Maret. 

■\Ibid., 979. . , , J. -u t^ 

Xlbid., 987-1025. Pitt was disturbed and chagrmed by a preceding speech by 
Earl Temple, Buckingham's son and Grenville's nephew, who, posmg as an inde- 
pendent, rejoiced that the negotiation had been broken ofE, and approved ot 
those measures which have been taken, when we were in the scrape, to extricate 
us from it " (p. 995). This had importance solely because of Temple's relationship 
with Grenville, and Pitt devoted a good part of his own speech to denying that any 
such measures had been taken. 

§ F{« and Sheridan were still absenting themselves from Parliament. 



72 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

With the disappearance of the probability of peace, uew overtures 
were made to Russia and received from her.* The death of Frederick 
William II and the accession of a new monarch in Berlin created tem- 
porary hopes of a change in Prussian sentiment. f Even Austria hinted 
at a renewal of alliance with England. |' In other and more positive 
ways the English position was greatly improved. The naval mutiny 
was over, and Duncan's victory off Camperdown, October ii, had re- 
vived the confidence of England in her warfare at sea. New French 
attempts on Ireland and risings in England itself had alike proved 
abortive. The crop prospects were unusuallj^ favorable. The very 
reaction from the first wave of panic tended to arouse the nation and 
to restore its vigor. It needed but some aggressive act of the French 
government to create that unanimity of English opinion for which 
Grenville hoped, and this France did not long delay to supply. In 
January, 1798, the government of Holland was remodeled to suit the 
new conditions in France ; in February the Papal States were attacked, 
while in April occurred the most irritating blow of all and the one 
least possible of defense by the partisans of peace, when France over- 
threw the ancient constitution of Switzerland and practically incorpo- 
rated that country within her own frontiers. At the same time the 
opposition in Parliament lost its vigor and cohesion. Fox and Sheri- 
dan, who had been absenting themselves from Parliament for some 
months past, and thus protesting against the ' ' arbitrary conduct of 
the government," resumed their seats in December, 1797, for the pur- 
pose of attacking Pitt's new tax scheme, but found their arguments 
considered unpatriotic in the light of these new French aggressions. 
On April 22 Sheridan, moved thereto by the attack upon Switzerland, 
came forward in a brilliant speech, in which he acknowledged that 
the defense of England must now take precedence over every other 
question. Fox more slowly and much later reached the same decision. 
For the moment there was no essential opposition to Pitt's govern- 
ment. Parliament and nation alike were united by a wave of patriotic 
enthusiasm for war.§ 

After April, 1798, the policy of the English government was, as Pitt 
in his speech of November 10, 1797, had himself asserted, fixed in the 

* Woronzow to Grenville, Nov. 10 and Dec. 12, 1797. Dropmore, III, 391, 403. 

t George III to Grenville, Dec. 23, 1797, and Grenville to George III, Dec. 29, 
1797. Ibid., 405, 407. 

J Woronzow to Grenville, Nov. 17, 1797, and Grenville to George III, Dec. 29, 
1797. Ibid., 395, 407. 

§ Even Miles thought war now justifiable, writing to NichoUs on April 10, 1798, 
"France leaves us no alternative between ruinous dishonorable concession and 
eternal warfare." Miles, II, 293. 



THE RESULTS OF GRENVILLE'S VICTORY. 73 

determination not to consent to a peace that did not permit the reten- 
tion by England of some of her conquests during the progress of the 
war. This was based on the theory that compensations were due for 
the continental acquisitions of France. The definite adoption of that 
policy, from which Pitt did not thereafter waver, was due in fully as 
great a degree to the long- continued insistence of Grenville as to the 
aggressions of France. Its maintenance was a victory for Grenville 
and constitutes the best general evidence of his later influence. Thus 
the conclusion of the negotiation at lyille furnishes a logical halting 
place in an examination of Grenville' s importance in Knglish foreign 
policy, for with that event Grenville' s advice, hitherto alternately ac- 
cepted and discarded, became a permanent determining factor. Gren- 
ville' s war policy became Pitt's policy, and as such has been regarded 
in history as the most distinguished feature of Pitt's administration. 

Reviewing briefly the conditions of Grenville' s influence, it appears 
that the inception of his importance in foreign affairs was due to the 
opportunities of service that came to him from his intimacy and per- 
sonal friendship with Pitt. The ability and wisdom with which he 
conducted isolated diplomatic missions led Pitt to repose a large confi- 
dence in his general diplomatic intelligence and to respect his sugges- 
tions on broad questions of foreign policy. Until 1791, then, Gren- 
ville acted in the capacity of private adviser to his chief, but was in no 
sense determining the line of policy pursued. After that date — taking 
office on a sharp and distinct reversal of a former project, the armed 
intervention in the Turkish war — Grenville, who more than any other 
one person was responsible for the adoption of peaceful measures, 
assumed the control and directed the business of the Foreign Office. 
Thus the isolation of England from 1791 to 1793 was largely the result 
of Grenville' s influence. 

Before the outbreak of war with France no difference of opinion 
arose within the English Cabinet, for both Pitt and Grenville believed 
in the possibility and in the wisdom of neutrality ; but as it became 
evident that war was inevitable, Grenville was less dismayed than Pitt 
at the prospect. In the conduct of the war itself several disagreements 
arose, in some of which, as in the wording of the manifesto of October, 

1793, the plan of recovering Prussian aid by territorial concessions in 
1796 and 1797, and the difficulties placed in the way of Malmesbury's 
two negotiations, Grenville' s influence was predominant, while in others, 
as in the first Prussian subsidy of 1793 and the purpose to renew it in 

1794, as well as in the genuine offers of peace made to France, Pitt dis- 
played his personal desires and attempted to execute them in spite of 



74 the; influence of GRENVILLE on PITT'S FOREIGN POLICY. 

Grenville's objections. But it is to be noted that, taken as a whole, 
Grenville's war policy was that which England followed. This in- 
volved two main ideas : first, to maintain coalitions against France in 
order to reduce French influence and to restore the balance of power 
in Europe; second, to seek English colonial expansion as a compensa- 
tion for the continental aggrandizement of France. These two points 
are customarily stated as the essentials of Pitt's own policy, when in 
fact Pitt, in his desire to secure peace at almost any price, would in 
1796 have sacrificed the first entire, and in 1797 was ready to yield all but 
the shadow of the second. Canning's estimate of the struggle between 
Cabinet factions and his statement of the ascendancy of Grenville * 
sustains the impression which is created by a study of the Dropmore 
manuscripts. Pitt, after 1797, heartily accepted Grenville's war policy, 
but it was due to Grenville rather than to Pitt that in the earlier years 
of the conflict England assumed and persevered in that line of conduct 
which later rose to the dignity of a national principle. 

* See ante, p. 60. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. 



The references cited in the body of the work are here arranged in 
alphabetical order under the subtitle used in the foot-notes. The prin- 
cipal source is the new collection of letters known as the ' ' Dropmore 
Manuscripts." Whenever possible, all other references have been 
tested by it. 

In a study having for its main object the personal relations and in- 
fluence of two men it was inevitable that the memoirs of contempora- 
ries should be used largely. The caution with which such sources 
must be cited has been kept constantly in mind, and they have been 
cited only in cases where comparison with the Dropmore Manuscripts 
proves the credibility of the incidents stated, or where the citations 
serve to bring out the personal attitude or impression of the writers. 
The secondary authorities have been used merely either to authenticate 
well-established incidents essential to a logical statement of events or as 
supplementary proof. 

AuCKiyAND. The journal and correspondence of William, Lord Auckland. 4 vols. 
London : 1861-1862. 
William Eden, afterward l,ord Auckland, was on a diplomatic mission in Paris from 178510 1788 
and represented England at The Hague from 1790 to 1793. His correspondence is therefore impor- 
tant for the formation of the Triple Alliance of 1788, for the Russian armament of 1791, and for the 
events leading up to and including the outbreak of war in 1793. 

Baii,i,eu. Preussen und Frankreich von ijg§ bis iSoy. Diplomatische Correspon- 
denzen, herausgegeben von Paul Bailleu. 2 vols. Leipzig : 1881-1887. 

Barras. Memoirs of Barras. Edited by George Duruy. 4 vols. New York : 
I 895-1 896. 
The compilation of these memoirs, long after the events treated, renders them of doubtful 
service, and they have been used here only as supplementary evidence. 

BouRGOiNG. Histoire diplomatique de V Europe pendant la revolution frangaise. 
Par Fran9ois de Bourgoing. 4 vols. Paris : 1865- 1886. 
Bourgoing is now considered an antiquated work, but well-authenticated data are sometimes 
found in it not elsewhere cited. His sources were limited as compared with those at the service 
of more recent historians. 

BuRGES. Selections from the letters and correspondence of Sir fames Bland Surges. 
Edited by James Hutton. London: 1885. 
Burges was Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs under both IvCeds and Grenville. His 
letters are especially important for the change of English policy in 1791, which brought about the 
resignation of I<eeds and the advancement of Grenville, but they have been so edited as to furnish 
a readable book rather than a valuable historical source, and extracts of correspondence must 
therefore be checked from other works. 

(75) 



76 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVILLE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POUCY. 

Burke's Works. The worksof Edmund Burke. Bohn edition. 6 vols. London: 
1868. 

Chari^emont MSS. 

Vol. I. British Historical Manuscripts Commission. Twelfth Report. 

Appendix, Part X. 
Vol. II. British Historical Manuscripts Co^mnission. Thirteenth Report. 
Appendix, Part VIII. 
The first volume covers the period from 1745 to 1783, while the second extends to 1799. The 
Earl of Charlemont's letters cover a wide range of subjects, but are chiefly literary and political, 
while his correspondents included many of the most distinguished men of his time. These 
volumes are mainly valuable in the present study for the side-lights thrown on men and events 
and in the description of conditions and parties in Ireland during the earlier years of the French 
Revolution. This latter consideration is of importance in a study of Cabinet difficulties in 
England. 

Court and Cabinets. Memoirs of the court and cabinets of George HI. By the 
Duke of Buckingham. 4 vols. London : 1853-1855. 
Consists almost wholly of letters between Grenville and his brother, the Duke of Buckingham. 
These are of great value as frequently indicating Grenville's real opinion and purpose, where 
official letters are expressed in more guarded language. 

Croker . The correspondence and diaries of the late Right Honourable fohn Wilson 
Croker. Edited by Louis J. Jennings. 2 vols. New York : 1884. 
After his retirement from active political life, Croker was much given to collecting from men 
of prominence narratives of obscure incidents in the diplomatic history of the French Revolution. 
A few of these have been cited in the study as supplementary evidence. 

UEBRETT. A collection of state papers relative to the war against France. 1 1 vols. , 
first edition. Published at London from 1794 to 1802. 
This collection was issued as a private enterprise, and contains many documents not elsewhere 
obtainable, together with many private letters from the scene of war. The documents cannot be 
taken as authoritative without comparison with official sources, some wholly fictitious pieces 
being included. Some of these very fictitious pieces are, however, important, as explaining refer- 
ences in memoirs and letters by men who drew their information from Debrett. 

. The despatches of Earl Gower. June, 1790, to August, 1792. Edited 

by Oscar Browning, i vol. Cambridge, England : 1885. 
Earl Gower was the English representative at Paris in the period indicated. His despatches 
are therefore valuable in a study of the events leading to war, and have also been used in con- 
nection with the Nootka .Sound controversy. 

Dropmore. Volume I. British Historical Manuscripts Commission. Thirteenth 
Report, Appendix, Part III. 

Volume II. British Historical Manuscripts Commission. Fourteenth 

Report. Appendix, Part V. 
Volume III. British Historical Manusa'ipts Commission. Fifteenth Re- 
port. "J. B. Fortescue MSS., III." 
The collection appears as a " Report on the Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue, Esq., preserved at 
Dropmore." It coutains principally the private and secret letters passing between Grenville and 
diplomatic agents at foreign courts, letters between Grenville and Pitt on government questions, 
and letters between Grenville and George III. Very few of these have been previously published, 
and all of them are of the greatest importance in a study of English diplomacy during the period 
covered. Volume I, published in 1892, covers the period from 1698 to 1790 and is chiefly concerned 
with the affairs of Thomas Pitt, governor of Madras, though it contains the first part of the Gren- 
ville letters. Volume II appeared in 1893 and carries the correspondence up to 1795, while in vol- 
ume III, published in 1899, these letters are continued to December 31, 1797. As the report 
numbers and titles of the publications follow no uniform system, the references here given are 
to volume aud page of the subtitle used, "The Dropmore Manuscripts." 



BIBI.IOGRAPHY. 



77 



Ei/ivioT. Life and letters of Sir Gilbert Elliot. 3 vols. London : 1874. 

Elliot's importance in this study lies iu his relations with Burke and with Portland and in his 
service in Corsica as governor of that island. His observations on public men were usually 
shrewd and his comments illuminating, while his attitude on Pitt's peace negotiations is im- 
portant, since he entered the service of the government because of his belief in the necessity of 
combating the French Revolution. 

GuSTAVE III. Collection des ecrits politiques, littSraires et dramatiques de Gus- 
tave III. 5 vols. Stockholm: 1804-1805. 
This is of value in connection with the relations of Sweden and the Triple Alliance of 1788 and 
again in 1791. The more interesting relations of Gustavus III and the court of France have no 
bearing in this study. 

; — . History of the late revolution in the Dutch Republic. Anon3'mous. 

London : 1789. 
A resume written by George Ellis immediately after the events leading up to the Triple Alliance 
of 1788. Ellis was long the confideutial friend of Harris, afterward Earl of Malmesbury, and 
accompanied him on many of his diplomatic missions. This account is the best, from the English 
point of view, of the public causes of the revolution in Holland. 

Keith. Memoirs and correspondence of Sir Robert Murray Keith. 2 vols. Lon- 
don : 1849. 
Keith represented England at Vienna at the time of the Russian armament of 1791 and was one 
of the negotiators of the Austrian-Turkish peace of Sistovo. His letters are valuable iu connec- 
tion with the resignation of Leeds, the involved diplomacy of Leopold II, and also for his intimate 
acquaintance with Ewart, the English representative at Berlin, revealing the latter's disgust with 
Grenville's diplomacy. 

Koch. Histoire abrigee des traitts de paix. Par C. G. de Koch et M. vS. F. Schoell. 
15 vols. Paris : 1817-1818. 

LECky. a histojy of England in the eighteenth century. By William E. H. 
Lecky. 8 vols. New York : 1S78-1890. 

Leeds. The political ^memoranda of Francis, Fifth Duke of Leeds. Edited by 
Oscar Browning. Camden Society, 2d series, vol. 35, 1884. 

M ALMESBUR Y. Diaries and correspondence of fames Harris, first Earl of Malmes- 
bury. 4 vols. London : 1844. 
Malmesbury was Pitt's favorite agent in diplomacy from 1788 to 1797. These volumes are espe- 
cially important in this study iu connection with the Triple Alliance of 1788, the Prussian subsidy 
of 1 793-1794, the attempt to recover Prussian aid in 1795, the peace negotiations at Paris in 1796, 
and those at Lille in 1797. The conrespondence in Malmesbury is published iu the form of extracts, 
thus somewhat lessening its value as a source and rendering it impossible to rely upon it alone. 
Most of Malmesbury's letters and despatches to England may, however, be checked word for word 
by reference to the Dropmore Manuscripts or to the Parliamentary History, and this has been 
done in every important instance. Very few cases of important difference have been found, and 
where found these have been pointed out in the foot-notes. In general it may be said that Malmes- 
bury as a source has been taken by historians too much at his face value, insufficient care having 
been taken to discover his exact and often hidden meaning. He was by habit diplomatically indi-. 
rect, even in his most intimate letters. 

Maret. Maret, Ducde Bassano. Par Baron Ernouf. i volume edition. Paris: 
1878. 
A superficial monograph, used in this study only as supplementar\' proof in connection with 
Maret's part in the negotiations at Lille. 

M ASSON. Le d^partement des affaires Hrangh-es pendant la Revolution , 1787-1S04. 
Par Frederic Masson. Paris : 1877. 
Useful for exact dates and well-established facts, as well as for general estimates of French 
diplomats. 



78 THE INFLUENCE OF GRENVIIvLE ON PITT'S FOREIGN POIvICY. 

Miles. The correspondence of W. A. Miles on the French Revolution, lySg-iSiy. 
Edited by C. P. Miles. 2 vols. London : 1890. 
Miles's importance lies in his secret use by Pitt in the Nootka Sound controversy of 1790, and 
his enthusiasm for the French Revolution. This enthusiasm made him desirous of peace with 
France, and constituted him an influence upon Pitt in that direction. Miles held no ofi&cial posi- 
tion, but was an influential publicist, though not always a correct exponent of public opinion. 

Morris. The diary and letters of Gouverneur Morris. Edited by Anne Cary 
Morris. 2 vols. New York : 1888. 
These letters, written from Paris in the earlier years of the French Revolution, and later from 
various European courts, furnish brilliant descriptions of contemporary men and events. They 
are not wholly trustworthy, for Morris had a vivid imagination ; but in this study Morris plays 
an important though brief part as confidential adviser and agent of Grenville in the latter's 
effort to secure a Prussian alliance in 1796. 

Oscar Browning. "England and France in 1793." By Oscar Browning. 
Fortnightly Review. February, 1883. 

A critical examination of the diplomatic incidents preceding the French declaration of war, 
based on the documents in the English archives. 

P.\Ri<. Hist. The Parliamentary histoiy of England front the earliest period to 
the year 1803. 36 vols. London: 1806-1820. 

Records Austria. 49. Volume 49 of British Foreign Office Records foi- Austria. 

The Records themselves being inaccessible, no use of them has been attempted in general, and 
in fact the letters given in Dropraore amply supply the necessary information for a purely per- 
sonal study of the relations of Pitt and Grenville. But in one instance the references in the 
letters were so blind as to require a transcript of the actual instructions. This was in the case 
of Hammond's mission to Vienna and Berlin in 1797. 

Rose. Diaries and correspondence of the Hon. George Rose. 2 vols. London : 
i860. 
Rose acted for many years as Pitt's confidential secretary, but the inexactness with which his 
papers have been edited greatly limits their usefulness. Dates are frequently lacking and the 
letters are usually merely extracts. Rose has therefore been used in this study onlj' as sup- 
plementary evidence. 

ScHivOSSER. History of the eighteenth century. By F. C. Schlosser. Translated 
by D. Davison. 8 vols. London : 1843-18.52. 

Schlosser is violently anti-British and his sources are limited, but he is of value in depicting 
conditions in the minor German states. 

Smith MSS. British Historical Mantiscripts Commission. Twelfth Report. Ap- 
pendix, Part IX. 

The notes and letters comprised in this brief collection consist of the papers of Joseph Smith, at 
one time private secretary to Pitt. They are of value in elucidating Pitt's secret diplomacy in the 
case of Nootka Sound, and in the steps leading to Malmesbury's peace mission of 1796. 

SoREL. V Europe et la revolution frangaise. Par Albert Sorel. 5 vols. Paris: 
I 885-1 903. 

Sorel is justly regarded as the great authority on the diplomacy of Europe during the French 
Revolution. In this study, however, he has been cited only in support of statements of fact in 
non-English diplomacy, for his knowledge of English documents is apparently very limited. In 
many cases, where he is guilty of absolute error in his statement of English purpo.ses and acts, it 
has been thought worth while to prove that error in the foot-notes. And in general the entire 
thesis maintained by Sorel in regard to the relations of England and France in 1796 and 1797 is 
denied by the conclusions reached in this study. 



BIBIvIOGRAPHY. 79 

Sparks. The life of Gouvemeur Morris. By Jared Sparks. 3 vols. Boston: 1832. 

Contains some letters between Morris and Grenville not given either in the Dropmore Manu- 
scripts or in Morris's Diaries. 

Stanhopk. Life of the Right Honourable William Pitt. By Earl Stanhope. 4 
vols. lyondon : 1861-1862. 
The best long biography of Pitt with much intim.ate knowledge of men and events. 

SYBEiy. Histoire de V Europe pendant la revolution frangaise. Par H. de Sybel, 
Traduit par Marie Dosquet. 6 vols. Paris : 1869-1887. 

WiCKHAM. The correspondence of the Right Hon. William Wickham. From the 
year 1794. 2 vols. I/ondon : 1870. 
wickham was for several years Grenville's most trusted agent in Switzerland, and foremost in 
intrigues with the Royalists of France. His importance in this study is in connection with the 
various peace proposals, in showing Grenville's energy in war, and in uniting the threads of Eng- 
lish and Austrian diplomacy. 



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